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Science should be based on… 
“try today and be less wrong tomorrow” 
rather than 
“be right at all times and if you are even 
momentarily wrong….. 
than death to you” 
 
Rufus Hound 
The Infinite Monkey Cage Podcast 
 05 July 2016 
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1.3 Overview 
In fulfilling the requirements for the Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology), 
this bound volume represents work completed at: 
a) National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS),  
b) Western Sydney Public Health Unit (WSPHU), and  
c) Communicable Diseases Branch (CDB), NSW Health.  
 
The National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) is 
located within the Kids Research Institute (KRI) at Westmead Children’s Hospital. 
It is somewhat hidden away from the children’s hospital, and no easier to 
navigate internally once you find the building on your first day. During my two 
years there, I was part of the Coverage, Evaluation and Surveillance (CES) 
Program Stream, which met monthly to discuss achievements and deliverables of 
the group. As an active member, I was encouraged to keep the group up to date 
on my progress throughout my MAE journey.  
The Western Sydney Public Health Unit (WSPHU) is located at Cumberland 
Hospital adjacent to Westmead Children’s Hospital. I spent two weeks at the 
PHU, observing and assisting wherever possible. I helped with a measles 
outbreak, including contract tracing, interviewing people, maintaining clinical line 
lists, informing high-risk people of a measles-clinic and assisting medical staff 
during the running of the measles-clinic. During this emergency response, all 
high-risk people (including pregnant mothers and newborn babies) were 
contacted and provided with appropriate prophylaxis to prevent illness. During my 
time there, I was also very fortunate to lead a Salmonella outbreak investigation 
(Chapter 3). 
The Communicable Diseases Branch (CDB) is located in the Ministry of Health 
building in North Sydney. I spent almost four months there conducting the 
epidemiological investigation (Chapter 4). During my time at the CDB, I attended 
staff meetings, afternoon debriefs, surveillance meetings and an in-house 
emergency response workshop. I was also very fortunate to be funded to attend 
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the OzFoodNet whole genome workshop in Melbourne. I also assisted with two 
Legionella outbreaks, where I helped to maintain line-lists and the Sit-Rep, and 
attended the afternoon meetings, where I was asked to take, transcribe and 
distribute minutes of meeting from time to time. I truly enjoyed my experience at 
the CDB, NSW Health.  
 
1.4 Summary of my public health experience 
1.4.1 Analysis of a public health dataset (Chapter 2) 
In November 2005, hepatitis A vaccine was funded under the Australian National 
Immunisation Program for Indigenous children aged 12-24 months in the targeted 
jurisdictions of Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory. I reviewed the epidemiology of hepatitis A from 2000-2014 using data 
from the Australian National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, the 
National Hospital Morbidity Database, and Australian Bureau of Statistics causes-
of-death data. Overall, the national hepatitis A immunisation program has had a 
significant impact in the targeted population with relatively modest vaccine 
coverage, with evidence of substantial herd protection effects. 
 
1.4.2 Outbreak Investigation (Chapter 3) 
During May 2015, an increase in Salmonella Agona cases was reported from 
western Sydney, Australia. I present the public health actions used to investigate 
and control this increase. A descriptive case-series investigation was conducted. 
Six outbreak cases were identified; all had consumed cooked tuna sushi rolls 
purchased within a western Sydney shopping complex. Onset of illness for 
outbreak cases occurred between 7 April and 24 May 2015. Salmonella was 
isolated from food samples collected from the implicated premise and a 
prohibition order issued. No further cases were identified following this action. In 
addition, this outbreak investigation also demonstrated genomics-enhanced 
public health action, where whole genome sequencing significantly enhanced the 
resolution of the epidemiological investigation. 
Chapter One  Introduction 
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1.4.3 Epidemiological investigation (Chapter 4)  
Among adults, pneumococcal pneumonia causes significant mortality and 
morbidity. While the funding of polysaccharide pneumococcal vaccines have 
reduced the incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) in older people, 
uncertainty remains regarding their effectiveness against reducing the 
hospitalisation rate due to community acquired pneumonia. In this study I use 
linked-data to document that approximately one in seven hospital admissions 
coded for pneumococcal pneumonia in older people of NSW were due to invasive 
pneumococcal disease. The remaining six hospital admissions were presumptive 
non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia cases. I also documented significant 
declines in the rate and severity of hospitalisations over time due to presumptive 
non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia. The pneumococcal polysaccharide 
vaccine that was used for adults has not been consistently shown to be effective 
against non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia hospitalisations, while the 
conjugate vaccine used in the children program has provided substantial indirect 
protection against IPD to adults. The results presented here could impact on 
cost-effectiveness of pneumococcal vaccine programs in Australia. 
 
1.4.4 Evaluation of a surveillance system (Chapter 5) 
The AusVaxSafety enhanced active surveillance system was established in 2014 
and has two main functions. Firstly, to gather near real-time data of AEFI 
following seasonal influenza vaccination of children aged between six months 
and five; secondly, to collate, interpret and disseminate these results in near real-
time to stakeholders and the public. AusVaxSafety was evaluated to assess the 
usefulness of the information collected; identify strengths and limitations; and 
provide feedback to stakeholders regarding recommendations to the system. 
During the 2015 influenza season, the AusVaxSafety successfully demonstrated, 
in real-time, that influenza vaccines registered for used in children aged six 
months to five years were safe, well tolerated, and that the AEFIs experienced 
were within expected ranges. 
 
Chapter One   Introduction 
 
6 | P a g e  
 
1.5 Oral presentations 
1. Sources of Infant Pertussis Infection in the United States; NCIRS Journal 
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Australia: 2000-2014. Vaccine 2017; 35: 170-176. 
8. Craig Thompson, Qinning Wang, Shopna Bag, Neil Franklin, Craig 
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Kirsty Hope. Epidemiology and whole genome sequencing of an ongoing 
point-source Salmonella Agona outbreak associated with sushi 
consumption in western Sydney, Australia 2015. Epidemiol Infect 2017; 
145: 2062-2071.
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2.3 Prologue 
2.3.1 Background 
As I write this, I am taken back to my first day as an MAE scholar. Four hours 
after arriving at the National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance 
(NCIRS), I was asked to attend an emergency Communicable Diseases Network 
Australia (CDNA) teleconference that had been organised to discuss the 
outbreak of hepatitis A and frozen berries. After the two hour teleconference, I 
remember thinking that I was going to have to increase my treading of water in 
order to keep my head above the waterline. It also became obvious that the MAE 
was the right direction for me and I was going to enjoy this new educational path 
as an epidemiologist-in-training.  
 
2.3.2 My role 
I was the principal investigator and analyst for this chapter. I was responsible for 
liaising with Ms Han Wang (statistician and data manager at NCIRS) to obtain 
access to the datasets and supporting data dictionaries. I cleaned the data, 
merged data and conducted all of the analyses. I conducted the literature review 
for this chapter, generated all tables and figures, liaised with co-authors during 
preparation of the manuscript to ‘Vaccine’, formatted the manuscript for the target 
journal, submitted the manuscript as lead-author and drafted the responses to 
peer-reviewers. 
 
2.3.3 Lessons learned  
Before starting this project at NCIRS, I was very fortunate to have had some 
experience conducting a major data analysis project during my PhD candidature. 
However, this data analysis was my first introduction to Stata. Throughout this 
project I learned many valuable skills including data cleaning, creating and 
validating variables, cross-tabulation, and conducting descriptive analyses and 
incidence rate ratios. I now have a much better understanding of count data and 
Poisson analyses.  
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I learned how to properly document a data analysis project, especially when 
using multiple datasets. This approach included completing an analysis plan, 
writing and annotating do-files, and maintaining log files in Stata so that detailed 
records were kept throughout. At the completion of this analysis, I definitely have 
a much better understanding of Stata and how to write syntax, with these new 
skills transferable to my new career as an epidemiologist. 
Furthermore, I now have a much better understanding of hepatitis A disease, its 
epidemiology in Australia, and the benefits of the targeted immunisation program 
upon the Indigenous people of Australia. 
  
2.3.4 Public Health impact 
This impact evaluation of the hepatitis A vaccination program in Australia is an 
important review of a highly effective targeted program. Due to an excessive 
burden of disease in Indigenous people, hepatitis A vaccine became funded 
under the Australian National Immunisation Program (NIP) for all Indigenous 
children aged 12 to 24 months residing in Queensland, South Australia, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory during November, 2005. Historically, targeted 
vaccine programs in Australia have somewhat failed to deliver the desired 
results. For example, the initial strategy for hepatitis B vaccination was a program 
targeting infants born to chronic carrier mothers; however, this was expanded to 
universal vaccination for all infants from 2000. Here I present a good news story 
that demonstrates that a targeted vaccination program can work, with evidence of 
the significant impact that the hepatitis A immunisation program has had in the 
Indigenous population of Australia. 
Originally this report was to complement the Australian vaccine preventable 
disease epidemiological review series published in Communicable Diseases 
Intelligence (CDI). However, as the manuscript developed, it became obvious 
that the results were of public health significance, in particular to the Indigenous 
people of Australia, and for the success of a targeted vaccine program; it was 
agreed that we should target a higher impact journal with a wider target audience, 
such as ‘Vaccine’. 
Chapter Two  Data Analysis 
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Since this refocus of target journals, the results have been formatted and 
submitted for peer-review at ‘Vaccine.’ Minor comments from the peer-review 
have been received, addressed and resubmitted. This manuscript has been 
accepted for publication and is currently in press.  
In addition, results of this data analysis were presented at the recent Public 
Health Association of Australia (PHAA) 15th National Immunisation Conference, 
held in Brisbane 7-9 June, 2016 (Appendix 2.1). Together, the presentation at 
PHAA and publication will make this data more accessible to those who rely on 
current information, including policy makers of the hepatitis A vaccine schedule in 
Australia.  
 
2.3.5 Acknowledgements 
Emily Fearnley, Frank Beard and Aditi Dey took the lead supervisory roles during 
this project. I am very grateful to Benjamin Polkinghorne at the Australian 
Government Department of Health, Helen Quinn and Peter McIntyre at NCIRS 
and Katrina Roper and Kerri Viney at ANU for their technical guidance, thoughtful 
review and feedback during the development of this chapter and the manuscript 
to ‘Vaccine’.  
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2.4 Abstract  
In November 2005, hepatitis A vaccine was funded under the Australian National 
Immunisation Program for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Indigenous) 
children aged 12-24 months in the targeted jurisdictions of Queensland, South 
Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory.  
I reviewed the epidemiology of hepatitis A from 2000-2014 using data from the 
Australian National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, the National 
Hospital Morbidity Database, and Australian Bureau of Statistics causes-of-death 
data. The impact of the national hepatitis A immunisation program was assessed 
by comparison of pre-vaccine (2000-2005) and post-vaccine time periods (2006-
2014), by age group, Indigenous status and jurisdiction using incidence rate 
ratios (IRR) per 100,000 population and 95% confidence intervals (CI). 
The national pre-vaccine notification rate in Indigenous people was four times 
higher than the non-Indigenous rate, and declined from 8.41 per 100,000 (95% CI 
5.03 – 11.79) pre-vaccine to 0.85 per 100,000 (95% CI 0.00 – 1.99) post-vaccine, 
becoming similar to the non-Indigenous rate. Notification and hospitalisation rates 
in Indigenous children aged <five years from targeted jurisdictions declined in the 
post-vaccine period when compared to the pre-vaccine period (notifications: IRR 
= 0.07; 95% CI 0.04 – 0.13; hospitalisations: IRR = 0.04; 95% CI 0.01 – 0.16). 
Notification rates also declined in Indigenous people aged five to 19 (IRR = 0.08; 
95% CI 0.05 – 0.13) and 20 to 49 years (IRR = 0.06; 95% CI 0.02 – 0.15) in 
targeted jurisdictions. For non-Indigenous people from targeted jurisdictions, 
notification rates decreased significantly in children aged <five years (IRR 0.47; 
95% CI 0.31 – 0.71), and significantly more overall (IRR = 0.43; 95% CI 0.39 – 
0.47) compared to non-Indigenous people from non-targeted jurisdictions (IRR = 
0.60; 95% CI 0.56 – 0.64). 
The national hepatitis A immunisation program, with relatively modest vaccine 
coverage, has achieved a significant impact in the targeted population with 
evidence suggestive of substantial herd protection effects. 
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2.5 Acronyms  
ABS  Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACT  Australian Capital Territory  
CDNA  Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
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NCIRS National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance 
NHMD  National Hospital Morbidity Database 
NIP   National Immunisation Program 
NNDSS  National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
NSW  New South Wales 
NT  Northern Territory 
QLD  Queensland 
SA  South Australia 
TAS  Tasmania 
USA  United States of America  
VIC  Victoria 
WA  Western Australia 
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2.6 Introduction  
Hepatitis A causes significant morbidity globally, affecting approximately 120 
million people annually1, with the incidence of disease usually inversely 
correlated with level of sanitation and access to safe drinking water.2-4 With 
improved sanitation and living conditions in Australia, the annual notification rate 
of hepatitis A has declined from 123 notifications per 100,000 population in 1961 
to 1 per 100,000 population in 2014.5,6 A number of person-to-person and 
foodborne outbreaks of hepatitis A have occurred in Australia over the past 
twenty years, including very large outbreaks associated with raw oysters (1997) 
and semi-dried tomatoes (2009).7-15  
Hepatitis A vaccine was first registered for use in Australia in 1994 and has since 
been recommended for high-risk groups.16 In response to an increasing number 
of hepatitis A cases and the death of three Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
(henceforth referred to as Indigenous) children in north Queensland, a hepatitis A 
immunisation program commenced in February 1999 for all Indigenous children 
in this region. North Queensland has a population of approximately 600,000 
people, of which 1.2% are Indigenous children aged under five years.17,18 Two 
doses of hepatitis A vaccine were scheduled at 18 and 24 months of age, and 
catch-up vaccination recommended for children less than six years of age.16,17 
Following implementation of the north Queensland program, a rapid decline in 
hepatitis A notifications was reported in the Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
populations.17  
In November 2005, hepatitis A vaccine was funded under the Australian National 
Immunisation Program (NIP) for all Indigenous children aged 12 to 24 months 
residing in four of the eight states and territories of Australia, namely 
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, due 
to a high risk of acquiring hepatitis A and resulting hospitalisation.16 Two doses 
were originally scheduled at 12 months and 18 months of age in the Northern 
Territory and Western Australia, and at 18 and 24 months of age in Queensland 
and South Australia, changing to 12 and 18 months of age in all four jurisdictions 
in July 2013.16,19 Over the period 2006 to 2010, decreases in hepatitis A 
notifications in the Indigenous Australian population was reported.20 These 
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decreases in targeted jurisdictions occurred in the context of relatively modest 
hepatitis A vaccination coverage in Indigenous children before 36 months of age, 
with two-dose coverage increasing from 31% in 2007 to 60% in 2013, and one-
dose coverage at 71% during 2013.19,20 
The aim of this study was to review the epidemiology of hepatitis A in Australia 
from 2000 to 2014, focusing on the impact of the national hepatitis A 
immunisation program on both the directly targeted population (Indigenous 
children in the targeted jurisdictions) and broader herd protection effects 
Australia-wide.  
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2.7 Methods 
2.7.1 Study design and study period 
I undertook a descriptive epidemiological study with comparison of notifications 
and hospitalisations in the period before (2000 to 2005) and after (2006 to 2014) 
the introduction of the targeted hepatitis A immunisation program in Australia.  
 
2.7.2 Data sources  
Notifications 
Confirmed and probable cases of hepatitis A are notifiable to the National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) under the public health 
legislation of each jurisdiction.21 A confirmed case of hepatitis A requires either 
laboratory deﬁnitive evidence (detection of hepatitis A virus by nucleic acid 
testing [added to the confirmed case definition in January 2013]); or laboratory 
suggestive evidence (detection of hepatitis A-specific immunoglobulin M 
antibodies in the absence of recent vaccination [moved from definitive evidence 
to suggestive evidence in January 2013]) plus clinical evidence; or laboratory 
suggestive evidence plus epidemiological evidence (contact between two people 
involving a plausible mode of transmission at a time when one of them is likely to 
be infectious and the other has an illness that started within 15 to 50 days after 
this contact and at least one case in the chain of epidemiologically linked cases is 
laboratory conﬁrmed).22 A probable case requires clinical evidence plus 
epidemiological evidence.22  
For this analysis, notification data included all confirmed and probable cases of 
hepatitis A from the NNDSS with an onset date between 1 January 2000 and 31 
December 2014. For cases with no recorded onset date, I used the earliest 
recorded date among the fields of date of specimen, date of notification, and date 
when the notification was received. Variables extracted comprised onset date, 
age, sex, jurisdiction of residence, Indigenous status, place of acquisition, 
whether died from disease, and vaccination status. The analysis of the ‘place of 
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acquisition’ data field was restricted to the years 2010 to 2014, where data 
completeness was 80% or greater. 
 
Hospitalisations 
The National Hospital Morbidity Database (NHMD) is an administrative database 
maintained by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. Private and public 
hospital discharge summaries are used to capture data relating to administrative, 
demographic and clinical information on patients hospitalised in Australia.21 Using 
the International Statistical Classification of Disease and Related Health 
Problems, 10th Revision, Australian Modification (ICD-10-AM) code B15 (hepatitis 
A), all eligible hospital admissions coded as hepatitis A (either as the principal or 
other diagnosis) and with an admission date between 1 January 2000 and 31 
December 2013 (latest data available) were included in this analysis.  
Variables extracted comprised primary or other diagnosis, date of admission, 
age, sex, jurisdictions of residence, Indigenous status, length of stay (bed days) 
and mode of separation from hospital. Jurisdiction of residence and age specific 
hospitalisation data were only available between 1 January 2000 and 30 June 
2012. 
 
Mortality  
Mortality data related to hepatitis A were obtained from the NNDSS, NHMD and 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). ABS causes of death data included in 
this analysis were deaths due to hepatitis A (ICD-10: code B15) as the primary 
underlying cause, for deaths registered between 2007 and 2011 (latest data 
available). 
 
Population estimates 
National, jurisdictional, age-specific and Indigenous-specific mid-year estimates 
of resident population sizes were obtained from the ABS.23  
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2.7.3 Data analysis  
I compared notification and hospitalisation rates for two time periods, i.e. before 
the introduction of the hepatitis A targeted immunisation program (pre-vaccine 
2000-2005) and after (post-vaccine 2006-latest available data), and for targeted 
(Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory) and 
non-targeted (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital 
Territory) jurisdictions. In this analysis, missing Indigenous data was included in 
the 'non-Indigenous and others' category, which will be referred to as 'non-
Indigenous' for the rest of the chapter.     
Notification and hospitalisation rates were calculated using ABS population 
estimates as the denominator and are presented as age-specific, jurisdiction-
specific, or Indigenous-specific subpopulation rates per 100,000 population. 
Descriptive statistics included median age (and range) and average length of 
hospital stay. Place of acquisition for Indigenous and non-Indigenous people was 
compared and tested for significance using a Fisher’s exact test. Age-specific 
incidence rate ratios (IRR), 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) and p-values were 
calculated for Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations at the national level, 
and for targeted and non-targeted jurisdictions, assuming a Poisson distribution. 
If the 95% CI for any age-specific or total IRR did not overlap with the 
corresponding comparison group, this was considered evidence of a difference 
beyond that expected from random variation. Analyses were conducted using 
STATA software (version 13.1; StataCorp, College Station, Texas USA). 
Geo-mapping of hepatitis A notifications during the pre-vaccine (2000-2005) and 
post-vaccine (2006-2014) time periods were created using ArcGIS Online (2016; 
http://www.arcgis.com/home/index.html; Esri, Redlands CA, USA). Notifications 
were plotted using the post codes of residence variable; data points were 
included if they represented a cluster of three or more cases.  
Ethical approval was not required as de-identified non-reidentifiable data 
collected in the course of routine public health surveillance was used for the 
analysis. 
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2.8 Results 
2.8.1 Overarching trends 
A total of 5,096 hepatitis A notifications were recorded in the NNDSS between 
January 2000 and December 2014, of which 5,004 (98%) were confirmed and 92 
(2%) were probable cases. The overall national notification rate declined from 
4.25 per 100,000 in 2000 to 0.97 per 100,000 in 2014, with a nadir of 0.65 per 
100,000 in 2011. The national notification rate in Indigenous people declined from 
8.41 per 100,000 (95% CI 5.03 – 11.79) during the pre-vaccine period to 0.85 per 
100,000 (95% CI -0.28 – 1.98) during the post-vaccine period, while the 
notification rate in non-Indigenous people declined from 2.24 per 100,000 (95% 
CI 1.22 – 3.25) pre-vaccine to 1.17 per 100,000 (95% CI 0.71 – 1.63) post-
vaccine.  
In the NHMD, 3,398 hospitalisations with a diagnosis that included hepatitis A 
were recorded between January 2000 and December 2013. The overall national 
hospitalisation rate declined from 2.31 per 100,000 in 2000 to 0.89 per 100,000 in 
2013, with a nadir of 0.53 per 100,000 in 2012. The national hospitalisation rate 
in Indigenous people declined from 4.23 per 100,000 (95% CI 3.52 – 4.94) during 
the pre-vaccine period to 1.09 per 100,000 (95% CI 0.46 – 1.73) during the post-
vaccine period, while the hospitalisation rate in non-Indigenous people declined 
from 1.45 per 100,000 (95% CI 0.95 – 1.96) pre-vaccine to 0.87 per 100,000 
(95% CI 0.62 – 1.13) post-vaccine. Of the 3,398 hospitalisations, 1,781 (52%) 
had hepatitis A identified as the primary diagnosis, with a median length of stay of 
three days for these 1,781 hospitalisations (range: one – 55 days). 
Eight deaths (age range five – ≥ 65 years) were recorded by the ABS between 
2007 and 2011 with hepatitis A as the primary underlying cause (data available 
for post-vaccine period only); six of these deaths were of people aged ≥ 65 years. 
Fewer deaths were recorded in the other data sources; NNDSS (2000 to 2014) 
and NHMD (2000 to 2013) captured five deaths each. Matching of deaths 
between data sources was not possible using the data fields available. 
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2.8.2 Age and sex distribution 
The median age of notified and hospitalised hepatitis A cases in Australia was 
similar between the pre-vaccine (notifications: 28 years, range 0 – 93; 
hospitalisations: 41 years, range 0 – 93) and post –vaccine periods (notifications: 
27 years, range 0 – 97; hospitalisations: 41 years, range 0 – 97). Overall, 6.9% of 
notified and 2.7% of hospitalised cases were aged less than five years. The 
average male to female notification ratio was 1.61:1 (range 1.16:1 - 2.54:1) in the 
pre-vaccine period, and 1.21:1 (range 0.95:1 - 1.47:1) in the post-vaccine period. 
 
2.8.3 Indigenous status 
Between 2000 and 2014, 6% (326/5096) of people notified with hepatitis A were 
recorded as Indigenous, 77% (3895/5096) as non-Indigenous and 17% 
(875/5096) as unknown or missing Indigenous status. Completeness of this data 
field was higher for the targeted jurisdictions (87% complete; 1803/2073) than 
non-targeted jurisdictions (80% complete; 2418/3023). Of people hospitalised 
with hepatitis A between 2000 and 2013, 6% (196/3398) were recorded as 
Indigenous, 92% (3137/3398) as non-Indigenous and 2% (62/3398) as unknown 
or missing Indigenous status. Between January 2000 and June 2012, 
completeness of this data field was slightly higher for the non-targeted 
jurisdictions (99% complete; 1877/1899) than targeted jurisdictions (97% 
complete; 1118/1158).  
 
2.8.4 Vaccination status 
Of all notifications (N= 5096), 13 (0.3%) were reported as fully vaccinated (three 
during the pre-vaccine period and ten during the post-vaccine period), 36 (0.7%) 
as partially vaccinated (four during the pre-vaccine period and 32 during the post-
vaccine period), and 5047 (99%) were of unknown vaccination status (where 
unknown vaccination status included 'missing' and 'not vaccinated' data). 
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2.8.5 Place of acquisition 
Of the 882 notifications with a recorded place of acquisition between 2010 and 
2014, 72% (638/882; annual range 56% - 87%) were acquired overseas. 
Common places of overseas acquisition included the Oceania region (15.2% 
[134/882]), southern-east Asia (17.1% [151/882]) and southern-central Asia 
(21.3% [188/882]). The proportion of hepatitis A notifications acquired overseas 
was significantly higher in non-Indigenous people (73%; 636/874) than in 
Indigenous people (25%; 2/8) (p>0.05). 
 
2.8.6 Jurisdiction  
Targeted jurisdictions (Queensland, Northern Territory, South Australia and 
Western Australia) 
In the targeted jurisdictions, notifications dropped from 411 in 2000 (rate 2.2 per 
100,000) to 73 in 2014 (0.3 per 100,000), and hospitalisations from 188 in 2000 
(1.0 per 100,000) to 24 during the first half of 2012 (0.1 per 100,000). Prior to the 
introduction of the national hepatitis A immunisation program Indigenous people 
residing within targeted jurisdictions had an 11.6 times higher notification rate 
(13.85 vs. 1.19 per 100,000) and a 3.9 times higher hospitalisation rate (6.20 vs. 
1.61 per 100,000) of hepatitis A than Indigenous people residing within non-
targeted jurisdictions (Table 2.1).  
The notification rate in Indigenous people residing within targeted jurisdictions 
declined by 93% overall (IRR = 0.07; 95% CI 0.05 – 0.10) in the post-vaccine 
period. Age-specific declines were also identified; 93% for the less than five years 
age group (IRR = 0.07; 95% CI 0.04 – 0.13), 92% for the five to 19 years age 
group (IRR = 0.08; 95% CI 0.05 – 0.13) and 94% for the 20-49 years age group 
(IRR = 0.06; 95% CI 0.02 – 0.15). The overall notification rate in non-Indigenous 
people declined by 57% (IRR = 0.43; 95% CI 0.39 – 0.47), and by 51% for the 
less than five years age group (IRR = 0.49; 95% CI 0.33– 0.73) (Table 2.1).  
Hospitalisations in Indigenous people declined by 82% overall (IRR = 0.18; 95% 
CI 0.12 – 0.27). Age-specific declines were also identified; 96% for the less than 
five years age group (IRR = 0.04; 95% CI 0.01 – 0.16), 82% for the five to 19 
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years age group (IRR = 0.18; 95% CI 0.09 – 0.40) and 63% for the 20-49 years 
age group (IRR = 0.37; 95% CI 0.20 – 0.66). In non-Indigenous people the overall 
hospitalisation rate declined by 46% (IRR = 0.54; 95% CI 0.48 – 0.62) (Table 
2.1).  
The largest decreases in notification and hospitalisation rates were in the 
Northern Territory (88% and 86%, respectively) and Western Australia (70% and 
64%, respectively) (Figure 2.2). The geo-mapped decrease of notifications is 
depicted in Figure 2.3. 
 
Non-targeted jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the 
Australian Capital Territory) 
Notifications in Indigenous people residing in non-targeted jurisdictions declined 
by 53% (IRR = 0.47; 95% CI 0.23 – 0.95) in the post-vaccine period. An age-
specific decline of 68% was identified for the five to 19 years age group (IRR = 
0.32; 95% CI 0.11 – 0.95), while there were no notifications in children aged less 
than five years during the entire study period. Notifications in non-Indigenous 
people declined by 40% (IRR = 0.60; 95% CI 0.56 – 0.64). No significant 
reduction was identified in the non-Indigenous less than five years age group 
(IRR = 0.96; 95% CI 0.69 – 1.33) (Table 2.1).  
Hospitalisations in Indigenous people declined by 30%, however, this was not 
statistically significant (IRR = 0.70; 95% CI 0.38 – 1.27). Hospitalisations in non-
Indigenous people declined by 33% (IRR = 0.67; 95% CI 0.61 – 0.73) (Table 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1: Targeted and non-targeted hepatitis A notification* and hospitalisation# 
rates of Australia, by Indigenous status, age group and year  
(continue on next page) 
 
 
a)  Notification rates for targeted jurisdictions^ 
 
b) Notification rates for non-targeted jurisdictions~    
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c) Hospitalisation rates for targeted jurisdictions^ 
 
d) Hospitalisation rates for non-targeted jurisdictions~ 
*Notifications: January 2000 - December 2014 
# Hospitalisations: January 2000 - June 2012 
^ Targeted jurisdictions: Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory 
~ Non-targeted jurisdictions: New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital 
Territory 
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Table 2.1: Hepatitis A notifications and hospitalisations, by age group, Indigenous 
status and pre-/post- vaccine period, Australia, 2000 – 2014; rates, counts and 
incidence rate ratios (95% CI) 
a) Targeted jurisdictions: Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia 
and the Northern Territory 
  Pre-vaccine (2000-2005) Post-vaccine * Incidence Rate Ratio# 
 Age 
group 
(years) 
Non-
Indigenous^ 
(N) 
Indigenous^ 
(N) 
Non-
Indigenous^ 
(N) 
Indigenous^ 
(N) 
Non-Indigenous 
(95% CI) 
Indigenous 
(95% CI) 
 
N
o
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
s 
<5 2.09 (55) 33.91 (90) 0.99 (46) 2.41 (10) 0.49 (0.33-0.73) 0.07 (0.04-0.13) 
5-19 2.24 (194) 18.37 (120) 1.33 (185) 1.46 (16) 0.59 (0.48-0.73) 0.08 (0.05-0.13) 
20-49 3.30 (604) 6.13 (48) 1.30 (404) 0.38 (5) 0.39 (0.35-0.45) 0.06 (0.02-0.15) 
50-64 1.63 (116) 2.36 (3) 0.66 (88) 0.81 (2) 0.41 (0.31-0.54) 0.29 (0.05-1.73) 
≥65 1.01 (52) 0.00 (0) 0.35 (33) 0.98 (1) 0.34 (0.22-0.52) – 
Total 2.44 (1021) 13.85 (261) 1.04 (756) 1.08 (34) 0.43 (0.39-0.47) 0.07 (0.05-0.10) 
H
o
sp
it
al
is
at
io
n
s 
<5 0.19 (5) 16.99 (45) 0.26 (9) 0.62 (2) 1.45 (0.49-4.33) 0.04 (0.01-0.16) 
5-19 0.54 (47) 5.26 (35) 0.43 (44) 1.04 (8) 0.82 (0.54-1.23) 0.18 (0.09-0.40) 
20-49 1.95 (359) 4.51 (35) 0.89 (200) 1.72 (16) 0.46 (0.39-0.55) 0.37 (0.20-0.66) 
50-64 1.53 (108) 1.54 (2) 0.88 (87) 0.00 (0) 0.61 (0.46-0.81) – 
≥65 1.76 (91) 0.00 (0) 0.94 (65) 0.00 (0) 0.55 (0.40-0.76) – 
Total 1.45 (610) 6.20 (117) 0.77 (405) 1.15 (26) 0.54 (0.48-0.62) 0.18 (0.12-0.27) 
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b) Non-targeted jurisdictions: New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the 
Australian Capital Territory 
  Pre-vaccination (2000-2005) Post-vaccination * Incidence Rate Ratio# 
 Age 
group 
(years) 
Non-
Indigenous^ 
(N) 
Indigenous^ 
(N) 
Non-
Indigenous^ 
(N) 
Indigenous^ 
(N) 
Non-Indigenous 
(95% CI) 
Indigenous 
(95% CI) 
 
N
o
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
s 
<5 1.21 (55) 0.00 (0) 1.23 (92) 0.00 (0) 0.96 (0.69-1.33) – 
5-19 2.21 (319) 1.96 (10) 1.79 (393) 0.57 (5) 0.81 (0.70-0.94) 0.32 (0.11-0.95) 
20-49 2.89 (907) 1.09 (6) 1.43 (720) 0.70 (7) 0.50 (0.46-0.56) 0.67 (0.23-1.99) 
50-64 1.12 (133) 0.00 (0) 0.77 (164) 0.86 (2) 0.69 (0.55-0.87) – 
≥65 1.07 (102) 2.07 (1) 0.64 (107) 0.00 (0) 0.59 (0.45-0.78) – 
Total 2.12 (1516) 1.19 (17) 1.25 (1476) 0.55 (14) 0.60 (0.56-0.64) 0.47 (0.23-0.95) 
H
o
sp
it
al
is
at
io
n
s 
<5 0.18 (8) 1.48 (3) 0.23 (12) 0.00 (0) 1.28 (0.52-3.14) – 
5-19 0.53 (77) 0.81 (4) 0.61 (99) 0.28 (1) 1.18 (0.87-1.58) 0.20 (0.02-1.80) 
20-49 1.79 (562) 2.50 (14) 1.01 (383) 2.08 (15) 0.60 (0.52-0.68) 0.88 (0.42-1.82) 
50-64 1.56 (185) 0.90 (1) 1.15(177) 1.99 (4) 0.76 (0.62-0.93) 2.67 (0.30-23.88) 
≥65 2.22 (211) 2.34 (1) 1.19 (142) 0.00 (0) 0.54 (0.44-0.67) – 
Total 1.45 (1043) 1.61 (23) 0.94 (813) 1.10 (20) 0.67 (0.61-0.73) 0.70 (0.38-1.27) 
 
*Post-vaccine period- Notifications: January 2006- December 2014; Hospitalisations: January 
2006- June 2012  
# Comparison of pre- and post-vaccine periods 
^ average annual rate per 100,000 total population 
N= number of cases 
bold IRR denote significant reductions (p-value < 0.05) 
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Figure 2.2: Hepatitis A notification and hospitalisation rates by jurisdiction, and 
pre-/post- vaccine period, Australia, 2000 to 2014  
 
a) Notification rates in pre-vaccine period 2000-2005 and post vaccine period 
2006-2014 
 
b) Hospitalisation rates in pre-vaccine period 2000-2005 and post vaccine 
period 2006-2012 
Non-targeted: NSW- New South Wales; VIC.- Victoria; ACT- Australian Capital Territory; TAS- 
Tasmania 
Targeted: NT- Northern Territory; QLD- Queensland; SA- South Australia; WA- Western Australia  
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Figure 2.3: Geo-mapping of hepatitis A notifications in Australia using post codes 
of residence 
 
a) Notifications in pre-vaccine period 2000-2005 
 
b) Notifications in post vaccine period 2006-2014  
Non-targeted: NSW- New South Wales; VIC.- Victoria; ACT- Australian Capital Territory; TAS- 
Tasmania 
Targeted: NT- Northern Territory; QLD- Queensland; SA- South Australia; WA- Western Australia 
Cluster point represented by three of more cases  
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2.9 Discussion  
Significant declines in hepatitis A notification and hospitalisation rates (93% and 
96%, respectively) between the pre- and post-vaccine periods were observed in 
the population directly targeted by the national hepatitis A immunisation program 
in Australia, that being Indigenous children aged less than five years residing in 
targeted jurisdictions. The program also appears to have provided substantial 
herd protection to both the Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations aged five 
to 49 years within targeted jurisdictions. Notification rates declined in the post-
vaccine period by 92% for the five to 19 years Indigenous age group, and by 94% 
for the 20 to 49 years age group, compared to 68% and 33%, respectively, in 
non-targeted jurisdictions, with the decrease being significantly different to the 
non-targeted jurisdictions for the latter age group. In non-Indigenous people, the 
notification rate in targeted jurisdictions decreased by 51% for children aged less 
than five years, and by 57% overall, with the overall decrease being significantly 
different to the overall decrease in non-targeted jurisdictions.  
These decreases in targeted jurisdictions occurred in the context of relatively 
modest hepatitis A vaccination coverage in Indigenous children.24,25 Young 
children play a key role in the transmission of hepatitis A to other children and 
adults, as they are usually asymptomatic (or only mildly symptomatic) and have 
lower levels of personal hygiene.17,18,26 Significant, albeit lower, decreases in 
hepatitis A notifications were also observed between the pre- and post-vaccine 
periods in both Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations in non-targeted 
jurisdictions (53% and 40%, respectively). These decreases may also be partly 
attributable to the targeted national immunisation program given the extensive 
population movement of Indigenous people between states and territories of 
Australia.27  
The national targeted hepatitis A immunisation program appears to have been 
highly effective at reducing the incidence of disease in Australia. However, the 
descriptive nature of this study makes it difficult to quantify the exact contribution 
of this program. Of note, the funding of a hepatitis A immunisation program in 
north Queensland from 1999 (with estimated two-dose coverage of 77% in the 
Indigenous birth cohort for the year 200017) may have led to an underestimation 
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of the true impact of the national targeted program. Other factors, including the 
targeted immunisation of high-risk groups (such as travellers to hepatitis A 
endemic areas, and people with an increased risk of exposure to hepatitis A 
based on their occupation or lifestyle) as recommended in the Australian 
Immunisation Handbook16, may also have contributed to the declines Australia-
wide. However, available information indicates that hepatitis A vaccination 
coverage of adults in high-risk groups such as travellers to hepatitis A endemic 
areas, although recommended since 1994, is relatively low.28,29  
More general limitations of this data are that hepatitis A notifications may 
underestimate true incidence, particularly in young children, and may be 
influenced by changes in case definition, diagnostic and public health follow-up 
practices over time and across jurisdictions. In particular, the national hepatitis A 
case definition was amended in January 2013, changing the definitive laboratory 
evidence required to confirm a case from serology to the more specific nucleic 
acid testing, and changing serology to laboratory suggestive evidence requiring 
clinical or epidemiological evidence to confirm a case. False positive IgMs occur 
with serology, particularly in the elderly population and in the presence of other 
infectious agents. Therefore, the test should only be performed in patients with a 
clinical picture of hepatitis A. The impact of the amended case definition on 
notification data is unclear but could mean that during the final years of this 
investigation we could have overestimated the impact of the targeted vaccination 
program, with fewer cases (i.e. fewer false positive cases) included in the 
analysis resulting from a more specific case definition. 
Hospitalisation data can be influenced by access to hospital care, changes in 
admission practices and coding error. Also, given that only 52% of cases have 
hepatitis A identified as the primary diagnosis, we could have overestimated 
hospitalisation by using all diagnostic fields coded for hepatitis A, as we cannot 
be as sure about the actual contribution of hepatitis A to that hospitalisation. The 
accuracy of hospital coding could be significantly improved by the linking of 
hospitalisation data with the notification dataset, as core data in the NNDSS 
dataset would help to clarify the case status (with the importance of this 
methodology discussed further in Chapter 4). As recommended by the Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, all hospitalisation data were included for analyses 
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of Indigenous status.30 However, data relating to Indigenous status from the non-
targeted jurisdictions should be interpreted with caution, as weighted 
completeness for Indigenous identification in public hospitals during 2011-12 was 
below the level considered acceptable (80%) in Tasmania, the Australian Capital 
Territory, and Victoria.30 
Declines in hepatitis A in indigenous populations following targeted childhood 
immunisation programs have also been reported in the United States of America 
(USA), although without clear evidence of broader herd protection impacts on the 
non-indigenous population.31-34 However Indigenous Australians make up a 
greater proportion (2.4%) of the Australian population than Native Americans and 
Alaskan Natives do in the USA (0.9%).33,35 Substantial herd protection effects 
arising from universal childhood hepatitis A immunisation programs have been 
documented in Israel, Argentina and the USA, with the USA introducing a 
national universal program in 2006 following evidence of substantially higher 
decreases in incidence in states with universal programs already in place.36-40 
However, targeted hepatitis A vaccination programs have generally been 
estimated to be more cost-effective in lower incidence settings than universal 
programs.41 The World Health Organization recommends mass vaccination 
programs in countries moving from high to intermediate hepatitis A endemicity, 
but targeted programs in countries with low endemicity.1 The USA is the only low 
endemicity country of similarly high income to Australia that has introduced a 
universal childhood program. As of 2011, the hepatitis A notification rate in the 
USA was similar to that reported in Australia (0.4 and 0.6 per 100,000, 
respectively) despite reasonable vaccination coverage in the USA among 
children aged 19-35 months (78-87% one-dose coverage and 50-57% two dose 
coverage in 2011).42  
In most Western European countries hepatitis A incidence has also declined to 
below 1.0 per 100,000, in the context of immunisation programs targeting only 
individuals at high risk.43 Universal routine vaccination of children has been 
associated with increased age of infection, and hence risk of more severe 
disease.44,45 In the context of the targeted Australian immunisation program there 
was no observed change in the median age of notified and hospitalised cases 
between pre- and post-vaccine periods.  
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The relatively low hepatitis A seroprevalence in the Australian population 
(approximately 55% in persons aged less than 70 years, from Victoria during 
2008 46) leaves a large pool of susceptible individuals. Non-immune individuals in 
Australia, and other developed countries, remain at risk of hepatitis A, particularly 
when they travel to endemic countries and during foodborne outbreaks linked to 
the global food economy, such as those which occurred in Australia in 2009, 
associated with imported semi-dried tomatoes,9 in the USA in 2013, associated 
with imported pomegranate arils,37,47 and in Europe, Australia and New Zealand, 
associated with raw and frozen berries.7,48-51 The majority of hepatitis A cases 
(ranging from 56% to 87% between 2010 and 2014) in Australia now acquire their 
infection while travelling to endemic countries. Increasing hepatitis A vaccine 
coverage among travellers will reduce the risk of importation and subsequent 
secondary spread. However, this has proven difficult to achieve in Australia and 
further research is needed to inform effective strategies.28,29 Foodborne 
outbreaks are also difficult to prevent, even with rigorous food safety standards in 
place, due to the difficulties involved in testing for hepatitis A virus in imported 
foodstuffs.52,53 A universal infant hepatitis A immunisation program in Australia 
could help mitigate the impact of foodborne outbreaks: however, this would 
involve substantial cost and take decades to have its full effect.  
2.10 Conclusions 
In summary, the national hepatitis A immunisation program in Australia has had a 
significant impact in the targeted population, with evidence suggesting a broader 
herd protection effect. Ongoing surveillance is required to be sure that the current 
targeted immunisation strategy is maintaining satisfactory disease control. 
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3.3 Prologue 
3.3.1 Background 
This chapter represents the second core component of the Master of Philosophy 
in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) field program, in which I conducted a descriptive 
case-series epidemiological investigation and assisted with the interpretation and 
presentation of results. I was initially contacted by the Western Sydney Public 
Health Unit (WSPHU) at 12:35pm on 4 June 2015 and informed about the 
Salmonella cluster in western Sydney. Three hours later, I was sitting in Dr 
Shopna Bag’s office being briefed of the situation. I went home that evening, with 
questionnaire in hand, going over and over the delivery of questions for the 
interviews. I conducted the first three interviews the following day (5 June 2015) 
and completed the final interview on the 17 June 2015.  
  
3.3.2 My role 
I took a lead role in the descriptive case-series epidemiological investigation, 
interviewing as many cases as I could, scheduling meetings, and attending all 
meetings that took place with the epidemiological team, the food authority and 
the laboratory. Meetings, which included both teleconferences and face-to-face, 
were held regularly between 10 June and 17 September.  
Importantly, I was the person that first made the connection between Salmonella 
Agona cases and exposure to sushi in western Sydney. Following the first three 
interviews on 5 June no common exposures were identified between these 
cases. After the fourth interview (9 June 2015), Dr. Bag and I suggested that 
petting animals could be a possible source, with exposure to animals at the Royal 
Easter Show (17 to 30 March 2016) and the Hawkesbury Show (24 to 26 April 
2015). This hypothesis was followed up and the investigatory team had decided 
to discuss this further during a teleconference scheduled for the following day (10 
June 2015). Just prior to this teleconference, I managed to contact the fifth case 
and conduct an interview. During this interview, a common theme of sushi 
consumption from a particular shopping complex in western Sydney and illness 
became plausible. I finished this interview just as the teleconference was starting. 
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The feedback regarding the petting animals was not encouraging, with different 
animals used at the two shows. Following this negative result, I suggested to the 
team that the source could be sushi. Based on this suggestion, the New South 
Wales (NSW) Department of Primary Industries (DPI) inspected two sushi outlets 
soon after the teleconference; the results of this first inspection are discussed 
further in this chapter. 
In the time since the outbreak investigation, I have continued to synthesise and 
analyse results, write and format a manuscript, communicate with co-authors and 
submit a manuscript to “Epidemiology and Infection.” I am the lead author on this 
potential publication and I am currently awaiting feedback from the peer-
reviewers. 
 
3.3.3 Lessons learned  
I truly learned a lot from this outbreak investigation. I learned how to be part of a 
multidisciplinary public health team, organise meetings, provide epidemiological 
information during meetings, interview cases, discuss and support different 
hypothesis, analyse, interpret and present results, write a manuscript, and 
communicate effectively and efficiently within a large team. On a number of 
occasions I communicated directly with the WSPHU, Communicable Diseases 
Branch (CDB) NSW Health, NSW DPI and NSW Enteric Reference Laboratory to 
gain a better understanding of their procedures, processes and results. 
Another key learning from this outbreak was my growing understanding of whole 
genome sequencing and its increasing role during outbreak investigations. It 
appears likely that this modern methodology will become routine during outbreak 
investigations, and I feel very privileged to have been part of its early evaluation 
and application with outbreaks in Australia. I was also very fortunate to attend the 
OzFoodNet workshop in Melbourne during 2016 to learn more about this 
technology and its application. 
I acknowledge that this outbreak included only a small number of cases and did 
not require the recruitment of controls for a case-control investigation. However, I 
feel that I have developed a lot of other relevant skills pertaining to how to 
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conduct an outbreak investigation that will be highly applicable during my next 
outbreak. I feel very privileged to have been part of this outbreak team.  
 
3.3.4 Public Health impact 
This multidisciplinary outbreak investigation was responsible for correcting 
various hygiene and food safety control defects identified at a sushi outlet. This 
outlet was responsible for a point-source foodborne outbreak of S. Agona in 
western Sydney, Australia between April and June 2015. Salmonella was isolated 
from food samples collected from the implicated premise and a prohibition order 
issued. No further cases were identified following this action. This investigation 
demonstrated a multidisciplinary approach to public health action. In addition to 
the manuscript currently under review at ‘Epidemiology and Infection,’ results of 
this investigation have already been presented in the ‘OzFoodNet—Enhancing 
Foodborne Disease Surveillance Across Australia’ report (2nd Quarter Summary, 
2015 NSW) (Appendix 3.2) and ‘The Broad Street Pump’ (June 2016, Issue 43) 
(Appendix 3.3). 
 
3.3.5 Acknowledgements 
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Chapter Three  Outbreak Investigation 
 
62 | P a g e  
 
  
Chapter Three  Outbreak Investigation 
63 | P a g e  
 
3.4 Abstract 
During May 2015, an increase in Salmonella Agona cases was reported from 
western Sydney, Australia. We examine the public health actions used to 
investigate and control this increase. A descriptive case-series investigation was 
conducted. Six outbreak cases were identified; all had consumed cooked tuna 
sushi rolls purchased within a western Sydney shopping complex. Onset of 
illness for outbreak cases occurred between 7 April and 24 May 2015. 
Salmonella was isolated from food samples collected from the implicated premise 
and a prohibition order issued. No further cases were identified following this 
action. Whole genome sequence (WGS) analysis was performed on isolates 
recovered during this investigation, with additional S. Agona isolates from 
sporadic-clinical cases (with unknown epidemiological status) and routine food 
sampling in New South Wales, January to July 2015. Clinical isolates of outbreak 
cases were indistinguishable from food isolates collected from the implicated 
sushi outlet. Five additional clinical isolates not originally considered to be linked 
to the outbreak were genomically similar to outbreaks isolates, indicating the 
point-source contamination may have started before routine surveillance 
identified an increase. This investigation demonstrated the value of genomics-
guided public health action, where near real-time WGS enhanced the resolution 
of the epidemiological investigation.  
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3.5 Acronyms 
BP  Base-Pairs 
CDB  Communicable Disease Branch 
CI  Confidence Intervals 
DNA  Deoxyribonucleic Acid  
DPI   Department of Primary Industries 
MAE   Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology 
NCIMS  Notifiable Conditions Information Management System 
NSW   New South Wales  
SNP  Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms 
UPGMA Unweighted Pair Group Method with Arithmetic mean 
WGS  Whole Genome Sequence 
WSPHU  Western Sydney Public Health Unit  
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3.6 Introduction 
Salmonellosis is a zoonotic disease which remains the second most commonly 
notified gastrointestinal disease in Australia, following campylobacteriosis.1 
Transmission to humans occurs via the consumption of raw or inadequately 
cooked foods of animal origin, or by food items and untreated water 
contaminated with infected faeces from a reservoir host.1-3 The incubation period 
of salmonellosis is typically 12-36 hours (range 6-72 hours), with symptoms 
including diarrhoea (sometimes bloody), fever, vomiting, abdominal pain and 
nausea.3 The severity of disease is often related to different factors, including the 
serotype of Salmonella, the dose ingested, and the immunocompetency of the 
patient; death from salmonellosis is a rare event.3  
Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica serovar Agona (Salmonella Agona) was 
originally isolated from cattle in Ghana in 1952, and became an emerging public 
health problem in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Israel following the importation of contaminated Peruvian fish 
meal during the 1970s.4-6 Presently, S. Agona is recognised as a common global 
cause of salmonellosis in both animal and humans,7 and is a contaminant of 
farmed livestock and vegetables,8-10 and factory prepared foods.11-14 Salmonella 
Agona has been ranked among the top 15 most frequent Salmonella serotypes in 
North America, seventh in Europe, and 15th in Australia during 2006.7,15 
Outbreaks of S. Agona have occurred in Ireland,11 United Kingdom,16,17 United 
States of America,17-20 Israel,21 Finland,5 France,13 Germany22 and Australia23 
with some sources of S. Agona identified as chickens,24,25 cattle,26 Peruvian 
fishmeal,27 dry unsweetened cereals,19 and powered infant formula.13 
Whole genome sequencing (WGS) of foodborne bacteria of public health 
importance provides the ability to distinguish between isolates of interest within 
an individual outbreak.28,29 Enhanced management of outbreaks using WGS 
helps to confirm the contamination source, characterise transmission events 
using near real-time methodology and increased quality control of data.28,29 Along 
with the comprehensive genetic information provided by WGS, comes additional 
information regarding antibiotic resistance, virulence determinants and genome 
evolution.30 As technology becomes less cost-prohibitive and turnaround times 
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are reduced, WGS is expected to benefit communicable disease surveillance and 
outbreak investigations of foodborne disease.28,31,32 It is essential, as the 
application of WGS advances quickly, that the public health community 
understands the benefits of the analytical methods used to explore their data.33 
Salmonellosis is notifiable within New South Wales (NSW),34,35 with records 
aggregated within the Notifiable Conditions Information Management System 
(NCIMS). Salmonella isolates from public and private pathology providers, and 
the NSW Department of Primary Industries (DPI) are routinely referred to the 
NSW Enteric Reference Laboratory, Centre for Infectious Diseases and 
Microbiology Laboratory Services for serotyping using the White-Kauffmann-Le 
Minor scheme (9th Ed 2007).29 During routine surveillance, the NSW 
Communicable Disease Branch identified nine cases of S. Agona in May 2015, 
all clustered geographically in western Sydney. This report examines the 
epidemiological and molecular investigation of an increase in S. Agona cases in 
NSW between January and July, 2015. 
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3.7 Methods 
3.7.1 Epidemiological investigation of the outbreak 
A retrospective review of notifications in NCIMS was conducted, with de-identified 
data extracted for laboratory-confirmed S. Agona cases diagnosed within NSW 
between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2014. Extracted variables included 
notification date, onset date and jurisdiction of residence. Average number of 
cases per year and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) were calculated 
(assuming a Poisson distribution of count data) for the entire NSW population, 
with NSW population estimated obtained from NSW Health. 
A descriptive case-series investigation was conducted on all notified cases of S. 
Agona, residing in the western Sydney area, and with a notification date of 
salmonellosis between March and June 2015. Telephone interviews of cases or 
surrogates (either a parent or guardian when the case was a child aged less than 
16 years) were conducted using a standardised Salmonella questionnaire. 
Questions covered case demographics and illness, food consumption history, 
travel and environmental exposures seven days prior to the onset of disease.  
At the time of the epidemiological investigation it was discussed how we would 
conducted a case-control analysis if further cases were notified (Appendix 3.1). 
This methodology was not required during this particular investigation.  
 
3.7.2 Food and environmental investigation of the outbreak 
Based on the responses of interviewed cases, the NSW DPI conducted 
investigations at two separate sushi premises (Sushi-A and Sushi-B), both 
operating within one large shopping complex in western Sydney. The NSW DPI 
inspected both Sushi-A and Sushi-B on 17 June 2015, with follow-up inspections 
conducted at Sushi-B. Food and environmental samples were collected during 
each inspection and sent to the NSW Enteric Reference Laboratory for 
Salmonella identification and further molecular typing of isolates. Management 
and staff members at both premises were questioned by the NSW DPI during 
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these inspections, regarding food preparation techniques, cleaning processes 
and staff illnesses. 
 
3.7.3 Retrospective whole genome sequence analysis  
A retrospective WGS analysis was performed on clinical and food isolates 
recovered during this descriptive cases-series investigation, along with additional 
S. Agona isolates from sporadic-clinical cases and routine food samples 
(collected by the NSW DPI) in NSW, during the period January to July 2015. The 
genomic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was prepared using an automated 
workstation Chemagic Prepito-D (PerkinElmer). The DNA sequencing libraries 
were prepared using the Nextera XT DNA preparation kit (Illumina) and the 
sequencing was performed on the NextSeq 500 (Illumina) with 2 x 150 base-pairs 
(bp) paired-end chemistry. Sequencing data quality was checked by FastQC 
v1.0.0 (BaseSpace Labs, Illumina). Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) were 
identified using CLC Genomics Workbench v8.0 (Qiagen) by mapping reads to 
the reference genome S. Agona 460004 2-1 (GenBank: NZ_CP011259 ). The 
significant thresholds for SNP calling were set for a minimum coverage at 20 and 
a minimum variant frequency at 80%.  
The generated SNP list from each of the isolates were exported as Excel files 
and a binary type SNP matrix representing presence and absence of SNP in 
each isolates was generated. The clustering analysis was performed using a 
categorical coefficient with an unweighted pair group method with arithmetic 
mean (UPGMA) in BioNumerics (Applied Maths). To validate the clustering 
analysis, de novo assembly was performed in the CLC Genomics Workbench 
with a minimum contig-size set at 200 bp. The assembly was then mapped 
against the reference genome for SNP calling and phylogeny inferred using a 
web-based server (https://cge.cbs.dtu.dk/services/CSIPhylogeny/). Maximum 
likelihood trees at 100 bootstraps were generated from SNP fasta file using 
MEGA-6.36 
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3.8 Results 
3.8.1 Outbreak 
Historically, an annual average of 28.3 cases of S. Agona (N= 113; 95% CI 17.2 
– 39.3) were notified in NSW between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2014. 
Within the epidemiological investigation period (March to June 2015), 19 cases 
residing in the greater western Sydney area were notified, and were included in 
the descriptive case-series investigation. Sixteen of these 19 clinical cases (84%) 
were contactable for an interview, of which, six had consumed sushi that had 
been purchased from an outlet within a large shopping complex in western 
Sydney. Onset of illness for these six outbreak cases occurred between 7 April 
and 24 May 2015. These six outbreak cases had a median age of 8 years (age 
range 3 – 45 years), with five reporting symptoms of diarrhoea (median duration 
of 5.5 days: range 2 - 8 days), and four with bloody stools. Two cases, both aged 
less than 14 years, presented to the emergency department with one case 
hospitalised for three days due to the severity of symptoms.  
Of the remaining ten clinical cases of the descriptive case-series investigation, no 
common exposures were identified during interviews. Salmonellosis experienced 
by a mother and her new-born baby were possibly hospital related; two cases 
unrelated to each other had recently returned home from international travel 
(Vanuatu and Thailand); two regularly attended child-care; and one was a 
resident of an aged care facility. No high-risk exposures were identified for three 
cases. Repeated attempts to contact the remaining three cases for an interview 
were unsuccessful. 
On 17 June 2015, food and environmental samples were collected from two 
different sushi venues (Sushi-A and Sushi-B) operating within a large shopping 
complex in western Sydney. All food and environmental samples collected from 
Sushi-A were negative for the isolation of Salmonella. Cooked tuna sushi rolls 
from Sushi-B (Figure 3.1) were found positive for S. Agona culture, while the 
individual ingredients of the sushi rolls and environmental samples were each 
negative (Table 3.1). Salmonella Kiambu was isolated from raw chicken pieces 
collected from Sushi-B. Due to specific food hygiene and food safety defects 
identified, Sushi-B was issued with a notice requiring corrective action. Cooked 
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tuna sushi rolls and the cooked tuna mix (cooked tuna, mayonnaise and sugar) 
collected on 26 June 2015 from Sushi-B were positive for S. Agona (Table 3.1). 
This subsequent health breach was indicative of inadequate hygiene and food 
safety controls at Sushi-B that posed a risk to consumers.  
On 6 July 2015, immediately following the availability of laboratory results, a 
Prohibition Order was issued to Sushi-B prohibiting the handling or production of 
cooked tuna sushi rolls intended for sale on the premises. At the time of issuing 
the Prohibition Order, a third batch of food and environmental samples were 
collected. Cooked tuna sushi rolls were positive for S. Agona for a third time, as 
again was the cooked tuna mix (Table 3.1). Further samples were collected on 16 
July 2015 from Sushi-B, including a ‘test batch’ of cooked tuna sushi rolls, all of 
which were negative for the isolation of Salmonella (Table 3.1). On 22 July 2015, 
the Prohibition Order was lifted from Sushi-B. In total, 35 days had elapsed 
between initial inspection by the NSW DPI and final lifting of the Prohibition Order 
(Figure 3.2). 
It was revealed that a staff-member at Sushi-B had been ill during early May 
2015, with symptoms including vomiting and diarrhoea whilst at home on a 
rostered day-off; no stool sample was collected for testing. This staff member, 
when questioned by the NSW DPI, confirmed that they had consumed sushi rolls 
while at work between 28 and 30 April 2015, as staff members at Sushi-B are 
entitled to one sushi roll per shift. This staff member could not recall which 
varieties of sushi were eaten on those days but indicated that it could have been 
cooked tuna, salmon or chicken. Daily work duties for this staff member included 
preparing sushi rolls at the designated preparation bench and serving customers.   
Chapter Three  Outbreak Investigation 
71 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Sushi-B operating within a large shopping complex in western Sydney, 
New South Wales 
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Table 3.1: Food and environmental samples collected by the NSW Department of 
Primary Industries (DPI) from Sushi-B between 17 June and 16 July 2015 
Date Samples collected  
Sample type 
(Env = Environmental) 
Test Result 
(S=Satisfactory 
U=Unsatisfactory) 
17.06.15 
 
Raw chicken pieces Food U (S. Kiambu detected) 
Raw sliced beef Food S 
Sliced cucumber Food S 
Sliced avocado Food S 
Composite red cabbage and red pepper Food S 
Cooked chicken strips Food S 
Chicken and avocado sushi roll Food S 
Cooked acidified white rice Food S 
Cooked acidified brown rice Food S 
Raw whole shell eggs Food S 
Chicken avocado and cucumber sushi rolls Food S 
2 x Beef and cucumber sushi rolls Food S 
2 x Avocado and vegetable sushi rolls Food S 
2 x Cooked tuna sushi rolls (cucumber + avocado) Food U (S. Agona detected) 
Total of 15 environmental samples Env S 
26.06.15 
Unsanitised unwashed lettuce Food S 
Cooked acidified white rice Food S 
Cooked beef Food S 
Composite vegetables Food S 
Sliced avocado for sushi rolls Food S 
Cooked chicken Food S 
Cooked tuna mix (tuna + mayonnaise + sugar) Food U (S. Agona detected) 
Garnish carrots and cabbage shredded Food S 
Cooked tuna and avocado sushi roll Food U (S. Agona detected) 
Cooked tuna and cucumber sushi roll Food U (S. Agona detected) 
Avocado and vegetable sushi roll Food S 
Chicken teriyaki sushi roll Food S 
Beef teriyaki sushi roll Food S 
Salmon and avocado sushi roll Food S 
Total of 16 environmental samples Env S 
06.07.15 
Cucumber (whole before washing) Food S 
Avocado whole Food S 
Sliced avocado Food S 
Sliced cucumber Food S 
Cooked tuna mix (tuna + mayonnaise + sugar)- large 
container 
Food U (S. Agona detected) 
Cooked tuna mix (tuna + mayonnaise + sugar)- small 
container 
Food U (S. Agona detected) 
Cooked acidified white rice Food S 
Cooked tuna and avocado sushi roll Food U (S. Agona detected) 
Cooked tuna and cucumber sushi roll Food S 
Nori sheets Food S 
Mayonnaise (opened) Food S 
Mayonnaise (sealed) Food S 
Sugar Food S 
Total of 5 environmental samples Env S 
16.07.15 
Total of 22 foods- including all ingredients for new trial 
batch of cooked tuna sushi rolls and additional foods not 
previously sampled (white and black sesame seeds, 
panko breadcrumbs, teriyaki sauce, hot pepper sauce, 
canned tuna (both sealed and after removing from the 
can), beef teriyaki sushi rolls and chicken teriyaki sushi 
rolls) 
Food S 
Sushi preparation bench Env S 
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Figure 3.2: Time line of the outbreak investigation, retrospective whole genome 
sequencing analysis and public health action 
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3.8.2 Whole genome sequencing  
Forty-eight isolates serotyped as S. Agona and referred to the NSW Enteric 
Reference Laboratory between January and July 2015 were subjected to whole 
genome sequencing. These included 38 clinical isolates (from 35 notified cases) 
and ten food isolates. The 38 clinical isolates encompassed 21 clinical isolates 
collected during the descriptive case-series investigation (from the 19 S. Agona 
notifications of residents in the western Sydney area, March to June 2015, and 
included two repeat samples) and 17 sporadic-clinical isolates (from S. Agona 
notifications in the wider region of NSW, January to July 2015, and included one 
repeat sample). Based on the epidemiological results of this investigation, six of 
the 21 clinical isolates collected during the descriptive case-series investigation 
were classified as outbreak isolates (recovered from people who had consumed 
sushi purchased from within a large shopping complex in western Sydney). Of 
the ten food isolates, six were recovered from samples collected from Sushi-B, 
March to July 2015, and four were collected as part of routine survey work by the 
NSW DPI, January to March 2015 (Figure 3.3). 
The maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree of S. Agona, based on the SNP 
analysis of these 48 isolates, grouped 17 isolates together with a 0 - 1 SNP 
variation across clustered genomes (Figure 3.3). These included the six outbreak 
isolates, and six food isolates collected from Sushi-B during the outbreak 
(Cluster-A, Figure 3.3). Also within Cluster-A were four sporadic-clinical isolates 
(with unknown epidemiological status) collected in NSW between January and 
March 2015, and a single clinical isolate recovered from a non-contactable 
individual who was originally included in the descriptive case-series investigation. 
All clinical isolates within Cluster-A had similar genetic relatedness to food 
isolates recovered from Sushi-B during this outbreak (Figure 3.3). 
Two isolates of S. Agona obtained from raw retail chicken samples (collected 
between February and March 2015) and re-sampled isolates collected from an 
elderly individual at an aged care home (Cluster-B, Figure 3.3) had similar 
genomic content to the outbreak isolates (Cluster-A, Figure 3.3). The SNP 
variation between isolates of Cluster-A and Cluster-B did not exceed 4 - 8 bp 
across the entire genome. A mother and her new-born, who had onset dates 
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within three days of each other and were not related to the outbreak, had 
indistinguishable S. Agona genomes by SNP analysis (Cluster-C, Figure 3.3). 
Salmonella Agona recovered from cases with overseas travel histories were 
genetically unrelated to the outbreak isolates of Cluster-A (Figure 3.3).  
In total, 11 clinical isolates were grouped within Cluster-A by genetic analysis. 
This included (a) six outbreak isolates; (b) a single clinical isolate recovered from 
a non-contactable individual who was part of the descriptive case-series 
investigation; and (c) four sporadic-clinical isolates (with unknown 
epidemiological status) from cases that were notified outside the epidemiological 
investigation period and/or area. Common exposure to contaminated foods was 
confirmed between 7 April and 24 May 2015 during the epidemiological 
investigation of the outbreak. However, as indicated by the grouping of sporadic-
clinical isolates (with unknown epidemiological status) with similar genetic 
patterns to the cases of the outbreak (Cluster-A), the duration of this point-source 
contamination issue at Sushi-B cannot be confirmed without supporting 
epidemiological information (Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.3: Maximum likelihood tree of Salmonella Agona isolates based on single 
nucleotide polymorphism.  
* representing clinical cases who were originally included in the descriptive case-
series investigation and non-contactable for an interview during this investigation  
 
Chapter Three  Outbreak Investigation 
77 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Epidemiological curve of Salmonella Agona cases (Cluster-A) identified 
from New South Wales, Australia with an onset date between January and June 
2015.  
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3.9 Discussion  
Rapid epidemiological investigation identified contaminated cooked tuna sushi 
rolls consumed from an individual sushi outlet in western Sydney as the likely 
vehicle for this outbreak. Once the food outlet had been identified, our 
multidisciplinary team promptly detected the contamination issue and instigated 
action to eliminate the ongoing risk to the community. We highlight the public 
health importance of WGS, as well as the additional value that this modern 
technology provides. The WGS analysis identified five additional clinical isolates 
that may have been linked to the outbreak (one clinical isolate recovered from an 
individual who was originally included in the descriptive case-series investigation 
and was not contactable for an interview; and four sporadic-clinical isolates [with 
unknown epidemiological status]). It was speculated that the original 
contamination-source for this outbreak could have been raw retail chicken meat, 
based on the limited SNP variation between the isolates of the outbreak (Cluster-
A) and the routinely collected chicken meat samples in Cluster-B (Figure 3.3). 
The WGS offers increased discriminative power and enhances traditional 
descriptive epidemiology with detailed phylogenetic relationships between 
isolates.37 During this particular outbreak investigation, the SNP analysis, which 
included clinical isolates that were not originally considered to be part of the 
outbreak, may have increased the total outbreak size by five cases. However, it is 
worth noting that the ‘threshold’ for the maximum SNP differences of Salmonella 
isolates related to an outbreak cluster remains not well defined.29 Previous WGS 
reports of Salmonella outbreaks have had SNP difference of up to 12 to 30-bp to 
help define a cluster.29,31,37 Using a similar threshold, our outbreak would have 
included an elderly individual from the aged care home (Cluster-B, Figure 3.3), 
who lacked supporting epidemiological information to link them to this outbreak at 
Sushi-B. WGS data should not be used in isolation to define an outbreak, and 
should be used to compliment traditional epidemiological data.31 
The SNP variation of S. Agona isolates obtained from raw retail chicken meat 
routinely sampled by the NSW DPI during 2015 (Cluster-B, Figure 3.3) and our 
outbreak (Cluster-A, Figure 3.3) was between 4 and 8-bp over an entire genome 
of over four million bp.20 The low number of SNP variation between our outbreak 
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isolates and strains recovered from the raw chicken meat suggests that these 
different isolates may share a common source of origin, such as a single 
producer or processor of chicken meat. In light of the specific food hygiene and 
food safety defects identified at Sushi-B by the NSW DPI, we hypothesise that 
there could have been a breakdown of proper hygiene protocol at the implicated 
sushi outlet while processing contaminated raw chicken meat. This breakdown of 
proper hygiene resulted in the cross-contamination of the cooked tuna mix and/or 
containers used exclusively for storage of this product. Salmonella Agona is 
commonly associated with poultry and poultry products,8 and has a considerable 
ability to form biofilms on plastic materials.14 The resistant and persistent nature 
of Salmonella within biofilms38 may provide some insight for the extended 
duration of this localised contamination issue at the sushi outlet. Another possible 
source for cross-contamination could have been an ill staff-member at Sushi-B. 
However, when considering the WGS results and the possible extended period of 
this outbreak, it appears unlikely that this staff member was the only source of 
contamination. An additional undiagnosed human case (i.e. a food handler) 
linked to this outbreak was also a possibility.  
Based on epidemiological results, the duration of this point-source contamination 
event at Sushi-B was reported to be between 7 April and 24 May 2015. However, 
as indicated by the clustering of sporadic-clinical isolates (with unknown 
epidemiological status) within Cluster-A (Figure 3.3), this point-source 
contamination issue may have started earlier than first suspected (Figure 3.4). 
This hypothesis was unable to be investigated further during the investigation, as 
these additional cases linked to the outbreak by WGS were notified with S. 
Agona between six to eight months prior to the WGS-based analysis. Any 
epidemiological information obtained from these additional cases at the time of 
this outbreak investigation would have been unreliable due to poor recall of food 
consumption more than half a year ago. If these additional cases had been 
interviewed at the time of their illness (as notified cases of Salmonella are not 
routinely interviewed by NSW Health), it may have been possible to link them to 
the outbreak at Sushi-B, or obtain additional information to help identify the 
original source that led to the cross-contamination event at Sushi-B.  
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The probability of a Salmonella infection to the consumer from contaminated 
foods is related to the infectious dose ingested by the person. It is estimated that 
a person is required to ingest 100 to 1000 bacteria to initiate an infection, with a 
10-20% chance of infection related to 100 organisms (model based prediction) 
and a 60-80% chance related to 10,000 fold increase of organisms;3 furthermore, 
Proton Pump Inhibitors (PPIs) appearing to increase the susceptibility of an 
individual to Salmonella.39 During this outbreak, the low number of cases 
identified may have been a result of a highly variable organism counts within the 
contaminated cooked tuna mix. It is possible that following the original cross-
contamination event, the infrequent number of notified cases could have been 
related to mixing and/or diluting of cooked tuna mix between batches; from 
inadequate cleaning and sanitising of storage containers used exclusively for the 
cooked tuna mix; or from mild illness where the patient did not seek medical 
attention.  
WGS can assist routine epidemiological investigations, particularly with regards 
to the prevention of further cases through earlier identification of the outbreak 
source and important insights into the contamination timeline. This will 
fundamentally change the epidemiological understanding of transmission 
dynamics, and open up new, more targeted, strategies for disease control and 
prevention.28 Even for this investigation where the final results for the WGS 
analytical component were not available until eight weeks following the lifting of 
the prohibition order at Sushi-B (Figure 3.2), the information has been valuable in 
better understanding the epidemiology of the outbreak. Use of this technology will 
become more applicable to real-time investigations in the future as speed of 
sequencing of bacterial genomes improves from weeks and days to perhaps 
hours.31,40  
Costs are also an issue when considering the inclusion of WGS as part of 
outbreak investigations (especially when WGS costs are additional to the costs of 
conventional laboratory methods), and are not necessarily affordable for routine 
use. In time, WGS has the potential to allow epidemiological hypotheses to be 
tested in near real-time, supporting enhanced management and control of 
communicable diseases and effective public health action.28 With declining costs, 
improved speed of WGS and minimising the number of laboratory tests 
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conducted, this modern technology will have a more permanent role within 
routine surveillance of notifiable diseases, with high-quality data influencing 
decision-making and action during an outbreak investigation. 
Limitations of this outbreak investigation should be noted. They included poor 
recall of some cases and surrogates during interviews, a low sample size for the 
epidemiological investigation, and the descriptive nature of the epidemiological 
study. This descriptive study measured the occurrences of outcomes rather than 
incorporating an analytical design that could investigate associations between 
exposures and outcomes. WGS analysis was completed after the outbreak was 
concluded, and it was not ideal to follow-up the additional cases within Cluster-A 
due to the time that had lapsed. Also, due to the passive nature of the notification 
surveillance system in NSW, this investigation was biased towards people with 
more severe illness, who were more likely to be tested and had a positive culture. 
In spite of these limitations, our findings present strong evidence of a traditional 
epidemiological investigation supported by high-throughput sequencing 
technology, which implicated a single sushi outlet as the source of this outbreak, 
and assisted with the hypothesis that this outbreak was caused by cross 
contamination from raw chicken. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This multidisciplinary outbreak investigation was responsible for correcting 
various hygiene and food safety control defects identified at a sushi outlet. This 
outlet was responsible for a point-source foodborne outbreak of S. Agona in 
western Sydney, Australia between April and June 2015. The high-throughput 
genome sequencing was also utilised retrospectively and identified additional 
cases that may have been linked to the outbreak, extending the timeframe of the 
outbreak and providing additional insight as to the possible source for the 
outbreak. The genomics-enhanced public health action added value to the 
descriptive epidemiological investigation and will most certainly play an 
increasing role in public health surveillance of foodborne diseases, especially as 
costs of this technology becomes more acceptable and turn-around times of 
testing are reduced.  
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3.12 Appendix 3.1  
Case-control study design-1 
In addition to interviewing laboratory confirmed cases of S. Agona, non-serotyped 
laboratory positive cases of Salmonella sp. were going to be sourced from the 
NCIMS database and recruited as controls. Two controls would have been 
matched to every case; chosen from the western Sydney area, of similar age (if 
feasible) and with notification date similar to that of the case. These controls 
would have been interviewed in a timely manner using exactly the same 
questionnaire as cases. 
 
Case-control study design-2 
In addition to interviewing laboratory confirmed cases of S. Agona, two matched-
controls were going to be recruited for each case. Matched-controls would be 
recruited for the same consulting GP practice of the cases. Controls would have 
been matched by age and sex, and would have a consultation date similar to the 
case. Controls would have been interviewed in timely manner using exactly the 
same questionnaire as cases. 
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3.13 Appendix 3.2  
Source: OzFoodNet—Enhancing Foodborne Disease Surveillance Across 
Australia (2nd Quarter Summary, 2015 NSW)
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3.14 Appendix 3.3 
Source: The Broad Street Pump (June 2016, Issue 43) 
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4.3 Prologue 
4.3.1 Background 
This chapter is set out slightly different to the previous two research chapters. 
Part I is a systematic literature review and Part II is a data linkage project that I 
conducted. Together, Part I and II provide valuable information regarding 
pneumococcal disease in people aged 50 years or older. 
Furthermore, when I agreed to undertake this project I really had no idea of what 
I had got myself into. Pneumococcal disease and data-linkage together in one 
project – Wow! 
 
4.3.2 My role 
I was the principal investigator and analyst for this chapter. I was responsible for 
developing the main research questions of this project with Peter McIntyre, 
Sanjay Jayasinghe, Helen Quinn, Frank Beard and Aditi Dey at the National 
Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS), and with Paula 
Spokes, Robin Gilmour and Nick Rose at the Communicable Disease Branch 
(CDB), NSW Health. I was also responsible for liaising with Nick Rose and Paula 
Spokes at the CDB, NSW Health to obtain access to the datasets at North 
Sydney. I gained ethics approval from ANU for approval to publish results that 
were generated from this investigation. I cleaned the data from five different 
datasets (over 24 million records), merged data and verified the merged data with 
SAS Enterprise Guide while at CDB, NSW Health. I then conducted all of the 
analyses using Stata while at NCIRS. I conducted the systematic literature review 
for this chapter and generated all tables and figures.  
I have presented the methodology that I used for this analysis at the inaugural 
NCIRS i-BESIG (immunisation Epidemiology and Biostatistics Special Interest 
Group) meeting during August 2016. I also prepared and presented my results to 
the CDB team at NSW Health during a weekly surveillance meeting in November 
2016. I am currently liaising with co-authors during preparation of two different 
manuscripts for publication in peer-review journals, and have also been asked to 
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present my findings at one of the upcoming Enhanced Invasive Pneumococcal 
Disease Surveillance Working Group (EIPDSWG) meetings. 
 
4.3.3 Lessons learned  
This project represents my first attempt of a data-linkage investigation. I was very 
fortunate that NCIRS recognised this and enrolled me into a four day course 
‘Managing Big Data in Health Research’ at the University of NSW. In addition, 
this project also represents my first attempt at using SAS Enterprise Guide for 
data analysis. To obtain these essential skills for this project, I enrolled in a one 
day course (‘Introduction to SAS’) at the University of NSW and a one day course 
(‘Introduction to SAS Enterprise Guide’) at NSW Health, North Sydney.  
Together these three independent courses allowed me to understand key 
concepts essential for this analysis, including SAS syntax, the concepts of 
managing large datasets and data-linkage (Appendix 4.1 – example screen shot 
from SAS Enterprise Guide). Without this prior education, the complex 
methodology as detailed in Part II would not have been possible. 
In addition to this work presented in Chapter 4, I also assisted with the 
preparation of pneumococcal slides for the ATAGI meeting in late 2015 by 
analysing Invasive Pneumococcal Disease (IPD) data from the NNDSS 
enhanced IPD surveillance dataset. This process allowed me to gain a better 
appreciation for the complexity of IPD data. I analysed risk factor data for IPD 
notification for non-Indigenous people ≥65 years of age, and Indigenous people 
≥50 years of age. 
 
4.3.4 Public Health impact 
This is the first study to estimates of the burden of pneumococcal pneumonia 
using linked data from the NSW Public Health Registry (PHR) for people aged 50 
years or older in NSW. In this investigation, I have demonstrated the validity and 
usefulness of a complex data-linkage analysis to help investigate important 
issues that cannot be answered from a single database alone. I verified ‘proof of 
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concept’ when using linked data within the NSW PRH to further investigate 
notifiable diseases in NSW. This verification is an important step when 
considering the usefulness and future potential of the NSW PHR, as the 
methodology used here is transferable to other notifiable diseases, since the 
registry contains information on most notifiable conditions in NSW, not just IPD.  
While pneumococcal conjugate and polysaccharide vaccines are well 
documented to have reduced the incidence of IPD in children and older people, 
there is growing evidence that documents the reductions in all-cause pneumonia 
hospitalisation in adults following the introduction of 7vPCV in the United States 
of America and Australia. Furthermore, post-implementation studies that evaluate 
the trends in hospitalisation coding of non-invasive pneumococcal community 
acquired pneumonia (CAP) following the funding of pneumococcal conjugate and 
polysaccharide vaccines are sparse, especially in adults. Post-implementation 
studies are necessary to help inform national policy making regarding funding 
changes of pneumococcal vaccines, and provide additional information that 
supports evidence-based guidelines.  
The timing of this data-linkage investigation that I presented here is highly 
relevant in light of the recent findings of the Community Acquired Pneumonia in 
Adults (CAPiTA) Trial in the Netherlands and the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Advisory Committee (PBAC) approval for the use of 13vPCV in the adult 
population of Australia for the prevention of pneumococcal pneumonia and IPD. It 
was noted in the positive recommendation by the PBAC that the effectiveness of 
13vPCV against CAP is likely to be superior to that of 23vPPV, which may have a 
significant impact upon vaccination funding for the older population of Australia. 
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4.4 Acronyms:  
7vPCV 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine 
13vPCV 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine 
23vPPV 23-valent pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine 
ABS  Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACRD  Australian Co-ordinated Registry of Death 
ANU   Australian National University 
APDC  Admitted Patient Data Collection 
CAP  Community Acquired Pneumonia  
CDB   Communicable Disease Branch 
CDNA  Communicable Diseases Network Australia  
CI   Confidence Intervals 
COD URF Cause of Death Unit Record File  
CSF   Cerebrospinal fluid 
EDDC  Emergency Department Data Collection 
EIPDSWG Enhanced Invasive Pneumococcal Disease Surveillance Working 
Group  
ICD-9-CM Ninth Revision of the International Classification of Disease coding 
system 
ICD-10-AM Tenth Revision of the International Classification of Disease coding 
system - Australian modified  
IPD  Invasive Pneumococcal Disease 
IRR   Incidence Rate Ratio 
NCIMS Notifiable Conditions Information Management System 
NCIRS  National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance  
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NIP  National Immunisation Program 
NNDSS  National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
NSW  New South Wales 
PBAC  Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
PHR  Public Health Registry  
PPN  Project-specific Person Number 
QLD  Queensland 
RBDM Registry of Birth, Deaths and Marriages 
SA   South Australia 
VE  Vaccine Effectiveness  
VHPSS Victorian Hospital Pathogens Surveillance Scheme 
WA  Western Australia  
WHO  The World Health Organization  
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Part ɪ 
Systematic Literature Review 
 
 
4.5 Prologue to Part ɪ 
Part I of this chapter is a systematic literature review of invasive pneumococcal 
disease (IPD) in older people of Australia. I focused on vaccine coverage and the 
burden of disease following changes to the funding of different pneumococcal 
vaccines under the National Immunisation Program (NIP).  
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4.6 Introduction 
Globally, diseases caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae (or pneumococcus) are 
a major public health problem. During 2005, it was estimated by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) that among all age groups, pneumococcal disease was 
responsible for approximately 1.6 million deaths.1 The highest global incidence of 
pneumococcal disease occurs in young children and the elderly, with 
approximately 14·5 million episodes of serious pneumococcal disease occurring 
in children aged less than five years of age during 2000.2,3  
Streptococcus pneumoniae is a Gram-positive coccus, which colonises the 
nasopharynx of the host, and is transmitted from person-to-person via respiratory 
droplets.4,5 There are over 90 serotypes of pneumococci recognised, which 
cause conditions such as meningitis, septicaemia, pneumonia, otitis media and 
sinusitis.2,4 Invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) refers specifically to those 
conditions in which the S. pneumoniae infection penetrates a sterile site of the 
body (including the blood, cerebrospinal fluid [CSF], peritoneal, pleural and joint 
fluid) and causes symptomatic conditions such as meningitis, bacteraemic 
pneumonia, and bacteraemia without focus.2,6 Only a limited number of 
pneumococcus serotypes are responsible for the majority of IPD cases.2 IPD has 
been nationally notifiable in Australia since 2001, with enhanced data being 
collected by all jurisdictions since 2002.4  
 
4.7 Pneumococcal vaccine schedule  
Pneumococcal vaccines available in Australia come in two forms: conjugate and 
polysaccharide vaccines. The recommendations and funding of these vaccines 
under the National Immunisation Program (NIP) have changed over time and 
within each state and territory of Australia (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Pneumococcal vaccine availability and funding in Australia, 1986-2011 
Date 
Changes made to pneumococcal vaccine availability and 
funding 
1986 23-valent pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine (23vPPV) 
became available in Australia2,5 
1998 23vPPV was locally funded within the jurisdiction of Victoria, for 
both non-Indigenous individuals aged 65 years or older, and 
Indigenous individuals aged 50 years or older7 
March 2000 23vPPV was nationally funded for all Indigenous people aged 
50 years or older 
December 2000 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (7vPCV) was first 
registered in Australia2 
June 2001 7vPCV funded for children at highest risk (including all 
Indigenous infants, all children with specified underlying medical 
conditions that predispose them to IPD, and non-Indigenous 
children residing in Central Australia)2 
January 2005 7vPCV became nationally funded under the NIP in for all 
Australian infants, with a three dose schedule at two, four and 
six months of age (3+0 schedule)2  
 23vPPV was nationally funded for all non-Indigenous individuals 
aged 65 years or older2  
July 2011 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (13vPCV) replaces 
the 7vPCV for use in infants2 
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4.8 Methods  
A systematic literature review was conducted to identify in the published literature 
what influence pneumococcal vaccines have had upon the IPD-associated 
morbidity and mortality in older people of Australia. The following focused 
research question was chosen for this literature review: 
 
What impact has funded pneumococcal vaccines had upon vaccine coverage and the 
incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease of older and elderly people in Australia? 
 
Elderly people of Australia (with reference to the NIP pneumococcal funding) are 
defined as: 
 those who are aged 65 years or older 
 
The focused literature search was conducted using the ‘Scopus’ database. Table 
4.2 defines the search terms used and resulting number of articles sourced at 
each step of the search procedure. 
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Table 4.2: Focused literature review search terms and resulting number of articles 
History Search fields Search terms 
Date 
restrictions 
Article 
Results 
#1 
TITLE-ABS-
KEY 
Pneumococcal AND 
(disease OR vaccin*) 
PUBYEAR >  
2004 
11,379 
#2 
TITLE-ABS-
KEY 
elderly Nil 349,858 
#3 
TITLE-ABS-
KEY 
adult Nil 6,495,465 
#4 
TITLE-ABS-
KEY 
Australia Nil 310,509 
#5 ALL coverage Nil 444,189 
#6 ALL schedule Nil 466,753 
#7 
TITLE-ABS-
KEY 
invasive Nil 366,979 
#8  
#1 AND (#2 OR #3) AND #4 
AND (#5 OR #6) AND #7 
Nil 27 
#9 
TITLE-ABS-
KEY 
review* Nil 4,052,352 
#10  #8 AND NOT #9 Nil 19 
 
 
Therefore, a total of 19 articles met the inclusion criteria for this literature review; 
these were written in English and published between 2004 and 2015. 
Exclusion criteria for these 19 articles included studies that focused on: 
 countries other than Australia (x1) 
 only people less than 50 years of age (x5) 
 outbreaks of pneumococcal (x1) 
 Community Acquired Pneumonia (CAP) and not IPD (x1), and  
 only the incidence of disease prior to funding of pneumococcal vaccine for 
elderly people (x1)  
 
These nine articles were excluded from the literature review.  
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4.9 Results and discussion 
4.9.1 Data quality 
A total of ten articles met the search inclusion criteria for this focused literature 
review (Table 4.3). 
Vaccine coverage was reported by nine of the ten studies.4-12 Five articles 
reported vaccine coverage of elderly people,5,7,10-12 and five reported vaccine 
coverage of children.4,6,8-10 
Two articles were national studies4,5 and used data from the National Notifiable 
Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS). The NNDSS is managed by the 
Australian Government Department of Health, with IPD data quality monitored by 
the Enhanced Invasive Pneumococcal Disease Surveillance Working Group 
(EIPDSWG) (a sub-group of the Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
[CDNA]).4  
Four articles included an analysis of state-wide IPD notification data.6,7,9,10 Two of 
these four studies used data collected by the state’s enhanced IPD surveillance 
system, with 2001 data excluded from the analyses (due to poor quality).9,10 The 
other two studies included data collected before IPD became nationally notifiable 
in 2001.6,7 Data analysed in these two studies was collected locally by either: (a) 
the Victorian Hospital Pathogens Surveillance Scheme (VHPSS),7 or (b) the IPD 
Laboratory Surveillance Network in NSW.6  
Two of the ten articles used data collected from northern Queensland (QLD), 
where IPD became locally notifiable in 1996, and IPD data was collected by local 
public health units.8,13  
The remaining two articles did not use IPD surveillance data; they used locally 
collected data to evaluate vaccine coverage within a defined setting.11,12 These 
two articles made no attempts to investigate the incidence of IPD within their 
jurisdiction.  
Of the eight articles that reported IPD incidences, population estimates were 
obtained from either the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)4-7,9,10 or from the 
Queensland Treasury’s Office of Economic and Statistical Research.8,13 For 
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these eight articles, an IPD case was defined by the isolation, or nucleic acid 
detection of S. pneumoniae from a normally sterile site, including blood, CSF, 
peritoneal, pleural and joint fluid.4,6,9 An IPD case definition was defined in seven 
of these eight articles,4-6,8-10,13 with the eighth article reporting that IPD cases 
were laboratory confirmed.7 
 
Table 4.3: Synthesis of data from of ten articles that met the search inclusion 
criteria 
Author 
Year 
[Ref #] 
Setting  
/ 
Study type 
Data source  
/  
Population 
estimates 
 
Monitoring 
periods (pre 
and post 
funding) 
Vaccine 
Coverage 
 
Incidence: 
Pre-funding rate 
Post-funding rate 
Incidence Rate Ratio 
(IRR (CI 95%)) 
Outcomes / Results Comments 
Lowbridge 
2015 
 [6] 
 
Setting: 
Greater 
Sydney-
area 
(Sydney, 
Hunter, 
Illawarra 
Statically 
divisions) 
 
Study type: 
Ecological 
analysis of 
trends of 
IPD over 
time 
IPD data source: 
IPD Surveillance 
Network  
(state-wide)  
 
Population est: 
Australian 
Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) 
population 
estimates for 
Greater Sydney -
~ 4.9 to 5.6 
million people 
 
Pre- 
National 
Funding  
1998-2004 
 
Post-
National 
Funding  
2008-2010 
 
(In 2005 7vPCV 
nationally 
available to all 
children, and 
23vPPV 
nationally 
available all 
non-
indigenous 
people ≥ 65 
years) 
2005 
7vPCV 
Children 
Coverage: 
89% 
≥65 years only- 
all people 
All IPD serotypes: 
Pre: 35.61 / 100,000 
Post: 21.52 / 100,000 
IRR 0.60 (0.55-0.67) 
7vPCV serotypes only 
Pre: 24.68 / 100,000 
Post: 3.64 / 100,000 
IRR 0.15 (0.12-0.19) 
13v-non-7v serotypes 
Pre: 4.83 / 100,000 
Post: 4.01 / 100,000 
IRR 0.83 (0.65-1.06) 
23vPPV-non-13vPCV: 
Pre: 4.00 / 100,000 
Post: 3.69 / 100,000 
IRR 0.92 (0.71-1.20) 
Non vaccine serotype 
Pre: 2.09 / 100,000 
Post: 2.58 / 100,000 
IRR 1.23 (0.89-1.72) 
 
Between 1998-2010: 
7213 cases of IPD in 
the greater Sydney 
area 
 
35% of cases  
(n= 2525 cases) in 
people ages  
≥ 65 years 
7vPCV 
focused 
article.  
However, 
23vPPC data 
in article 
 
Direct and 
indirect 
impact of 
pneumococc
al vaccines 
upon the 
elderly 
Menzies 
2014 
[5] 
Setting: 
National 
analysis 
 
Study type: 
Ecological 
analysis of 
trends of 
IPD over 
time 
IPD data source: 
National 
Notifiable 
Disease 
Surveillance 
System (NNDSS)  
Inclusion: Non-
indigenous 
Australians ages 
≥65 years 
Exclusion: 
Victoria (Vic) 
jurisdiction 
removed, 
Indigenous 
people removed 
(due to different 
funding 
programs)  
 
Population est: 
ABS population 
estimates (2006 
census) 
 
Pre-National 
Funding  
2002-2004 
 
Post-
National 
Funding 
2010-2011 
 
(In 2005 7vPCV 
nationally 
available to all 
children, and 
23vPPV 
nationally 
available all 
non-
indigenous 
people ≥ 65 
years) 
23vPPV 
≥65 years 
non-
Indigenous 
 
2004 
Coverage: 
41% to 
53% 
 
2006 
Coverage: 
51% to 
64% 
 
2009 
Coverage: 
48% to 
56% 
 
range per 
individual 
jurisdiction 
(excluding 
Vic) 
≥65 years only – 
non-Indigenous 
All IPD serotypes: 
Pre: 25.21 / 100,000 
Post: 16.41 / 100,000 
IRR 0.65 (0.59-0.71) 
7vPCV serotypes only 
Pre: 17.00 / 100,000 
Post: 1.84 / 100,000 
IRR 0.11 (0.09-0.14) 
23vPPV-non-7vPCV: 
Pre: 5.65 / 100,000 
Post: 9.27 / 100,000 
IRR 1.64 (1.14-1.91) 
Non vaccine serotype 
Pre: 2.56 / 100,000 
Post: 5.30 / 100,000 
IRR 2.07 (1.67-2.57) 
 
Between 2002-2011: 
3978 cases of IPD 
notifications for ≥65 
years (excluding Vic 
and indigenous 
population). 
 
No clear impact 
directly from 23vPPV 
in elderly people 
 
A greater reduction 
of IPD in ≥65 years 
could be expected 
from the indirect 
effect of 7vPCV 
vaccination of 
children. Also 
increased vaccine 
coverage of 23vPPV 
in elderly people 
would be beneficial. 
 
23vPPV 
specific for 
≥65 years. 
Mentioned 
concurrent 
7vPCV 
program for 
children 
launched at 
same time as 
23vPPV of 
elderly 
people. 
 
Vaccine 
Effectiveness 
of 23vPPC 
61.1%  
(CI95%:55.1%-
66.9%). 
 
Quality 
assurance 
exercise 
pertaining to 
the NIP. 
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Author 
Year 
[Ref #] 
Setting  
/ 
Study type 
Data source  
/  
Population 
estimates 
 
Monitoring 
periods (pre 
and post 
funding) 
Vaccine 
Coverage 
 
Incidence: 
Pre-funding rate 
Post-funding rate 
Incidence Rate Ratio 
(IRR (CI 95%)) 
Outcomes / Results Comments 
Barry 
2012 
[4] 
Setting: 
National 
analysis 
 
Study 
type: 
Ecological 
analysis of 
trends of 
IPD over 
time 
 
Point in 
time 
analysis 
IPD data 
source: 
IPD 
Notifications-
from the 
Enhanced 
Pneumococcal 
Dataset, 
NNDSS 
 
Population 
est: 
ABS Australian 
population 
estimates 
Pre-National 
Funding  
2002 
 
Post-
National 
Funding 
2008 
 
(In 2005 7vPCV 
nationally 
available to all 
children, and 
23vPPV 
nationally 
available all 
non-
indigenous 
people ≥ 65 
years) 
 
 
2007 
7vPCV 
children  
(< 1 year & 
3 doses) 
Indigenous 
Coverage: 
85%  
Non-
Indigenous 
Coverage: 
91% 
 
2008 
7vPCV 
children  
(< 1 year & 
3 doses) 
Indigenous 
Coverage: 
85%  
Non-
Indigenous 
Coverage: 
92% 
 
≥65 years - 
non-Indigenous only 
All IPD serotypes: 
2006 – 18.4 / 100,000 
2007 – 17.2 / 100,000 
2008 – 19.0 / 100,000 
7vPCV serotypes only 
Pre: 14.2 / 100,000 
Post: 3.7 / 100,000 
IRR 0.26 
23v serotypes only 
Pre: 16.7 / 100,000 
Post: 11.9 / 100,000 
IRR 0.72 
Non vaccine serotype 
Pre: 1.8 / 100,000 
Post: 4.5 / 100,000 
IRR 2.5 
 
≥50 years - 
Indigenous only 
23v serotypes only 
2002: 20.5 / 100,000 
2008: 39.5 / 100,000 
IRR 1.93 
Non vaccine serotype 
2002: 4.1 / 100,000 
2008: 10.6 / 100,000 
IRR 2.59 
 
2007: 476 IPD cases in 
all people ≥ 65 years 
of age (92% in non-
indigenous people) 
 
2008: 537 IPD cases in 
all people ≥ 65 years 
of age (93% in non-
indigenous people) 
 
Substantial increase 
of 19A serotype 
 
Relatively large 
vaccine failure due to 
serotype 19F 
 
Herd Immunity 
impact of 7vPCV 
 
Enhanced 
Invasive 
Pneumococcal 
Disease 
Surveillance 
Working 
Group 
(EIPDSWG) 
responsible for 
finalising IPD 
data reporting 
to NNDSS 
 
IPD Enhanced 
Data reporting 
commenced in 
2001, with 
complete 
enhanced data 
collected from 
all 
states/territori
es from 2002 
 
Johnson 
2012 
[9] 
Setting: 
South 
Australia 
(SA) 
 
Study 
type: 
Ecological 
analysis of 
trends of 
IPD over 
time 
IPD data 
source: 
Routine 
Enhanced 
Surveillance 
Data collected 
by SA 
Department of 
Health 
Exclusion: 
Indigenous 
data excluded 
from the 
analysis 
 
Population 
est: 
ABS 
population 
estimates 
(2001 and 
2006 census 
data) ~1.57 
million people 
 
Pre-National 
NIP Funding 
2002-2004 
 
Post-
National NIP 
Funding 
2007-2009 
 
(In 2005 7vPCV 
nationally 
available to all 
children, and 
23vPPV 
nationally 
available all 
non-
indigenous 
people ≥ 65 
years) 
2005 
7vPCV 
children  
(< 1 year & 
3 doses) 
SA only 
Coverage: 
91%  
 
≥65 years – 
non-Indigenous only 
All IPD serotypes: 
Pre: 68.4 / 100,000 
Post: 50.0 / 100,000 
IRR 0.73 (0.58-0.93) 
7vPCV serotypes only 
Pre: 42.4 / 100,000 
Post: 11.0 / 100,000 
IRR 0.26 (0.17-0.40) 
13vPCV-non-7vPCV 
Pre: 11.0 / 100,000 
Post: 17.1 / 100,000 
IRR 1.55 (0.94-2.54) 
23vPPV-non-13vPCV 
Pre: 5.7 / 100,000 
Post: 11.0 / 100,000 
IRR 1.91 (0.99-3.71) 
Non vaccine serotype 
Pre: 1.7 / 100,000 
Post: 9.3 / 100,000 
IRR 5.3 (1.83-15.34) 
 
Large benefit of 
7vPCV, with a direct 
and sustained benefit 
to children 
 
Good evidence that 
childhood program 
has provided indirect 
benefit to adults aged 
≥65 
 
Reduced incidence of 
IPD in adults- a result 
of childhood 
vaccination rather 
than direct benefit 
from increased 
uptake of 23vPPV 
 
Serotype replacement 
has reduced initial 
benefit of program 
 
 
Decrease of 
7vPCV 
serotypes 
 
Increased 
incidence of 
13vPCV and 
23vPPV 
serotypes 
 
Ecological 
study- no 
cause / effect 
relation able 
to be 
established 
 
Benefits of 
vaccine 
program at 
population 
level 
 
Direct and 
indirect 
benefits to 
elderly people 
aged ≥ 65 
years from the 
two programs 
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Author 
Year 
[Ref #] 
Setting  
/ 
Study type 
Data source  
/  
Population 
estimates 
 
Monitoring 
periods (pre 
and post 
funding) 
Vaccine 
Coverage 
 
Incidence: 
Pre-funding rate 
Post-funding rate 
Incidence Rate 
Ratio (IRR (CI 
95%)) 
Outcomes / Results Comments 
Wallace 
2008 
[12] 
Setting: 
North Coast 
Area Health 
Service 
(NCAHS), 
NSW 
 
Study type: 
Intervention 
(TV 
commercial) 
study 
 
Data source: 
Vaccine 
ordering 
pattern of 
NCAHS 
population 
used as a 
proxy of 
vaccine 
coverage in 
the state 
 
CSL Cognos 
Vaccine 
Distribution 
Reporting 
System 
Database 
Post-National 
NIP Funding 
2005/2006 
 
Intervention 
between  
June- Sept 
2006 
2004 
23vPPV 
Adults  
≥65 years 
NCAHS 
Coverage: 
41.8% 
NSW 
Coverage: 
47.2% 
 
2007 
23vPPV 
Adults  
≥65 years 
NCAHS 
Coverage: 
59.8% 
NSW 
Coverage: 
59.1% 
 
Nil 7 week TV 
advertisement to 
raise community 
awareness of 
23vPPV funding 
changes. 
 
Significant increase 
in vaccine coverage 
 
TV campaign was an 
effective strategy to 
increase coverage 
and promote 
vaccine uptake 
 
Research was 
conducted to 
improve 
vaccine 
coverage with 
a 7 week TV 
campaign 
 
Intervention 
study 
 
Used vaccine 
ordering 
pattern as a 
proxy for 
coverage. No 
estimates of 
vaccine 
leakage or 
wastage  
Andrews 
2004 
[7] 
Setting: 
Victoria 
 
Study type: 
Ecological 
analysis of 
trends of IPD 
over time 
IPD data 
source: 
Victorian 
Hospital 
Pathology 
Surveillance 
Scheme 
(VHPSS) 
& Department 
of Human 
Services (DHS) 
 
Population 
est: 
ABS 
population 
estimates 
(2001 census 
data) 
Pre-Victorian 
Funding 
July 1995 to 
June 1998 
 
Post- Victorian 
Funding 
July 2001 to 
June 2002 
 
(1998- 23vPPV 
funding specific 
to Victorians ≥65 
years of age) 
 
1997 
23vPPV 
Elderly 
Coverage: 
7%  
 
2000 
23vPPV 
Elderly 
Coverage: 
51%  
 
≥65 years - 
all people 
IRR = 0.64 
 
 
36% reduction in 
rate of IPD following 
the funding changes 
amongst people 
ages  
≥ 65 years. 
 
115 cases of IPD 
amongst Victorians 
aged ≥65 years 
between July 2001 
and June 2002 
 
Publically funded 
23vPPV program 
resulted in the 
reduction of IPD in 
elderly Victorians 
 
Ecological 
assessment of 
the impact of 
Australian’s 
first publically 
funded 
23vPPV 
program 
against IPD 
targeting 
elderly people 
(≥ 65 years). 
 
May 2001- 
mandatory 
reporting of 
IPD required in 
Victoria 
Ridda 
2007 
[11] 
Setting: 
Westmead 
Hospital, 
NSW 
 
Study type: 
Observation
al survey 
within a 
specific 
cohort 
Data source: 
Hospital 
patients from 
Westmead 
 
~ 1997 people 
admitted 
within study 
period 
– 833 people 
approached 
 
 
In response to 
the 2005 
National 
Pneumococcal 
Vaccine 
Funding 
changes 
 
Information 
collected 
between 16 
May 2005 and 
20 February 
2006 
 
Before 
2005 
23vPPV 
Elderly 
≥65 years 
Coverage: 
39%  
 
After 2005 
23vPPV 
Elderly 
≥65 years 
Coverage: 
73% 
Nil Due to age of the 
cohort, self-
reporting of ≥65 not 
reliable 
 
Sensitivity: 0.53 
Specificity: 0.55 
Positive predictive 
value: 0.90 
Negative predictive 
value: 0.52 
 
Vaccine validation 
of records required 
 
Vaccine status 
validated 
against GP 
records 
 
Funding of 
23vPPV, 
immediate 
and rapid 
impact on 
vaccine uptake 
of ≥ 65 years 
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Author 
Year 
[Ref #] 
Setting  
/ 
Study 
type 
Data source  
/  
Population 
estimates 
 
Monitorin
g periods 
(pre and 
post 
funding) 
Vaccine 
Coverage 
 
Incidence: 
Pre-funding rate 
Post-funding rate 
Incidence Rate Ratio 
(IRR (CI 95%)) 
Outcomes / Results Comments 
Hanna 
2010 
[8] 
Setting: 
Northern 
Queensla
nd (QLD) 
 
Study 
type: 
Ecological 
analysis 
of trends 
of IPD 
over time 
IPD data source: 
NNDSS QLD, 
with diagnostic 
lab information 
provided to local 
Public Health 
Units 
 
Population est: 
QLD Treasury’s 
Office of 
Economic and 
Statistical 
Research 
 
Non-indigenous 
≥65 years 
~581,850 in 
2006 
 
Pre-
National 
Funding 
2001-2004 
 
Post-
National 
Funding 
2006-2009 
 
(In 2005 
7vPCV 
nationally 
available to 
all children, 
and 23vPPV 
nationally 
available all 
non-
indigenous 
people ≥ 65 
years) 
2007 
7vPCV 
Children 
(< 1 years 
& 3 doses) 
QLD 
Coverage: 
91% 
 
≥65 years - 
non-Indigenous only 
All IPD serotypes: 
Pre: 23.0 / 100,000 
Post: 14.1 / 100,000 
IRR 0.61 
7vPCV serotypes only 
Pre: 12.5 / 100,000 
Post: 2.8 / 100,000 
IRR 0.23 
23vPPV-non-7vPCV: 
Pre: 6.9/ 100,000 
Post: 6.0 / 100,000 
IRR 0.88 
23v serotypes only 
Pre 19.4 / 100,000 
Post 8.9/ 100,000 
IRR 0.46 
Overall, a 77% decline 
in 7vPCV serotypes in 
elderly people ≥65 
years 
 
7vPCV powerful indirect 
effect of IPD prevention 
in elderly people 
 
Uncertain if 23vPPV had 
a direct effect upon 
elderly ages ≥65 years 
 
 
Combination of 
direct and 
indirect benefits 
of the vaccines, 
new vaccines 
(13vPCV) could 
prevent more 
IPD of other 
serotypes than 
could be 
prevented with 
7vPCV and 
23vPPV 
 
Potential for 
‘replacement’ 
serotypes that 
are not covered 
by the two 
vaccines 
Hanna 
2006 
[13] 
Setting: 
Northern 
Queensla
nd (QLD) 
 
Study 
type: 
Ecological 
analysis 
of trends 
of IPD 
over time 
IPD data source: 
NNDSS QLD, 
with diagnostic 
lab information 
provided to local 
Public Health 
Units 
 
Population est: 
QLD Treasury’s 
Office of 
Economic and 
Statistical 
Research 
Indigenous 
population est: 
~ 5650 aged ≥50 
years 
Pre-Nth 
QLD 
Funding 
1999-2001 
 
Post-Nth 
QLD 
Funding 
2002-2004 
 
(7vPCV 
available to 
children mid 
2001 in Nth 
QLD) 
Nil ≥50 years - 
Indigenous only 
All IPD serotypes: 
Pre: 71.0 / 100,000 
Post: 41.0 / 100,000 
IRR 0.58 
7vPCV serotypes only 
Pre: 19.0 / 100,000 
Post: 15.0 / 100,000 
IRR 0.63 
23v serotypes only 
Pre: 49.0 / 100,000 
Post: 31.0 / 100,000 
IRR 0.79 
Herd immunity effect 
 
Continued decline of 
IPD in Indigenous 
people since 1996 
(when 23vPPV available 
in QLD) 
 
19 cases of IPD of 
Indigenous people ≥ 50 
years between 1999 
and 2004: 63% (n=12) 
between 1999-01 
 
86% declined of IPD in 
Indigenous people aged 
≥ 50 years since 23vPPV 
funding in 1996 
Encouraging 
 
High vaccine 
coverage 
 
Good vaccine 
effective in 
population 
Lehamnn 
2010 
[10] 
Setting: 
Western 
Australia 
(WA) 
 
Study 
type: 
Ecological 
analysis 
of trends 
of IPD 
over time 
IPD data source: 
Enhanced IPD 
Surveillance 
Vaccine Impact 
Surveillance 
Network – 
NNDSS and 
Hospitalisation 
datasets 
 
Population est: 
ABS population 
estimates (2006 
census data) 
 
~ 2.2 million 
people in WA, 
and about 3.5% 
of these people 
are Indigenous 
 
Pre-
National 
Funding 
2002-2004 
 
Post-
National 
Funding 
2005-2007 
 
(In 2005 
7vPCV 
nationally 
available to 
all children, 
and 23vPPV 
nationally 
available all 
non-
indigenous 
people ≥ 65 
years) 
 
2005 
7vPCV 
Children 
(<1 year & 
3 doses) 
Indigenous 
Coverage: 
75%  
 
Non 
Indigenous 
Coverage: 
88% 
 
2005 
23vPPV 
Indigenous 
Adults 
(50-64 
years) 
Coverage: 
~ 31% 
≥65 years - 
non-Indigenous only 
All IPD serotype: 
Pre: 19.2 / 100,000 
Post: 13.0 / 100,000 
IRR 0.68 (0.5-0.9) 
7vPCV serotypes only 
Pre: 12.7 / 100,000 
Post: 6.5 / 100,000 
IRR 0.51 (0.4-0.7) 
Non 7vPCV serotypes 
Pre: 5.6 / 100,000 
Post: 5.8 / 100,000 
IRR 1.04 (0.7-1.7) 
23vPPV non 7vPCV 
Pre: 3.3 / 100,000 
Post: 4.6 / 100,000 
IRR 1.39 
50 - 64 years - 
Indigenous only 
All IPD serotype: 
Pre: 76.1 / 100,000 
Post: 86.3 / 100,000 
IRR 1.13 (0.5-2.6) 
7vPCV serotypes only 
Pre: 12.7 / 100,000 
Post: 10.8 / 100,000 
IRR 0.85 (0.1-11.7) 
Non 7vPCV serotypes 
Pre: 57.1 / 100,000 
Post: 75.5 / 100,000 
IRR 1.32 (0.5-3.5) 
IPD incidence rate 
decreased remarkably 
in children and non-
indigenous adults 
IPD due to 7vPCV 
schedule 
 
Non – 7vPCV serotypes 
have increased 
 
An immunisation 
register covering all age 
groups should be 
established 
Herd effect of 
7vPCV 
 
Insufficient time 
frame to get 
true effect of 
the vaccine 
program 2005 to 
2007 
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4.9.2 Coverage of the 23vPPV  
Before the jurisdictional funding of 23vPPV in Victoria during 1998, very low 
coverage (7%) was reported among elderly people in 1997.7 However, after 
implementation of the jurisdicational funding, coverage of this group rapidly 
increased to 51% in 2000.7 A rapid increase of 23vPPV coverage was not evident 
in Western Australia (WA) following the NIP funding of the polysaccharide 
vaccine for elderly Indigenous people in 2000; in 2005, it was estimated that 
about 31% of the WA Indigenous population aged 50-64 years were vaccinated 
with 23vPPV.10 
Prior to the 2005 NIP funding of 23vPPV for elderly non-Indigenous people, 
national vaccine coverage of non-Indigenous people aged 65 years or older was 
between 41% and 53% in 2004.5 Following funding, coverage for this cohort 
increased slightly to between 51% and 64% in 2006, and 48% and 56% in 2009.5 
In NSW, coverage for all people aged 65 years or older was between 39% and 
47% before 2005, and between 59% and 73% after 2005.11,12  
 
4.9.3 Coverage of the 7vPCV  
At the time of NIP funding of the 7vPCV in 2005, high vaccine coverage of 
children aged less than 12 months and who had received three doses was 
reported throughout Australia. In 2005, 7vPCV coverage was 89% for all children 
in NSW6; 91% for all children in South Australia (SA)9; and in WA 88% for non-
Indigenous children and 75% for Indigenous children10. In the following years, 
national coverage reached 92% for non-Indigenous children, and 85% for 
Indigenous children between 2007 and 20084, and 91% for all children in 
Queensland (QLD) in 2007.8  
Overall, funding of the polysaccharide vaccine resulted in some increased 
vaccine coverage among targeted age groups, while higher coverage of 
conjugate vaccines has been achieved in younger children. 
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4.9.4 Incidence of IPD in non-Indigenous people aged 65 years or older 
All IPD serotypes:  
The concurrent funding of pneumococcal conjugate and polysaccharide vaccines 
in Australia has been responsible for an overall decrease of IPD cases among 
elderly non-Indigenous people. Funded pneumococcal vaccines have been 
responsible for a 35% decrease in the national incidence of elderly non-
Indigenous IPD cases (Incidence Rate Ratio [IRR] = 0.65)5, and a jurisdictional 
decrease of 27% in SA (IRR = 0.73)9, and 40% in NSW (IRR = 0.60).6  
Overall, the national incidence rate of elderly IPD cases for non-Indigenous 
people has dropped from 25 cases per 100,000 population before 2005, to about 
16.5 cases per 100,000 population after 2005.5 
 
Serotypes of the 23vPPV:  
Polysaccharide vaccines appear to have reduced the incidence of IPD cases 
caused by the serotypes specific to the 23vPPV. The incidence of IPD cases 
caused by the 23 serotypes of the polysaccharide vaccine has decreased 
nationally since 2005 (IRR = 0.72),4 and within the jurisdiction of northern QLD 
(IRR = 0.46).8 At the same time, the incidence of non-vaccine types (serotypes 
not included in the 23vPPV) have increased nationally (IRR = 2.1 - 2.5),4,5 and 
within the jurisdictions of NSW and SA (IRR = 1.23 and 5.3 respectively).6,9 It 
would appear, from these results alone, that the 23vPPV has had a significant 
impact upon reducing the incidence of IPD cases in the elderly non-Indigenous 
population. 
However, it is important to note that an evaluation of the incidence of IPD among 
elderly people should not only consider the direct impact of the 23vPPV, but also 
be evaluated in the context of the concurrently funded childhood conjugate 
vaccines. The overall effectiveness of the pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine 
program for elderly individuals is complicated, especially when considering the 
moderate coverage of 23vPPV in each jurisdiction, and the relatively low 
effectiveness of the 23vPPV vaccine (vaccine effectiveness (VE) of 
approximately 61%),5 alongside the high coverage and effectiveness of the 
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funded conjugate vaccines. The 7vPCV is not only highly effective at reducing the 
burden of IPD, it also reduces the nasopharynx bacterial carriage of 7vPCV 
serotypes within an immunised person, which reduces person-to-person 
transmission of 7vPCV specific serotypes, and induces a substantial indirect 
impact upon non-immunised people (via herd immunity).5  
 
Serotypes of the 7vPCV: 
Since funding of pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, the incidence of IPD cases 
caused by the 7vPCV specific serotypes has decreased considerably within the 
elderly non-Indigenous population of Australia. Nationally, the incidence of IPD 
cases caused by the 7vPCV specific serotypes within this cohort has decreased 
by 74% - 89% (IRR = 0.11 - 0.26)4,5 and by 49% in WA (IRR = 0.51)10 and 85% in 
NSW (IRR = 0.15).6 While 7vPCV is not administered to elderly people, the 
reduced nasopharynx carriage of 7vPCV serotypes within children has indirectly 
reduced the number of IPD cases caused by these serotypes among elderly 
people by reducing the transmission of respiratory droplets from person-to-
person. 
 
Serotypes specific only to the 23vPPV (23vPPV-non-7vPCV and 23vPPV-
non-13vPCV):  
When considering the serotypes specific only to the 23vPPV (i.e. 23vPPV-non-
7vPCV and 23vPPV-non-13vPCV), the impact of the 23vPPV program targeting 
elderly non-Indigenous people becomes questionable. The incidence of IPD 
cases caused by 23vPPV-non-7vPCV serotypes has increased nationally by 64% 
since 2005 (IRR = 1.64)5 and within WA by 39% (IRR = 1.39),10 while decreasing 
by 12% in northern QLD (IRR = 0.88)8. Similar jurisdictional variation regarding 
the incidence of IPD cases caused by 23vPPV-non-13vPCV are also evident in 
NSW (IRR = 0.92)6 and SA (IRR = 1.91).9  
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4.9.5 Incidence of IPD in Indigenous people aged 50 years or older 
While the impact of the 23vPPV funding program upon the elderly non-
Indigenous population was able to be interpreted from the results presented in 
the reviewed articles, the same cannot be said for the older Indigenous 
community. Incidence rate ratios for older Indigenous people were presented 
nationally (2002-2011),5 and for the jurisdiction of northern QLD (2001-2009)8 
and WA (2002-2007).10 However, these ratios measure the relative difference of 
the funding changes to the NIP during 2005, rather than the targeted 23vPPV 
funding changes for older Indigenous people in 2000.  
Nationally, the incidence of IPD cases caused by 23vPPV specific serotypes 
among older non-Indigenous people (aged ≥50 years) increased by 93% after 
2005 (IRR = 1.93), as did the non-vaccine serotypes (serotypes not covered by 
the 23vPPV) (IRR = 2.59).4 The national burden of IPD in older Indigenous 
people also increased over time, from 20.5 cases/100,000 people in 2002, to 
39.5 cases/100,000 people in 2008.4  
By jurisdiction, the incidence of IPD cases caused by all IPD serotypes among 
older Indigenous people has decreased by 42% in northern QLD (IRR = 0.58),13 
while increasing by 13% in WA (IRR = 1.13).10 The higher incidence of IPD within 
WA was largely caused by the serotypes not included in the 7vPCV (IRR for 
23vPPV-non-7vPCV = 1.32), rather than by the serotypes of the 7vPCV (IRR = 
0.85).10 The reduced incidence of IPD in northern QLD could have been a result 
of the reduced incidence of IPD caused by the serotypes of the 7vPCV (IRR = 
0.63), as well as the serotypes included in the 23vPPV (IRR = 0.79).13 
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4.10 Summary 
From the analysis of ten selected publications meeting the inclusion criteria for 
the literature review, there is suggestive evidence that the 23vPPV program had 
had an impact on the incidence of IPD in older people of Australia. However, this 
impact was weakened when considering the potential herd immunity impact of 
the concurrent childhood pneumococcal conjugate vaccine program. Conflicting 
evidence was reported regarding the 23vPCV-non-7vPCV serotypes and 
23vPPV-non-13vPCV serotypes among elderly non-Indigenous people in 
different jurisdictions. The heterogeneity of these results are possibly due to 
different contributing factors, such as the highly variable 23vPPV vaccine 
coverage within each jurisdiction; the different NIP recommendations that target 
different at-risk people and groups; and the community knowledge and 
awareness regarding the NIP funding changes.2,11,12 The need to improve the 
vaccine coverage of 23vPPV among the elderly Australian population was also 
identified. 
There appears to be stronger supporting evidence that the childhood 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine program has had a significant indirect impact 
(via herd immunity) on the incidence of IPD in older Australians than the targeted 
pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine program. The pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccines appear very effective at reducing the nasopharyngeal carriage of S. 
pneumoniae and person-to-person transmission of vaccine serotypes to 
susceptible older people.5 As a consequence of the effective herd immunity 
provided by the conjugate vaccines, there is also jurisdictional evidence to 
suggest that different replacement serotypes (non-vaccine serotypes) are 
infecting more vaccinated and unvaccinated people, which appear to be eroding 
the overall benefits of the pneumococcal vaccine programs.4-6,8,9  
Vaccines and vaccine schedules need to be constantly monitored to ensure that 
they are cost effective and protect as many people as possible. Robust 
surveillance systems (with serotyping data) are essential for controlling IPD in 
Australia, so that public health epidemiologists can monitor the changing 
epidemiology of the disease over time, investigate the changing incidence of IPD 
within each jurisdiction, evaluate the impact of different vaccines, and monitor the 
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increasing impact of non-vaccine/replacement serotypes. However, it is 
worthwhile noting that such ecological studies (as reviewed here) have 
limitations, and caution is required when interpreting results. Biases are 
introduced to an ecological study over time, including changes and improvements 
made to diagnostic, surveillance and laboratory techniques, which are constantly 
incorporated to improve the overall collection of enhanced IPD data.6  
Despite these limitations, this review generally confirms that funded 
pneumococcal vaccines in Australia have had a positive impact upon reducing 
the incidence of IPD within the older population. It also highlights the importance 
of continued and regular monitoring of IPD surveillance data. It is anticipated that 
further analysis of the linked datasets within the NSW Public Health Registry 
(which includes IPD notification, hospitalisation, emergency and deaths) will allow 
for this continues monitoring of IPD cases in the older NSW population, along 
with further investigation of the morbidity and mortality associated with 
pneumococcal disease, in particular pneumococcal pneumonia.  
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Part ɪɪ 
NSW Public Health Registry: 
created using linked data 
 
 
4.11 Prologue to Part ɪɪ 
This second part of the investigation was a large data linkage project to better 
identify the impact that funding of different pneumococcal vaccine (under the NIP) 
has had on the burden of disease in the older population in NSW. Data on 
invasive and non-invasive pneumonia (ICD-10-AM codes J13 and J18.1) was 
examined using hospitalisation, notification, emergency and death datasets from 
NSW. This work was conducted at the Communicable Disease Branch, NSW 
Health. This study would be the first to accurately quantify hospital coding of 
pneumococcal pneumonia that is attributable to laboratory confirmed IPD in 
NSW.  
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4.12 Introduction 
4.12.1 Background 
Post-implementation studies that evaluate the trends in hospitalisation coding of 
community acquired pneumonia (CAP) following the funding of pneumococcal 
conjugate and polysaccharide vaccines are sparse, especially in adults.14 While 
pneumococcal vaccines are well documented to have reduced the incidence of 
IPD in children and elderly (as documented in Part I), there are also some 
documented reductions in all-cause pneumonia hospitalisation in adults following 
the introduction of 7vPCV in the United States of America15,16 and Australia,17 
and in children from Canada.18 Streptococcus pneumoniae is the most commonly 
identified pathogen in hospitalised adults with CAP.17,19,20 Post-implementation 
studies are necessary to help inform national policy making regarding funding 
changes of pneumococcal vaccines, and provide additional information that 
supports evidence-based guidelines. The timing of this investigation is highly 
relevant in light of the recent Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
(PBAC) approval for the use of 13vPCV in the adult population of Australia for the 
prevention of pneumococcal pneumonia and IPD.21 The PBAC acknowledged 
that the effectiveness of 13vPCV against CAP not associated with IPD is superior 
to that of 23vPPV,21 and that CAP is a much bigger contributor to total disease 
burden than is IPD.  
 
4.12.2 New South Wales Public Health Registry 
Notification, hospitalisation, emergency and death data are useful for assessing 
the burden of diseases, but limitations of these data sources in isolation impact 
on their usefulness. Invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) notifications in NSW 
are based on agreed national surveillance case definitions, with inclusion criteria 
based on rigorous laboratory evidence. However, enhanced data about morbidity 
(emergency department presentation and hospitalisation) and mortality in IPD 
notification datasets is often incomplete. Linking hospitalisation, emergency 
department and death datasets to IPD notification data allows more complete 
capture of morbidity and mortality due to invasive pneumococcal disease. 
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Using the NSW Public Health Registry (PHR) (an established linked dataset 
including IPD and emergency department and hospital data) allows first, 
assessment of data completeness amongst IPD notifications and second, 
estimation of the proportion of hospitalisations coded as pneumococcal 
pneumonia which are associated with IPD, facilitating more accurate estimation 
of the burden of pneumococcal disease in people aged 50 years and over in 
NSW. 
 
4.12.3 Aims of project 
The aims of this project were to determine the morbidity and mortality associated 
with pneumococcal disease (invasive and non-invasive) using linked IPD 
notifications, pneumococcal disease related hospitalisations and emergency 
records and registration of death data in the older population of NSW. A further 
aim was to investigate the impact that the pneumococcal vaccination program 
has had upon the burden of disease within this cohort. 
 
4.12.4 Research questions  
For older people (aged 50 years or older) of NSW: 
a) What proportion of hospital admissions coded for pneumococcal 
pneumonia (ICD-10-AM codes J13 and J18.1) were associated with an 
IPD notification between 2002 and 2012? 
b) What proportion of cases captured by each of the datasets of the NSW 
PHR for IPD episodes with a linked hospital admission coded as 
pneumococcal pneumonia (ICD-10-AM codes J13 and J18.1) died 
between 2002 and 2012? 
c) Where did people reside in NSW who were notified with IPD and were 
without an associated hospital or emergency record in the NSW PHR 
datasets between the years 2002 and 2012?   
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4.13 Methods 
4.13.1 Datasets 
Data for this analysis were obtained from the NSW PHR. The PHR contains 
aggregated data from five abridged NSW public health surveillance systems 
(Table 4.4) and contains linked health records, with a unique Project-specific 
Person Number (PPN) assigned to each record. The creation of the PHR is 
covered by the NSW Public Health Act 2010 (Section 97), and the following 
analysis was covered by ethics approval from the Australian National University 
ethics committee (ANU/2016/197). Data-linkage was conducted using SAS 
Enterprise Guide (2013; Version 6.1-M1; SAS Institute Inc., Cary NC, USA). 
 
Table 4.4: Administrative datasets which comprise the New South Wales Public 
Health Registry 
Type of 
records 
NSW 
administrative 
datasets 
Acronym of 
surveillance 
system 
Complete date 
range 
available 
Number of 
records 
available 
Hospitalisation 
Admitted 
Patient Data 
Collection 
APDC 
01/07/2001 
– 31/03/2015 
13,537,957 
Emergency 
Department 
Emergency 
Department 
Data Collection 
EDDC 
01/07/2005 
– 31/03/2015 
9,528,460 
Notifications 
Notifiable 
Conditions 
Information 
Management 
System 
NCIMS 
01/01/1993 
– 31/12/2013 
695,335 
Death Records 
Registry of 
Birth, Deaths 
and Marriages 
RBDM 
01/01/1985 
– 31/03/2015 
245,324 
 
Australian Co-
ordinated 
Registry of 
Death 
ACRD 
01/01/1994 
– 31/12/2012 
183,369 
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4.13.2 Ascertainment of hospital cases 
APDC database: 
The Admitted Patient Data Collection (APDC) database contains records for all 
admitted patient services provided by NSW Public Hospitals, Public Psychiatric 
Hospitals, Public Multi-Purpose Services (an integrated health and aged care 
services, which provides a flexible and sustainable service options for rural and 
remote communities), Private Hospitals, and Private Day Procedures Centres. 
Each record represents an individual hospital admission event of a patient, and 
the period of care, not the completed disease episode. The APDC database 
contains 51 diagnostic fields, including the primary diagnosis (i.e. the condition 
that was associated with the highest use of resources) and up to 50 additional 
diagnoses, completed by certified medical archivists after hospital discharge, 
following review of medical notes.17,22 The diagnoses of the patient were coded 
using the tenth revision of the International Classification of Disease coding 
system-Australian modified (ICD-10-AM). 
 
Hospital admissions:  
The hospitalisation database was restricted to include only hospital admissions 
with an ICD-10-AM code within any of the 51 diagnostic fields that indicated 
pneumococcal disease and unspecified pneumonia (Table 4.5). This 
heterogeneous group of hospital codes were chosen as they should capture all 
cases of pneumococcal disease, allowing for incorrect hospital coding. Dates of 
admission were restricted to between 01/01/2002 and 31/12/2012. Age at 
admission was restricted to 49 years and older, so as to account for anyone who 
had been hospitalised prior to their IPD notification event on or just after their 50th 
birthday. 
 
Hospital-episodes:  
To account for inter- and intra-hospital transfers, and follow-up and rehabilitative 
care associated with pneumococcal disease, hospital admissions were 
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aggregated into hospital-episodes (where a hospital-episode of an individual was 
defined as the grouping of consecutive hospital admissions that were coded for 
pneumococcal disease or unspecified pneumonia and occurred within 30 days of 
one another). Start-date, start-age, end-date and end-age of each hospital-
episode were maintained, as were the number of hospital admissions that had 
been combined and the cumulative time spent in hospital. In addition, 
pneumococcal ‘flags’ were created for each hospital-episode. The first two flags 
were ‘pneumococcal meningitis’ and ‘pneumococcal septicaemia’, and were 
defined as all cases where S. pneumoniae was coded as the causative pathogen 
(ICD-10-AM code: G00.1 and A40.3 respectively). The third flag included 
presumptive ‘pneumococcal pneumonia’, and was defined as all cases where S. 
pneumoniae was coded as the causative pathogen (ICD-10-AM code: J13) or 
were coded as lobar pneumonia (ICD-10-AM code: J18.1). The final group was 
‘unspecified pneumonia’, and included all hospitalisations coded as pneumonia 
and without a causative organism identified (Table 4.5).  
 
Single hospital record:  
Following the creation of hospital-episodes, hospital records were flattened to a 
single line per PPN. Each PPN including start-date, start-age, end-date and end-
age for each hospital-episode, cumulative time spent in hospital, elapsed time 
between each episodes and cumulative counts of each pneumococcal flags at a 
hospital-episode level. Finally, each PPN was assigned an overall pneumococcal 
condition flag, based on a defined pneumococcal disease hierarchy (Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.5: Diagnostic codes and classification of pneumococcal disease and 
pneumonia using hospitalisation coding (source of information: Jardine et al. 
201017) 
ICD-10-AM 
/ ICD-10 
coding 
ICD-9-CM 
coding 
Wording of condition Pneumococcal flag 
G00.1 320.1 Pneumococcal meningitis 
Pneumococcal 
meningitis 
A40.3 038.2 Pneumococcal septicaemia 
Pneumococcal 
septicaemia 
J13 481 Pneumococcal pneumonia 
Pneumococcal 
pneumonia 
J18.1 481 Lobar pneumonia, unspecified 
J15.9 482.9 Bacterial pneumonia, unspecified 
Unspecified 
pneumonia 
J18.0 485 Bronchopneumonia, unspecified 
J18.2 514 Hypostatic pneumonia, unspecified 
J18.8 486 
Other pneumonia, organism 
unspecified 
J18.9 486 Pneumonia, organism unspecified 
Table 4.6: Pneumococcal hierarchy groups used at an individual level 
Pneumococcal hierarchy 
group 
Definition, using hospital coding 
(i) Pneumococcal 
meningitis 
A patient coded with pneumococcal meningitis 
anytime during their hospital stay 
(ii) Pneumococcal 
septicaemia 
A patient coded with pneumococcal septicaemia 
anytime during their hospital stay, and without 
pneumococcal meningitis coding 
(iii) Pneumococcal 
pneumonia 
A patient coded with pneumococcal pneumonia 
anytime during their hospital stay, and without 
pneumococcal meningitis or pneumococcal 
septicaemia coding 
(iv) Unspecified 
pneumonia 
A patient coded with unspecified pneumonia anytime 
during their hospital history, and without 
pneumococcal meningitis or pneumococcal 
septicaemia or pneumococcal pneumonia coding 
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4.13.3 Ascertainment of emergency cases 
The Emergency Department Data Collection (EDDC) database contains 
information about patient presentations to the emergency department of public 
hospitals in NSW. This dataset included a single diagnostic field per emergency 
event, and was coded using either the ninth revision of the International 
Classification of Disease coding system (ICD-9-CM) or ICD-10-AM. 
Emergency events, emergency-episodes and single emergency records per PPN 
were created in the same manner as described above for hospital records, with 
the following exceptions. Pneumococcal disease and unspecified pneumonia 
emergencies (using both ICD_10_AM and IDC-9-CM codes: Table 4.5) were 
filtered using the single primary diagnosis field only. Also, dates of emergency 
presentation were restricted between 1/07/2005 and 31/12/2012.  
 
4.13.4 Ascertainment of notified cases 
The Notifiable Conditions Information Management System (NCIMS) contains 
confirmed cases of IPD notified to the NSW Department of Health by 
laboratories, hospitals and medical practitioners. A confirmed case of IPD is 
defined by laboratory definitive evidence of S. pneumoniae in a normally sterile 
site of the body, and includes isolation of S. pneumoniae by culture or detection 
by nucleic acid test. The abbreviated NCIMS dataset of the PHR included a 
single diagnostic field for each case, while lacking enhanced data fields such as 
focus of infection, serotype of infective agent and vaccination status of the case.  
Notifications were filtered to include confirmed cases of IPD who were 50 years 
of age or older, and with notification dates between 1/01/2002 to 31/12/2012. 
Duplicate records were removed from the dataset when two IPD notifications 
were recorded for the same individual within 30 days of one another. 
 
4.13.5 Ascertainment of deceased cases 
The Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages (RBDM) and the Australian Co-
ordinating Registry of Death (ACRD) contains mortality information for deaths 
Chapter Four  Epi-Project 
129 | P a g e  
 
occurring in NSW; RBDM recording fact-of-death (all records of death; no coding 
of the cause of death) and ACRD recording cause-of-death (coded using ICD-10 
classification of disease). 
Records of the RBDM were filtered for date of death between 1/01/2002 to 
1/03/2013 (to account for death occurring after final hospital-episode), and 
duplicates (using PPN) were removed. The RBDM dataset does not record age 
at death, so no further filtering was conducted.  
Records of the ACRD were filtered for date of death between 1/01/2002 to 
1/03/2013 (to account for death occurring after final hospital-episode), age at 
death of 50 years or older, and cause of death coded due to pneumococcal 
disease and unspecified pneumonia (Table 4.5). Duplicates (using PPN) were 
removed from the dataset.  
 
4.13.6 Merging of records 
For each of the following merge procedures, the ‘PPN’ variable was used as the 
single linking variable.  
With regards to the accompanying figures below: 
 a Merge circle is a temporary dataset; 
 a Cohort circle is an endpoint dataset; 
 a grey circle represents when the complete dataset was maintained during 
the merge procedure; and  
 a white circle represents when non-linked data was dropped from the 
merge. 
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Creation of Cohort 1 and 2 
a) The flattened APDC records and filtered NCIMS datasets were merged to 
create Merge-1 
 
All records were maintained during this merging process (grey circles) 
Merged records were validated for each PPN and flagged (IPD_episode_flag) 
when the notification date occurred within 30 days of an individual hospitalisation-
episode. For individuals with an IPD_episode_flag, the hospitalisation-episode 
number was recorded, as were the tally of pneumococcal disease/unspecified 
pneumonia hospitalisation-episodes that followed this IPD notification.  
 
b) The flattened EDDC records and Merge-1 datasets were merged to create 
Merge-2 
 
Unlinked EDDC records (white circle) were dropped from Merge-2 
This merging procedure was used exclusively to account for notification records 
without a linked hospitalisation-episode from Merge-1. Merged records were 
validated for each PPN and flagged (IPD_episode_flag) when the notification 
date occurred within 30 days of an emergency-episode and in the absence of a 
hospitalisation-episode.  
  
APDC NCIMS 
EDDC 
Merge-
1 
 Merge-
1 
 Merge-
2 
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c) Filtered RBDM, ACRD and Merge-2 datasets were merged to create 
Merge-3  
 
 
 
Unlinked RBDM and ACRD records were dropped from Merge-3 
Merged records were validated for each PPN and flagged (death_flag) when 
death occurred within 14 days of the (i) notification date, (ii) separation date of 
the final hospital-episode or (iii) departure date of the final emergency-episode 
recorded of an individual. 
 
d) Creation of Cohort-1 and Cohort-2 from Merge-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Merge-3 was separated into two separate cohorts based on the 
IPD_episode_flag  
 Cohort-1 contained filtered hospitalisation records coded for 
pneumococcal disease or unspecified pneumonia and without a linked 
IPD notification record. Records filtered for 50 years of age or older.  
 Cohort-2 contained IPD notification records with either a linked 
hospitalisation or emergency record coded for pneumococcal disease or 
unspecified pneumonia.  
 
 
RBDM 
ACRD 
 Merge-
3 
Merge-
2 
 Merge-
3 
 Cohort
-1 
 Cohort
-2 
where IPD_episode_flag = FALSE 
where IPD_episode_flag = TRUE 
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Creation of Cohort 3 and 4 
Notifications of IPD without an associated hospitalisation-episode or emergency-
episode coded for pneumococcal disease or unspecified pneumonia (i.e. IPD 
notifications that were not part of Cohort-1 or Cohort-2) were re-merged with the 
original hospitalisation and emergency datasets of the NSW PHR (i.e. the non-
filtered APDC and EDDC datasets). 
 
e) Non-filtered APDC and EDDC datasets and the unlinked NCIMS dataset 
were merged to create Merge-4  
 
APDC and EDDC records that did not merge with NCIMS records were dropped  
* original datasets of the NSW PHR with all hospitalisations and emergencies codes  
^ IPD notifications without a linked hospitalisation-episode or emergency-episode  
 
This merging procedure resulted in a single notified record merging with multiple 
hospitalisation and emergency records. Merged records were validated for each 
PPN and flagged (IPD_episode_flag_2) when the notification date occurred 
within 30 days of the hospitalisation admission or emergency arrival dates. 
Flagged records were sorted by length of elapse-time between notification date 
and hospitalisation admission or emergency arrival date in ascending order. The 
first records (including the shortest elapse-time and all unlinked IPD notifications) 
were retained for each PPN. 
  
APDC* 
EDDC* 
NCIMS^ 
 Merge-
4 
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f) Creation of Cohort-3 and Cohort-4 from Merge-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Merge-4 was separated into two cohorts based on the IPD_episode_flag_2  
 Cohort-3 contained IPD notification records with either a linked 
hospitalisation or emergency record coded for other diagnoses (i.e. not 
pneumococcal disease).  
 Cohort-4 contained IPD notification records without a linked 
hospitalisation or emergency record identified within the NSW PHR. 
 
4.13.7 Population estimates 
Age-specific and Indigenous-specific mid-year estimates of resident population 
size for the NSW population were obtained from NSW Health. 
 
4.13.8 Data analysis 
Overall 
A descriptive statistical analysis was conducted for the overall data, where 
numbers and proportions of pneumococcal and unspecified pneumonia cases 
were calculated. 
  
 Merge-
4 
 Cohort
-3 
 Cohort
-4 
where IPD_episode_flag_2 = TRUE 
where IPD_episode_flag_2 = FALSE 
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Pneumococcal pneumonia from Cohort-1 and Cohort2 only 
A second descriptive statistics analysis was conducted on filtered data from 
Cohort-1 and 2. Records were filtered for hospital code specifically for 
presumptive pneumococcal pneumonia (ICD-10-AM codes J13 and J18.1).  
 
For the following analysis: 
 ‘invasive pneumococcal pneumonia’ was defined as an IPD notification 
with a linked hospital-episode coded for pneumococcal pneumonia, and  
 ‘presumptive non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia’ was defined as 
hospital-episode coded for pneumococcal pneumonia and without a linked 
IPD notification. 
 
Numbers, frequencies and proportions of pneumococcal pneumonia cases were 
calculated. Rates were calculated using NSW Health population estimates as the 
denominator and are presented for the cumulative NSW population, or as age-
specific and Indigenous-specific subpopulation rates per 100,000 population. Age 
groups were assigned as follows: 50-64, 65-69, 70-74 and 75 years and over. 
Rates were also calculated to compare two time periods, i.e. before the 
introduction of the concurrent immunisation program of 7vPCV for children and 
23vPPV for older people (pre-vaccine 2002-2004) and after (post-vaccine 2005-
2012). Other descriptive statistics include median number of bed days in hospital 
(and range) and number of hospital-episodes following the linked IPD episode.  
Period-specific incidence rate ratios (IRRs), 95% confidence intervals (95% CI), 
and p-values were calculated using a negative binomial regression analysis, due 
to over dispersion of count data (as indicated by a significant p-value for the 
likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0, indicating that the negative regression model is 
more appropriate than the Poisson model). The time-series analyses of monthly 
rates were expressed as ratios between time-periods that followed the reference 
month (January, 2002). IRRs were considered as significant at the 5% level 
(p<0.05). Data analyses were conducted using STATA software (version 13.1; 
StataCorp, College Station, Texas, United States of America). 
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IPD records without a linked hospitalisation or emergency record (Cohort-
4) 
Geo-mapping of unlinked IPD notifications between 2002 and 2012 was created 
using ArcGIS Online (2016; http://www.arcgis.com/home/index.html; Esri, 
Redlands California, United States of America). Unlinked notifications were 
plotted using the postcode variable; data points were enlarged to help reduced 
re-identification of plotted cases. 
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4.14 Results 
4.14.1 Hospital case ascertainment 
From the 13,537,957 available records of the APDC dataset, 285,422 hospital 
admissions satisfied the filtering criteria for inclusion within this analysis. This in 
turn represented 238,531 hospitalisation-episodes of pneumococcal disease and 
unspecified pneumonia of 191,461 unique individuals aged 50 years and over in 
NSW (Figure 4.1).  
 
4.14.2 Emergency case ascertainment 
From the 9,528,460 available records of the EDDC dataset, 41,127 emergency 
presentations satisfied the filtering criteria for inclusion within this analysis. This in 
turn represented 39,918 emergency-episodes of pneumococcal disease and 
unspecified pneumonia of 35,815 unique individuals aged 50 years and over in 
NSW (Figure 4.2). 
 
4.14.3 Notification case ascertainment 
From the 695,335 available records of the NCIMS dataset, 3,605 notifications 
satisfied the filtering criteria for inclusion within this analysis. Two records 
occurred within 14 days of one another for an individual and a duplicate was 
randomly dropped. These 3,604 records represented 3,551 unique individuals 
aged 50 years and over in NSW, with 42 individuals having two separate IPD 
episodes and five individuals with three IPD episodes (Figure 4.3). 
 
4.14.4 Deceased case ascertainment 
From the 245,324 available records of the RBDM dataset, 175,406 deaths 
satisfied the filtering criteria for inclusion within this analysis (Figure 4.4). From 
the 183,369 available records of the ACRD dataset, 8,783 deaths satisfied the 
filtering criteria for inclusion within this analysis (Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.1: Step-wise filtering results of the Admitted Patient Data Collection 
(APDC) dataset for data-linkage inclusion 
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Figure 4.2: Step-wise filtering results of the Emergency Department Data 
Collection (EDDC) dataset for data-linkage inclusion 
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Figure 4.3: Step-wise filtering results of the Notifiable conditions Information 
Management System (NCIMS) dataset for data-linkage inclusion 
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Figure 4.4: Step-wise filtering results of the Registry of Birth, Deaths and 
Marriages (RBDM) dataset for data-linkage inclusion 
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Figure 4.5: Step-wise filtering results of the Australian Co-ordinated Registry of 
Death (ACRD) dataset for data-linkage inclusion 
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4.14.5 Overall linkage success 
Of the 3,604 notifications within Merge-3, 82.8% (N= 2,983) linked to a 
hospitalisation-episode or emergency-episode coded for pneumococcal disease 
or unspecified pneumonia within the PHR; emergency-episodes only accounting 
for 0.7% of these linked records (21 of 2,983).  
Of the remaining 621 notifications within Merge-4, 76.8% (N=477) linked to a 
hospitalisation or emergency record (i.e. not coded for pneumococcal disease) 
within the PHR; emergency-episodes only accounted for 0.8% of these records (4 
of 477).  
Within Cohort-4, 43.0% (62 of 144) of unlinked IPD notifications also had a 
hospitalisation date recorded within the NCIMS dataset. This indicates that 2.3% 
(82 of 3,604) of IPD notifications in NSW for people aged 50 years and over did 
not have either a linked hospital administration, an emergency presentation, or a 
hospitalisation date recoded in NCIMS between 2002 and 2012.  
 
At the end of the merging procedure, samples sizes for the four different cohorts 
were as follows:  
Cohort-1 N = 191,988 (summary statistics presented in Table 4.7) 
(filtered hospitalisation records coded for pneumococcal disease or unspecified 
pneumonia and without a linked IPD notification record) 
Cohort-2  N = 2,983 (summary statistics presented in Table 4.7) 
(IPD notification records with either a linked hospitalisation or emergency record coded for 
pneumococcal disease or unspecified pneumonia) 
Cohort-3  N = 477 
(IPD notification records with either a linked hospitalisation or emergency record coded for 
all other diagnoses [i.e. not pneumococcal disease]) 
Cohort-4  N = 144 
(IPD notification records without a linked hospitalisation or emergency record identified 
within the NSW PHR) 
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Table 4.7: Pneumococcal disease and unspecified pneumonia of individuals 50 
years or older as coded from hospital discharge records in NSW, 2002-2012  
(^ rates per 100,000 population; * Individuals are not exclusive to a sub-group; # age at first 
hospital admission) 
   Total 
(number) 
Deaths 
(number) 
% Total by 
All-Cause 
% Deaths by 
All-Cause 
Total  
Rates ^ 
Mortality 
Rates ^ 
C
o
h
o
rt
 1
 &
 2
 
 All-cause hospitalisation 189613 --- 100.00 --- 799.19 --- 
Sub-groups of 
pneumococcal 
disease * 
Meningitis  120 25 0.06 0.01 0.51 0.105 
Septicaemia 1437 446 0.76 0.24 6.06 1.88 
Pneumonia 8914 1516 4.70 0.80 37.57 6.39 
Unspecified pneumonia 183628 42385 96.84 22.35 773.96 178.65 
Age groups # 50-64 yrs 37571 4186 19.81 2.21 283.38 31.57 
(222 missing) 65-69 yrs 18489 2923 9.75 1.54 608.34 96.17 
 70-74 yrs 23061 4538 12.16 2.39 925.30 182.08 
 ≥ 75 yrs 110270 31366 58.16 16.54 2233.90 635.43 
Gender  Male 99411 --- 52.43 --- 877.56 --- 
(3 missing) Female 90199 --- 47.57 --- 727.55 --- 
Indigenous status Non-Indigenous 186373 42858 98.29 22.60 13.49 1.83 
 Indigenous 3165 430 1.67 0.23 27.71 2.22 
 Not specified  75 6 0.04 0.003 --- --- 
   
      
C
o
h
o
rt
-1
 o
n
ly
 
 All-cause hospitalisation 186668 --- 100.00 --- 786.78 --- 
Sub-groups of 
pneumococcal 
disease * 
Meningitis  17 1 0.01 0.001 0.07 0.004 
Septicaemia 290 84 0.16 0.04 1.22 0.35 
Pneumonia 7526 1223 4.03 0.66 31.72 5.15 
Unspecified pneumonia 182296 41992 97.66 22.50 768.35 176.99 
Age groups # 50-64 yrs 36573 4033 19.59 2.16 275.86 30.42 
(221 missing) 65-69 yrs 18166 2853 9.73 1.53 597.71 93.87 
 70-74 yrs 22721 4455 12.17 2.39 911.66 178.75 
 ≥ 75 yrs 108987 30911 58.39 16.56 2207.91 626.21 
Gender  Male 97878 --- 52.43 --- 864.03 --- 
(3 missing) Female 88787 --- 47.56 --- 716.16 --- 
Indigenous status Non-Indigenous 183460 42104 98.28 22.56 782.18 179.51 
 Indigenous 3134 423 1.68 0.23 1157.94 156.29 
 Not specified  74 6 0.04 0.003 --- --- 
 
  
      
C
o
h
o
rt
-2
 o
n
ly
 
 All-cause hospitalisation 2945 --- 100.00 --- 12.41 --- 
Sub-groups of 
Pneumococcal * 
Meningitis  103 24 3.50 0.81 0.43 0.10 
Septicaemia 1147 362 38.95 12.29 4.83 1.53 
Pneumonia 1388 293 47.13 9.95 5.85 1.23 
Unspecified pneumonia 1332 393 45.23 13.34 5.61 1.66 
Age groups #  50-64 yrs 998 153 33.89 5.20 7.53 1.15 
(1 missing) 65-69 yrs 323 70 10.97 2.38 10.63 2.30 
 70-74 yrs 340 83 11.54 2.82 13.64 3.33 
 ≥ 75 yrs 1283 455 43.57 15.45 25.99 9.22 
Gender Male 1533 --- 52.05 --- 13.53 --- 
 Female 1412 --- 47.95 --- 11.39 --- 
Indigenous status Non-Indigenous 2913 754 98.91 25.60 12.42 3.21 
 Indigenous 31 7 1.05 0.24 11.45 2.59 
 Not specified  1 0 0.03 0 --- --- 
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4.14.6 Cohort-1 & Cohort-2: Invasive and non-invasive pneumococcal 
pneumonia (ICD-10-AM codes J13 and J18.1) only  
This section focuses on those individuals with a hospital code specifically for 
presumptive pneumococcal pneumonia (ICD-10-AM codes J13 and J18.1) within 
cohorts 1 and 2 only. 
  
Descriptive:  
Of the 189,613 individuals identified with a hospital admission coded with 
presumptive pneumococcal codes or unspecified pneumonia, 8,914 (4.7%) were 
coded as pneumococcal (ICD-10-AM codes J13 and J18.1). Of these 8,914 
individuals, 15.6% (N= 1,388) had a linked notification record in NCIMS (invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia), and a collective total of 1,410 laboratory confirmed 
IPD notifications (Table 4.7); with 20 individuals having two or three IPD 
episodes. The remaining 7,526 (84.4%) individuals had a collective total of 8,550 
hospital admissions coded as presumptive pneumococcal pneumonia in the 
absence of a sterile site isolate (Table 4.7). 
For the 1,388 individuals with invasive pneumococcal pneumonia, 11.9% (N= 
165) had a hospital admission coded as pneumococcal disease occurring before 
their IPD notification, and after their 50th birthday. The median number of bed 
days for the hospital-episode directly linked to the IPD notification was 12 days 
(N= 1,404; range 1 – 309 days). The number of bed days increased from 10 days 
(N= 489; range 1 – 309 days) for those aged 50 – 64 years, to 14 days (N= 603; 
range 1 – 179 days) for those aged 75 years or older. Of individuals with a 
notification date between 2002 and 2011, 21.2% (272/1,282) had a hospital-
episode coded as pneumococcal or unspecified pneumonia (any hospital code 
from Table 4.5) following their IPD episode; 14.7% (N= 189) having a single 
hospital-episode, 4.4% (N= 56) having two, and 2.1% (N= 27) having three or 
more hospital-episodes.  
Indigenous status within the NSW PHR was 100% complete for notifications of 
invasive pneumococcal pneumonia, with 2.2% (30 of 1,388 individuals) being in 
people who identified as Indigenous. The rate of invasive pneumococcal 
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pneumonia was highest in Indigenous people aged 65-69 years (13.0 cases per 
100,000 population), followed by 50 – 64 (11.6 cases per 100,000 population), 
and 70 – 74 (10.0 cases per 100,000 population); no cases were recorded in 
Indigenous people aged 75 years and older between 2002 and 2012. A median 
of three cases (range 0 – 5 cases) were notified per year in people who identified 
as Indigenous. 
 
Time series:  
The monthly rate of hospital admissions coded for presumptive non-invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia declined significantly over time (N= 8,550; IRR = 
0.993; 95% CI 0.991 – 0.994; P < 0.001), as did the monthly rate of hospital 
admissions for unique individuals (N= 7,526; IRR = 0.992; 95% CI 0.991 – 0.994; 
P < 0.001) (Figure 4.6). The monthly rate of invasive pneumococcal pneumonia 
also declined significantly (N= 1,410; IRR = 0.996; 95% CI 0.993 – 0.999; P < 
0.001), however not to the same magnitude as presumptive non-invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia (Figure 4.6).  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Monthly rates of pneumococcal pneumonia (J13 & J18.1) per 100,000 
population of NSW people aged 50 years or older 2002 - 2012. 
Vertical grey box represents the concurrent changes to the NIP for 7vPCV and 23vPPV  
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Age groups:  
The rate of hospital admissions coded for presumptive non-invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia between 2002 and 2012 increased significantly with 
age, from 14.94 cases per 100,000 population for 50 to 64 years, to 73.07 cases 
per 100,000 population for 75 years and older (IRR = 5.146; 95% CI 4.555 – 
5.814; P< 0.001) (Figure 4.7). A similar trend was observed for invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia, with rates increasing from 3.70 cases per 100,000 
population for 50 to 64 years, to 12.30 cases per 100,000 population for 75 years 
or older (Figure 4.7). 
 
Vaccination periods:  
The rate of hospital admissions coded as presumptive non-invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia declined by 48.2% (IRR = 0.518; 95% CI 0.453 – 
0.592; P< 0.001) in the post-vaccine period (2005-2012) when compared to the 
pre-vaccine period (2002-2004), with the rate dropping from 56.56 cases per 
100,000 population (2002-2004) to 29.20 cases per 100,000 population (2005-
2012). Mortality rates for presumptive non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia 
(within 14 days) declined by 65.1% (IRR = 0.341; 95% CI 0.288 – 0.424; P< 
0.001) in the post vaccine period, decreasing from 11.47 cases per 100,000 
population between 2002 and 2004, to 3.97 cases per 100,000 population 
between 2005 and 2012. 
The rate of invasive pneumococcal pneumonia declined by 32.0% (IRR = 0.680; 
95% CI 0.537 – 0.861; P= 0.001) in the post vaccine period, decreasing from 
7.83 cases per 100,000 population between 2002 and 2004, to 5.31 cases per 
100,000 population between 2005 and 2012. When death was associated with 
invasive pneumococcal pneumonia (death occurring within 14 days of diagnosis), 
the rate of IPD notifications with a linked hospital-episode coding as 
pneumococcal pneumonia declined by 53.1% (IRR = 0.469; 95% CI 0.335 – 
0.657; P< 0.001) in the post vaccine period, decreasing from 2.06 cases per 
100,000 population between 2002 and 2004, to 0.96 cases per 100,000 
population between 2005 and 2012. 
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Figure 4.7: Monthly rates of pneumococcal pneumonia (J13 & J18.1) per 100,000 
population of NSW people 2002 – 2012: (a) 50-64 years of age, (b) 65-69 years of 
age, (c) 70-74 years of age, and (d) 75 years and older  
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Completeness of mortality from invasive pneumococcal pneumonia 
(Cohort-2 only) 
For the 1,388 individuals with laboratory confirmed invasive pneumococcal 
pneumonia, 293 (21.1%) deaths occurred within 14 days of this event (Figure 
4.8). The NCIMS dataset captured 57.7% (N= 169) of these deaths, ranging 
between 38.2% in 2005 and 76.0% in 2002, with a mortality rate of 0.71 cases 
per 100,000 population between 2002 and 2012. The APDC dataset captured 
87.0% (N= 255), ranging between 78.1% in 2003 and 95.0% in 2004. The RBDM 
dataset captured 98.3% (N= 288), while ACRD captured 22.9% (N= 67) (Figure 
4.8). Of the deaths captured by ACRD, 50.7% (N= 34) were coded as 
pneumococcal pneumonia (J13), 3.0% (N= 2) as lobar pneumonia, 4.5% (N= 3) 
as pneumococcal septicaemia, and 41.8% (N= 28) as unspecified pneumonia.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Record of mortality occurring within 14 days of laboratory confirmed 
invasive pneumococcal pneumonia, and different datasets of the NSW PHR 
capturing this information  
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4.14.7 Geo-mapping of unlinked IPD notifications in NSW (Cohort-4 only) 
Cases of IPD that were without a linked hospital or emergency record in NSW 
were largely concentrated on the eastern coast of NSW and towards the state 
and territory borders (Figure 4.9a). A similar spatial distribution was also evident 
for IPD cases without a linked hospital or emergency record in NSW and without 
a hospitalisation date recoded in NCIMS (Figure 4.9b). In particular, Sydney was 
a hotspot for unlinked IPD notifications between 2002 and 2012 (Figure 4.10). 
 
Figure 4.9: Geo-mapping of unlinked IPD notifications in NSW between 2002 and 
2012: (a) IPD cases without a linked hospital or emergency record in NSW (N=144), 
(b) IPD cases without a linked hospital or emergency record in NSW and without a 
hospitalisation date recoded in NCIMS (N=82).  
Chapter Four  Epi-Project 
 
150 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 4.10: Geo-mapping of unlinked IPD notifications around Sydney between 
2002 and 2012: (a) IPD cases without a linked hospital or emergency record in 
NSW, (b) IPD cases without a linked hospital or emergency record in NSW and 
without a hospitalisation date recoded in NCIMS.   
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4.15 Discussion  
This is the first study in Australia to estimate in detail the burden of 
pneumococcal pneumonia using the linkage of surveillance and hospitalisation 
data. In this investigation, I was able to demonstrate that approximately one in 
seven hospital admissions that are assigned ICD-10-AM codes for pneumococcal 
pneumonia (J13 and J18.1) in adults aged 50 years or older also had a 
notification as IPD in the laboratory based surveillance system. This would mean 
that the remaining six hospital admissions could be classified as presumptive 
non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia. The incidence rate of this presumptive 
non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia was significantly less (by 48.2%) in the 
period post-2005 when universal child and adult pneumococcal vaccination 
programs were introduced compared to the pre-2005 years. The decline was 
greater (by 65.1%) when limited to those presumptive non-invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia hospitalisations that were associated with death, 
suggesting a possible greater impact from the vaccination programs on more 
severe disease. Overall, the rate of presumptive non-invasive pneumococcal 
pneumonia hospitalisation increased with age, from 14.94 cases per 100,000 
population for 50 to 64 years, to 73.07 cases per 100,000 population for 75 years 
and older. The 23vPPV that was used for adults has not been consistently shown 
to be effective against non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia hospitalisations.21 
Therefore, it is not entirely clear the reasons attributable for this reduction in 
presumptive non-invasive pneumonia hospitalisations in older people of NSW. 
 
Invasive and non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia 
It has been demonstrated in Australia that S. pneumoniae is the most commonly 
identified pathogen (between 14% and 42%) in hospitalised adults with 
CAP.17,19,20 The 7vPCV used in the children program has provided substantial 
indirect protection against IPD to adults.23,24 Furthermore, a post-implementation 
analysis of national data presented strong evidence to suggest the 7vPCV 
nationally funded program was also responsible for an overall reduction of all-
cause pneumonia hospitalisations in Australia.17 Consistent patterns of change 
across all age groups were identified,17 with the observed trends in younger 
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people comparable to those documented in North America, where a 4 dose 
schedule, including a booster dose (3+1 schedule) is offered.25-27 The non-
invasive pneumococcal pneumonia trends observed in older people could be 
related to a herd impact of the pneumococcal conjugate vaccination program; 
rather than from the polysaccharide pneumococcal vaccine or non-specific 
confounding effects, including changes in diagnostic coding or clinical practices in 
NSW hospitals. However, further investigation would be required to confirm this. 
In addition to the reduced rate and severity of non-invasive pneumococcal 
pneumonia hospitalisations in elderly people over this period, there has also been 
a reduction in the length of stay in hospitalisations due to pneumococcal 
pneumonia. Community acquired pneumonia constitutes the large majority of 
pneumococcal disease in adults. Therefore the burden of pneumococcal 
pneumonia both invasive and non-invasive is a key parameter in the cost 
effectiveness assessments that inform publicly funding vaccination programs in 
Australia. Australia is unique among high-income countries in that it funds three 
primary doses of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine for children with no booster 
dose (3+0 schedule), with studies such as this being important to ascertain the 
indirect impact of this 3+0 schedule.28 To date, Australian studies have 
demonstrated reductions in the incidence of IPD following the funding of the 
7vPCV which were comparable to those in the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
USA where a booster dose is offered in the second year of life using a 2+1 and 
3+1 schedules respectively.6,29,30  
The descriptive nature of this data-linkage study makes it difficult to quantify the 
exact contribution that the pneumococcal conjugate vaccination program has had 
upon hospitalisations. The use of ICD-10-AM hospital codes has been 
demonstrated to have good sensitivity (98%) and specificity (97%) in medical 
record notation of all-cause pneumonia in the hospitalisation of older people in 
Australia.17,31 A ratio of 6:1 for non-invasive to invasive pneumococcal pneumonia 
was identified in this investigation, which differs to estimates from a systematic 
review of diagnostic techniques for pneumococcal pneumonia (ratio 3:1).32 The 
estimate presented here could represent the lower limit of the true ratio, as 
admissions have been reported by hospital coding only and lacks further validity 
through diagnostic testing of the causative agent of disease.32  
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Another possibility for the decline of presumptive non-invasive pneumococcal 
pneumonia hospitalisations as reported here, could be due to the 
recommendations made during clinical audits to improve the concordance of CAP 
management through promotion of the Pneumococcal Severity Index.33 The 
Pneumococcal Severity Index, which became a recommended guideline in 
Australia during 2003,17 is a tool to help regulate those cases of CAP that could 
be treated as outpatients and those that should be admitted to hospital.34 
Following reports that documented low compliance with the Pneumococcal 
Severity Index,35,36 it is possible that increased awareness (by a multi-faceted 
education intervention33) and a systematic shift to improve management of 
pneumococcal pneumonia cases as outpatients has coincided with the 2005 
funding changes to the pneumococcal conjugate vaccines under the NIP. Further 
work is required to confirm this as discharge diagnosis of pneumonia 
hospitalisations are usually based on clinical and radiologic findings and are 
without necessarily microbiological confirmation. It is possible that a proportion of 
pneumococcal pneumonia does not get identified as such and therefore escapes 
capture by relevant hospital discharge diagnosis codes.32  
Significant declines in the rate of invasive pneumococcal pneumonia between the 
pre- and post-vaccine periods were also documented during this investigation. 
Notification rates declined in the post-vaccine period by 32.0% overall, and by 
53.1% when death was associated with invasive pneumococcal pneumonia 
(within 14 days). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the pneumococcal 
vaccinations have had a significant impact on the incidence of invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia in adults in Australia; as well as causing a reduction in 
the severity of disease and mortality associated with invasive pneumococcal 
pneumonia. However, following the findings of the Community Acquired 
Pneumonia in Adults (CAPiTA) Trial in the Netherlands,37 the results presented 
here would be particularly important if funding of the 13vPCV were to be 
considered for older adults in Australia.  
Australia has continued the 3+0 schedule when 13vPCV replaced 7vPCV in mid-
2011.28 Somewhat unlike with 7vPCV, the indirect impact against pneumococcal 
disease from 13vPCV appears to be less with a 3+0 schedule, than schedules 
with a second year booster.28 Therefore, it is possible that a direct 13vPCV adult 
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program may have greater benefit in our setting, where we offer a 3+0 children 
schedule, compared to those settings that have children schedules that contain a 
booster dose. However, there is currently lack of data to estimate accurately the 
potential benefit of a direct 13vPCV program on non-invasive pneumococcal 
pneumonia in adults. In the CAPiTA study, 13vPCV had 45% efficacy against 
non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia caused by vaccine serotypes in adults 
aged 65 years and over,37 with the cost-effectiveness of such programmatic 
change in Australia remaining questionalble.28 If a direct 13vPCV adult program 
were to be considered in Australia, then results from this data-linkage 
investigation would be an important addition to the cost-effectiveness evaluation.  
The decrease of IPD notifications with a linked hospital-episode coded for 
pneumococcal pneumonia have occurred in the context of relatively modest 
23vPPV coverage, with coverage for all people aged 65 years or older in NSW 
being between 59% and 73% after 2005.11,12 As outlined in Part I of this chapter, 
these decreases may have also been influenced by the potential herd immunity 
impact of the concurrent childhood pneumococcal conjugate vaccine program 
that commenced in 2005. Unfortunately, it was not possible to further investigate 
the proportion of infection due to 23vPPV, 23vPPV-non-7vPCV serotypes, 
23vPPV-non-13vPCV serotypes and non-vaccine serotypes among older people 
of Chohort-1 and 2. One limitation of the datasets within the NSW PHR was the 
absence of serotype information within abridged NCIMS dataset. In NSW, 
enhanced IPD data has been collected since 2002,4 and include addition 
information such as IPD serotype, focus of infection, and vaccination status of the 
individual. However, these variables were not available for this analysis.  
 
Mortality from invasive pneumococcal pneumonia 
In this investigation, I also demonstrated that the completeness of mortality data 
for invasive pneumococcal pneumonia within the notification dataset was only 
58% complete, ranging between 38% and 76% per year. For older people of 
NSW with invasive pneumococcal pneumonia, the rate of mortality reported by 
NCIMS (0.71 cases per 100,000 population between 2002 and 2012) appears to 
be an underestimate of the total rate of mortality from the linked dataset (1.23 
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cases per 100,000 population between 2002 and 2012). This could potentially 
have a big impact upon our understanding of the mortality associated with 
pneumococcal pneumonia, and any economic evaluation of the pneumococcal 
vaccination programs in Australia.30 Both hospitalisation and RBDM data capture 
a higher proportion of deaths associated with invasive pneumococcal pneumonia 
(87% and 98% respectively). However, as standalone datasets, neither dataset 
can identify invasive pneumococcal pneumonia cases with ICD-10-AM coding; 
ICD-10-AM coding alone cannot distinguish between invasive and non-invasive 
cases.  
 
Geo-mapping of unlinked IPD notification in NSW 
Finally, the geo-mapping of IPD cases that were without a linked hospital or 
emergency record in NSW was also demonstrated in this investigation. The 
notification database (NICMS) in NSW uses the residential postcode of each 
case as the place of the IPD notification, while APDC and EDDC record the 
location of the hospital or emergency department where the individual attended. 
Therefore, a person who is a resident of NSW would be notified within NCIMS 
and could have attended a hospital or emergency department outside of NSW. 
This would help to explain the number of IPD notifications near the Australian 
Capital Territory and along the borders with SA and Victoria. The concentration of 
IPD notifications in Sydney and other major towns along the eastern coast of 
NSW might be further explained by the domestic or international travel of people, 
where the case, again, has attended a hospital outside NSW.  
 
Validity of methodology and limitations 
The methodology and ICD-10-AM codes used in this analysis appear to be 
validated, with 82.8% (2983 of 3604) of IPD notifications successfully linked to 
hospital admissions and emergency presentations coded for pneumococcal 
disease or unspecified pneumonia (as listed in Table 4.5). Also the proportion of 
IPD notifications without a linked hospital or emergency record is within the false 
positive rate of probabilistic linkage. The false positive rate of probabilistic linkage 
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for the NSW PHR is around 5/1,000.38 Therefore, it would be expected that within 
a dataset of 190,000 individuals there would be approximately 950 incorrect 
linkages. The number of IPD cases without a linked hospital or emergency record 
(N=114; Cohort-4) identified in this investigation is within the expected range. 
There were certain limitations of this investigation. This is a descriptive 
investigation; therefore, inferences of any causal links between changes in 
incidences of pneumococcal pneumonia disease in adults and vaccination are 
only speculative. Possible alternate explanations are changes to admission 
procedure, coding practices, treatment guidelines and improved methods of 
diagnostic testing; all of which could have influenced the declining monthly 
patterns that was identified during the post-vaccination period. Other influences 
to the post-vaccine decline of non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia include the 
prevalence of smoking, which increases the likelihood of pneumococcal 
pneumonia, and coverage of influenza vaccination, which decreases the 
likelihood of pneumococcal pneumonia. In Australian adults aged 18 years of 
older, smoking rates have declined from 22% in 2001 to 16% in 2011-12,39 while 
influenza vaccination coverage for people aged 65 years or older in NSW was 
stable during this investigation period, at 78.9% in 2004 and 72.7% in 2009.40,41 
In addition, this investigation was limited by the lack of serotype information from 
both the notification dataset. It was not possible to comment on the propensity for 
certain serotypes to cause invasive disease and those opportunistic serotypes 
less likely to become invasive within an individual. Also, it was not possible to 
investigate the risk associated with having co-morbidities,23 which would be 
elevated among the older population of NSW. 
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4.16 Conclusion 
Among adults, pneumococcal pneumonia causes significant mortality and 
morbidity.32 While the 23vPPV funded program under the NIP has been shown to 
reduce the incidence of IPD in elderly people, uncertainty remains regarding their 
effectiveness against reducing the hospitalisation rate due to CAP. The 
effectiveness of conjugate vaccines against CAP is likely to be superior to that of 
polysaccharide vaccines,21 as conjugate vaccines are more immunogenic than 
polysaccharide vaccines.23,24 In this study I documented that approximately one 
in seven hospital admissions coded for pneumococcal pneumonia in adults aged 
50 years or older in NSW was due to invasive pneumococcal disease. The 
remaining six hospital admissions were due to presumptive non-invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia. I also documented significant declines in the rate and 
severity of hospitalisations due to presumptive non-invasive pneumococcal 
pneumonia in elderly people of NSW from 2002 to 2012. For older people of 
NSW, mortality associated with invasive pneumococcal pneumonia may be 
misrepresented within the notification dataset, with the true rate being 
approximately twice as high. The misrepresentation of mortality due to invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia and significant declines in presumptive non-invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia in older people of NSW could have a major impact on 
cost-effectiveness of pneumococcal vaccine program in Australia.14 The 
conjugate vaccine may be preventing a significant number of non-invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia hospitalisations in older people over time and having a 
positive impact on the health of older people. Continued monitoring of 
pneumococcal pneumonia and vaccine impact is required in Australia to 
maximise the effectiveness of the different pneumococcal vaccination schedules 
in Australia.  
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4.18 Appendix 4.1  
Example screen shot from SAS Enterprise Guide 
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5.3 Prologue 
5.3.1 Background 
This chapter represents the final core component of the MAE field program in 
which I conducted an evaluation of AusVaxSafety sentinel active SMS-based 
surveillance system. I was very fortunate to be in a position to evaluate this 
system during its second year of operation. For this chapter, I follow the structural 
framework as outlined by the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) - Updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems.1 
For ease of reading I have combined the result and discussion sections. The 
timeliness of this evaluation was of particular importance and highly relevant; this 
evaluation was required to ensure that this relatively new system was working 
well, achieving its aims, and helping to restore and maintain parental and public 
confidence in seasonal influenza vaccines for children. 
 
5.3.2 My role 
As principal investigator, I designed and validated three different questionnaires 
for the purpose of conducting interviews of the AusVaxSafety stakeholders. 
These included an online questionnaire hosted on Survey Monkey for steering 
committee members and two separate telephone-administered questionnaires, 
the first for the AusVaxSafety administration staff member and a second for the 
Vaxtracker and SmartVax administration staff members. I entered data from 
these questionnaires into a dataset that I constructed and evaluated the 
responses of the stakeholders to gain a better understanding of how 
AusVaxSafety was performing during the 2015 influenza season. I assessed the 
operation of the system as it relates to the seven different surveillance system 
attributes. I have presented the results of this assessment together with 
recommendations to assist with the ongoing function of this active surveillance 
system. 
I also attended regular teleconferences hosted and chaired by the National 
Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS), which included 
steering committee members and jurisdictional co-ordinators. I have presented 
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interim results from this evaluation at the NCIRS Academic meeting in October 
2016. Also, results and recommendations from this evaluation were included in 
the final report presented to the Australian Government Department of Health 
(HEALTH) as part of the 2016 reporting commitments of AusVaxSafety; as well 
as made available (in its entirety) to steering committee members of 
AusVaxSafety. 
I was also responsible for producing a Vaccine Safety Surveillance information 
sheet targeting a lay audience for an ethics application at NCIRS. The 
information sheet targeted parents and cares of children who were between the 
ages of six months and five years and had been administered seasonal influenza 
vaccine at The Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network (Appendix 5.1).  
 
5.3.3 Lessons learned  
I have learned a lot from this opportunity of evaluating an active and relatively 
new surveillance system, including a better understanding of system attributes, 
how to conduct an interview and increase participation of stakeholders, and how 
to analyse qualitative data. It was a complex process evaluating AusVaxSafety. I 
was required to understand the system, figure out the important attributes to 
evaluate and synthesise both qualitative and quantitative information into this 
final report. Also, after re-listening to the recordings that I conducted with 
administration staff, I now have a better appreciation of the time required to draw 
themes from recorded interviews. I have also learned a great deal about the 
influenza vaccination recommendation in Australia, vaccine safety, how best to 
monitor adverse events, and the negative impact that a well-publicised adverse 
event can have to vaccine uptake in a defined cohort. 
 
5.3.4 Public Health impact 
Following the federal government’s decision in 2010 to suspend the national use 
of all seasonal trivalent influenza vaccines for children, Australia has been trying 
to make changes to its adverse events surveillance systems to align with 
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recommendations of the Horvath Review.2 AusVaxSafety was quickly established 
to occupy this important niche.  
AusVaxSafety is essential to monitor for potential adverse events following 
immunisation to help increase public confidence in influenza vaccines 
administered to children. Since 2010, an increasing number of parents have 
become more concerned about the side effects and safety issues of the influenza 
vaccine, and less concerned about the severity of influenza illness. The negative 
press associated with the 2010 Fluvax® vaccine remains prominent in 2015. 
AusVaxSafety has an important role to play in restoring the confidence of parents 
and vaccine providers regarding childhood influenza vaccination. Among the 
other roles of AusVaxSafety, this sentinel active surveillance system is in place to 
help increase coverage of the seasonal influenza vaccine and to be seen as 
being proactive when it comes to vaccine safety. 
When considering public health impact, the timing of this evaluation is highly 
significant. AusVaxSafety is a national system with the potential to expand and 
reform adverse event surveillance in Australia. The real-time nature of the 
AusVaxSafety system means that data are collected, aggregated, cleaned and 
analysed quickly, with results disseminated to the local and national community in 
near real-time during active surveillance. It is important, at this early stage, to 
take a step back and gain a better understanding of the data that are being 
collected and analysed. A systematic evaluation of AusVaxSafety was conducted 
to ensure that the results and recommendations of AusVaxSafety are based on 
data that are (a) of the highest quality; (b) complete and valid; (c) representative 
of the cohort; and (d) useful to parents and the public health community. It is also 
essential that the system is simple, flexible and stable, and that data flow is 
efficient, seamless and timely. Finally, it is important that problems of the system 
are identified and rectified quickly.  
On a personal note, as a parent it is reassuring to know that AusVaxSafety is 
doing what it is doing and, based on the results of this evaluation, is doing it very 
well. My son (age three and a half years) has been a recruit of the AusVaxSafety 
during 2015 and 2016. It is encouraging to know, beforehand, that the vaccines 
being administered to him have a good safety profile, and that the reported 
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adverse events experienced after vaccination are within acceptable limits. I have 
provided information to this system; I have witnessed the importance of this 
active surveillance system first-hand; and I am happy that these valuable results 
are being generated in real-time and with minimal extra work to the public health 
community.  
When it comes to vaccine safety, AusVaxSafety simply makes sense. 
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5.4 Abstract 
AusVaxSafety sentinel active SMS-based surveillance system was established 
following the Australian federal government temporary suspension of the national 
use of all 2010 seasonal trivalent influenza vaccines for children aged between 
six months and five years. It was developed to actively monitor, detect and report 
adverse events following immunisation (AEFIs) with influenza vaccine from 
children aged between six months and five years in as near to real-time as 
possible. AusVaxSafety is a clinical resource, designed to enable transparency 
and improve public trust when it comes to vaccine safety.  
Following the 2015 influenza season, AusVaxSafety was evaluated to assess the 
usefulness of the information collected; determine the performance, efficiency 
and effectiveness of the system; identify strengths and limitations of the 
surveillance system; and provide feedback to stakeholders regarding 
recommendations to the system. A short online questionnaire was developed for 
the steering committee members of AusVaxSafety and a longer telephone 
administered questionnaire was developed for the key administration staff of the 
system. Qualitative responses from all stakeholders were categorised into 
common themes. AusVaxSafety data collected during the 2015 influenza season 
were also explored. 
During the 2015 influenza season the AusVaxSafety system demonstrated, in 
real-time, that influenza vaccines registered for used in children aged six months 
to five years were safe, well tolerated, and that the rates of AEFIs experienced 
were within expected ranges. The AusVaxSafety system was well accepted by 
participants, with 99% of parents/carers agreeing to participate and 76% (N= 
3,340) returning a completed survey. No safety signals were identified during the 
2015 influenza season.  
AusVaxSafety demonstrated that it was a very useful system, providing very 
timely feedback to enable trust and transparency regarding vaccine safety. 
During the first two years of operation, AusVaxSafety can already be seen as 
being proactive when it comes to vaccine safety and working to restore 
professional and public confidence regarding the recommendations of the NIP. It 
is anticipated that AusVaxSafety will continue to expand, not only throughout 
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Australia, but also with the number of vaccines that it monitors. AusVaxSafety 
has enormous potential, not only to provide real-time information on the 
childhood influenza vaccine safety, but can also serve to reinforce consumer 
confidence in vaccines for all ages, in these times where there are pockets of low 
immunisation in Australia.   
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5.5 Acronyms  
ACT  Australian Capital Territory 
AEFI  Adverse Event Following Immunisation  
CDC  US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
FAST  Follow up and Active Surveillance of Trivalent influenza vaccine 
FIR CUSUM Fast Initial Response Cumulative Summation 
GP  General Practice  
HEALTH Australian Government Department of Health 
ICD-10 Tenth revision of the International Classification of Disease coding 
system 
MAE   Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology  
NCIMS Notifiable Conditions Information Management System 
NFA  No Further Action taken  
NIP  National Immunisation Program 
NSW  New South Wales 
NT  Northern Territory  
PAEDS Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance 
QLD  Queensland 
RNA  Ribonucleic acid 
SA  South Australia 
SAE  Serious Adverse Event  
SMS  Short Message Service 
TGA  Therapeutic Goods Administration 
TIV  Trivalent Influenza Vaccine  
QIV   Quadrivalent Influenza Vaccine 
VIC  Victoria 
WA  Western Australia  
WHO  World Health Organization 
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5.6 Introduction 
5.6.1 Influenza Disease 
Influenza is an infectious single-stranded ribonucleic acid (RNA) virus, which 
represents a pathogenic viral group sub-divided into two antigenic types that 
cause epidemic disease in humans (influenza virus type A and B).3 Symptoms 
are generally acute and include an abrupt onset of fever, cough and sneezes, 
accompanied by malaise, myalgia, sore throat and headaches.3-5 Usually, these 
symptoms are resolved in 5-7 days, with the cough persisting for an additional 
week or more.4 Complications associated with influenza disease include 
pneumonia, croup, acute bronchitis, otitis media and an exacerbation of chronic 
medical conditions, with children particularly suffering from high temperatures 
that can induce febrile seizures.3,5 Influenza can also cause severe respiratory-
illness with multisystem complications that can result in death.3  
Influenza virus is spread from person to person by direct contact facilitated by 
contaminated respiratory secretion or contaminated droplet transmission through 
the act of sneezing and coughing.5 The incubation period of influenza disease is 
1-3 days.3 In adults, the peak communicability of influenza virus is during the first 
three to five days after the onset of symptoms, while in children communicability 
can last up to ten days.4 Seasonal influenza epidemics can be explosive, and are 
facilitated by a high proportion of asymptomatic and mild cases, along with 
efficient transmission dynamics during optimal condition. At a community level, 
the annual attack rate of influenza is generally 5-10%, while in ‘closed’ 
populations including households and institutions such as childcare, schools and 
aged-care facilities, attack rates can be two to three times higher.3,4 Epidemics 
usually occur during the winter months in temperate environments, and during 
somewhat predictable times of the year in tropical and sub-tropical zones (such 
as during rainy seasons).4  
 
5.6.2 Influenza Vaccines 
Vaccination remains the most effective measure to prevent infection and to avoid 
the complications associated with influenza illness.6 The seasonal quadrivalent 
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influenza vaccine (QIV) is recommended for all adults and children over the age 
of six months who are concerned with reducing their likelihood of becoming ill 
with influenza.7 Certain high-risk groups are funded under the National 
Immunisation Program (NIP), and include pregnant women; people aged 65 
years or older; people who identify as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander and 
are aged between 6 months and five years or 15 years and older; and all persons 
aged six months or older with specific medical condition that put them at high risk 
of influenza related complications.6 In addition to these NIP recommendations, 
seasonal influenza vaccines have been funded by the Western Australian 
Department of Health since 2008 for children between the age of six months and 
four years.8-10 The funding of these vaccines in Western Australia (WA) was in 
response to the influenza-related deaths of three preschool aged children during 
2007.9 
Due to the highly variable nature of the influenza virus and constantly changing 
geographic distributions of pathogenic serotypes an annual review of the 
influenza vaccine is necessary. Prior to 2016, trivalent influenza vaccines (TIV) 
were funded in Australia, with these vaccines including components of influenza 
type A(H1N1), A(H3N2), and influenza type B (with the newly funded QIV 
contains a second influenza type B strain). The exact formulation of these 
vaccines change in response to seasonal strain variation, with changes 
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to best 
available global serosurveillance data,11 and are approved locally by the 
Australian Influenza Vaccine Committee.3 Since becoming widely available in 
Australia in 1999,3 there have been six reformulations to the influenza A(H1N1) 
serotype, 11 reformulations to the influenza A(H3N2) serotype and 11 
reformulations to influenza type B in the TIVs.12-27 Seasonal influenza vaccines 
are particularly challenging to the registration and distribution process given the 
short time between influenza seasons and lengthy manufacture process.2 This 
was quite apparent during 2015 with lengthy manufacturing delays experienced 
due to the double-serotype change of the seasonal TIV.28  
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5.6.3 2010 Influenza Season 
In 2010, soon after the distribution of the seasonal TIV to vaccine providers (8 
March 2010) and public launch of the childhood influenza vaccination program in 
WA (19 March, 2010), emergency department clinicians noticed an apparent 
increase of children (<5 years of age) presenting to a specialist paediatric referral 
hospital following vaccination with TIV.8,9 Symptoms included fever, vomiting, and 
febrile seizures.8,9 This signal was identified in WA due to the high uptake of 
funded vaccines provided by the local Department of Health.29,30 This issue 
required urgent attention to ascertain whether the signal represented a true 
increase of adverse event following immunisation (AEFI) and, if so, whether the 
AEFIs were related to all 2010 seasonal TIVs; to a single manufacturer; or a 
single batch.9 The WA influenza immunisation program was temporarily 
suspended on the 22 April, 2010.2,9 The following day the Australian federal 
government suspended the national use of all 2010 seasonal TIVs for children 
aged between six months and five years.2,9 This was the first time in Australian 
history that an immunisation program had been suspended due to AEFI.9 
During the 46 days of the 2010 childhood influenza vaccination program in WA, a 
total of 63 children (between the ages of six months and five years) presented to 
emergency departments with febrile seizures occurring within 72 hours after 
vaccination (Figure 5.1).9 This rate of febrile seizures (4.4 per 1000 doses) was 
more than 200 times higher than other population-based estimates.9 The highly 
elevated odds of febrile seizures was clearly associated with receipt of Fluvax® 
and Fluvax Junior® (CSL Biotherapies) 2010 seasonal influenza vaccine 
formulation.9 Similar issues with this vaccine brand were also identified in other 
jurisdictions of Australia.31,32 The national influenza vaccine program for children 
was re-established three months later on 30 July, 2010.2,30 
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Figure 5.1: Children aged between six months and five years of age presenting 
with febrile seizures (febrile convulsions: ICD-10 code R56.0) to nine different 
Perth hospital emergency departments between 01 January and 02 May, 2010. (TIV 
= trivalent influenza vaccine).9 
 
Fluvax® and Fluvax Junior® (CSL Biotherapies) have since been deregistered 
for children between six months and five years of age and are no longer 
recommended for children under the age of ten years.3 Of greater concern has 
been the negative and ongoing effect that these unprecedented AEFI have had 
on parental attitudes and behaviours regarding childhood vaccinations. Since 
2010, parents have become more concerned about the side effects and safety 
issues of the influenza vaccine and less concerned about the severity of influenza 
illness.10 The uptake of government funded TIV has decreased significantly in 
WA since 2010 (Figure 5.2).10  
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Figure 5.2: Vaccine uptake in children presenting with influenza-like-illness over 
time in Western Australia.10 
 
5.6.4 Surveillance of AEFI in Australia 
In Australia, the routine surveillance of AEFI is undertaken by the Therapeutic 
Goods Administration (TGA).33 The passive surveillance system of TGA ensures 
that vaccines and medicines maintain an acceptable safety profile following 
registration by collecting voluntary information reported by health professionals 
and members of the public.33 Inadequacies in this passive surveillance of vaccine 
safety were identified and recommendation made in March 2011.2 In response to 
these recommendations,2 AusVaxSafety was established in 2014 to actively 
monitor, detect and report AEFIs from an individual cohort (children aged 
between six months and five years) and following a particular vaccination 
(seasonal influenza) in as near to real-time as possible.34 Results are 
disseminated in near real-time to stakeholders and the public to help restore 
professional and public confidence regarding the recommendations of the NIP.  
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5.6.5 Purpose of evaluation  
Following the 2015 influenza season, AusVaxSafety was evaluated to: 
 assess the usefulness (defined as the ability to contribution to the 
monitoring, detection and provision of real-time feedback on potential 
safety signals) of the information collected; 
 determine the performance (defined as the function, operation and utility of 
AusVaxSafety during active surveillance), efficiency and effectiveness of 
the system; 
 identify strengths and limitations of the surveillance system; and 
 provide feedback to stakeholders regarding recommendations to the 
system. 
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5.7 Methods 
This chapter follows the structure of the framework as outlined by the US Centres 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) - Updated guidelines for evaluating a 
public health surveillance systems.1 The AusVaxSafety system used aggregate 
data collected by two different supporting tools: Vaxtracker and SmartVax. The 
functionality of Vaxtracker and SmartVax are described in more detail in the 
Results section. 
 
5.7.1 Stakeholder engagement and consultation  
Interviews were conducted to determine the level of engagement stakeholders 
had with the system; to seek their opinions about the system attributes; and 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of the system. The steering committee 
members of AusVaxSafety were administered a short online questionnaire that 
included a series of closed and short-open ended questions. A longer face-to-
face/telephone administered questionnaire was developed for the key 
administration staff of AusVaxSafety, Vaxtracker and SmartVax; these 
questionnaires had a greater emphasis placed on open ended questions. 
Qualitative responses from all stakeholders were categorised into common 
themes.  
 
5.7.2 Data exploration 
AusVaxSafety data collected during the 2015 influenza season were explored. 
This dataset was an aggregation of data collected by the supporting tools of 
Vaxtracker and SmartVax. Summary statistics (counts and proportions) were 
used to describe the reporting of AEFI in children aged between 6 months and 
five years. Details of these summary statistics are described below for each of 
the relevant system attributes. 
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5.7.3 System attributes 
Seven key system attributes were assessed from the AusVaxSafety system 
during its second year of operation. These included:  
1. Simplicity 
2. Flexibility  
3. Data quality 
4. Acceptability 
5. Representativeness 
6. Timeliness, and  
7. Stability.  
The surveillance attributes of sensitivity and predictive value positive were not 
evaluated here as they were not considered to be applicable to the AusVaxSafety 
system. AusVaxSafety is a sentinel active surveillance system designed to collect 
information on AEFIs experienced by the participating children. It is concerned 
with the identification of all AEFIs, and not the proportion of AEFIs detected by 
the system, or the proportion of reported AEFIs that are true AEFIs. It is the 
responsibility of the AusVaxSafety steering committee to interpret these signals 
and act upon them immediately, as required. Also, the active surveillance of 
AusVaxSafety is unique and as yet there is no 'gold standard' to compare the 
results generated by this system to the 'true condition' in the population under 
surveillance. In order to measure the sensitivity of AusVaxSafety, we would 
require access to data collected external to the system that has previously 
determined the true frequency of AEFIs with influenza vaccines for children aged 
between six months and five years.1 At the time of finalising this chapter this 
information was not yet readily available. Therefore, this attribute was not further 
evaluated here in this chapter. 
 
Simplicity 
This attribute was evaluated with reference to the overall structure and ease of 
operation of the AusVaxSafety system. The seamless movement of information 
was evaluated, with particular attention given to the consistent, timely and regular 
multi-level flow from Vaxtracker and SmartVax into AusVaxSafety.  
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Flexibility 
An understanding of this attribute was obtained throughout the 2015 influenza 
season by attending monthly AusVaxSafety meeting, as these meetings were an 
important platform for the exchange of information, ideas and problems 
experienced by different jurisdictions. This attribute was evaluated with qualitative 
information gathered from stakeholder interviews.  
 
Data quality  
Data quality was evaluated by completeness and validity of data collected, as 
well as protocols and procedures in place to monitor error within the generated 
datasets. This attribute was reliant on many different factors, which have been 
outlined by the ‘Nationally Agreed Protocols for Program Action and 
Communication.’2 These include an agreed national minimum dataset for 
AusVaxSafety; a nationally consistent AEFI reporting form and framework for 
supporting tools of AusVaxSafety; development of an agreed case definition for 
SAE; and agreed triggers that initiate further investigation. Data quality was 
evaluated on how these factors were met during 2015 and the proportion of 
‘unknown’ or ‘blank’ fields reported by respondents. 
 
Acceptability 
Interaction between participants and AusVaxSafety was assessed by an analysis 
of the number of participants enrolled in the system at the time of child 
vaccination (participant rate), the number of completed surveys (completion rate), 
the completeness of each survey-field (question completion rate), and the 
timeframe to complete the survey (average time for survey completion). A 
retrospective analysis of the two supporting tools (Vaxtracker and SmartVax) was 
also conducted to investigate the acceptability of each tool. 
 
Representativeness 
This attribute was evaluated with regards to the ability of AusVaxSafety to 
accurately and consistently describe the AEFI rates, as well as the distribution 
patterns of these AEFI rates within the study cohort. This was evaluated by 
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comparing supporting tools, individual jurisdictions, the public health setting from 
which data were collected, vaccine brands and symptoms experienced by the 
child. 
 
Timeliness 
Qualitative and quantitative data was collected from operational staff of 
Vaxtracker, SmartVax and AusVaxSafety as to the speed of data flow from 
supporting tools into AusVaxSafety. AusVaxSafety steering committee members 
were interviewed as to their opinions regarding the regularity of reports generated 
by AusVaxSafety (including weekly reports, final report, and data available on the 
NCIRS website) and how quickly the AusVaxSafety system identified, interpreted 
and dealt with a SAE signal.  
 
Stability 
Qualitative and quantitative data were collected from key administration staff at 
the end of the 2015 influenza season. Questions relating to reliability and 
continuous operation were asked, along with specific questions regarding 
unscheduled outages, down time, and identification of issues associated with 
getting the supporting tool back online. Similar questions were also asked of 
AusVaxSafety operational staff.  
 
5.7.4 Usefulness 
After each of the system attributes were independently assessed, the level of 
usefulness of AusVaxSafety was addressed. Usefulness was assessed with 
regards to the performance of AusVaxSafety during the 2015 influenza season, 
and the ability of the AusVaxSafety to: 
 monitor adverse events experienced by children aged six months to five 
years following influenza immunisation; 
 value-add to our understanding of AEFI experienced by children in this 
cohort, with near real-time data allowing rapid signal detection; and 
 detect changing trends.  
Chapter Five  Surveillance 
 
187 | P a g e  
 
5.8 Results and discussion 
5.8.1 Operation of AusVaxSafety 
The initiative of AusVaxSafety is led by NCIRS, and funded by the Australian 
Government Department of Health.35 The purpose and objectives of this 
surveillance system have been identified and outlined by NCIRS.34 AusVaxSafety 
is to facilitate the prompt identification of any adverse event (signal) of seasonal 
influenza vaccine administered to children under the age of five and to instigate 
appropriate implementations for public health action to eliminate the risk (if and 
when a signal is identified). 
 
Recruitment / Case definition: Eligibility for participation includes a child 
administered seasonal influenza vaccine in an appropriate setting (general 
practice [GP], hospital, public clinic); who is aged between six months and five 
years (i.e. maximum age of four years and 364 days); whose parents/carer 
agrees to participate; and whose parent/carer understands English, has a mobile 
phone and access to the internet. 
 
Serious Adverse Event: A serious adverse event (SAE) was categorised 
according to the criteria of any untoward medial event that resulted in death, was 
life threatening, or required hospitalisation.36,37 Under Australian legislation, all 
SAEs identified by AusVaxSafety were reported to the corresponding state or 
territory Health Department and to the TGA.37 
 
Source of information: The AusVaxSafety surveillance system captures data 
from two individual supporting tools:  
 Vaxtracker – operating in New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), and 
South Australia (SA); and  
 SmartVax* – operating in WA and VIC.  
* during 2015, SmartVax also includes a functional component called ‘Follow up and Active 
Surveillance of Trivalent influenza vaccine’, or FAST. For the rest of the evaluation, unless stated 
otherwise, SmartVax will be evaluated in its entirety. 
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Both tools use modern technology that is accessible by most people. This 
technology includes mobile phones (for Short Message Service [SMS] and 
computer assisted telephone interviews) and computers (for emails and online 
surveys). These supporting tools of AusVaxSafety actively follow-up 
parents/carers of children recently vaccinated against influenza and collect 
information regarding any AEFIs experienced by that child. AusVaxSafety utilises 
this aggregated information; the flow of information is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Data flow of the AusVaxSafety surveillance system, from data 
collection to final dissemination of results  
 (NFA = No Further Action taken if there is no response from the parent or carer) 
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5.8.2 Overview of the SmartVax and Vaxtracker tools 
During the 2015 influenza season, SmartVax and Vaxtracker collected 
demographic details of participants, vaccine brand, underlying medical 
conditions, concomitant vaccines, reactions and their symptoms, and whether 
further healthcare was consulted following influenza vaccines. Similarities and 
differences of the two supporting tools are detailed in Table 5.1. 
 
5.8.3 Stakeholder engagement  
Key administration staff of Vaxtracker, SmartVax and AusVaxSafety were each 
available for interview, while only a modest number of steering committee 
members responded to the online questionnaire (38.1%; 8 of 21 surveys 
completed). Overall, stakeholders were engaged from different Health 
Departments and Research Institutes within NSW, the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT), VIC, Queensland (QLD) and WA. 
 
Table 5.1: Key differences between SmartVax and Vaxtracker informing the 
AusVaxSafety system evaluation  
 Tool attribute SmartVax Vaxtracker Comments for AusVaxSafety 
A
t 
th
e 
ti
m
e 
o
f 
im
m
u
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 
Primary setting of 
system 
Mainly general practices 
-also set up in hospitals 
and clinical settings 
(including community 
clinics) 
Hospitals and clinical 
settings (including 
Aboriginal Medical 
Services and 
community clinics) 
-also set up in general 
practices 
Together, both systems cover 
all immunisation settings. 
Individually, some differential 
targeting possible (children of 
different health status prior to 
immunisation) 
Participant 
enrolment 
Automatic  
(with an ‘opt out’ 
option) 
Consent forms  
(requires participant’s 
signature for 
enrolment) 
SmartVax- participants may be 
unaware of their role in 
AusVaxSafety 
Vaxtracker- participants are 
aware of their role in 
AusVaxSafety 
Data entry of 
participant’s 
details 
Automatic extraction 
- built to compliment 
general practice 
software, however 
manual entry is possible 
Manual entry only Could influence attributes of 
AusVaxSafety, such as 
acceptability and flexibility 
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7
2
 h
o
u
rs
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 i
m
m
u
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 
Primary 
automated contact 
SMS - 72 hours after 
immunisation  
SMS - 72 hours after 
immunisation and 
email 
Similar for both systems 
Follow up action 
required by the 
participant 
SMS reply – Yes / No Directed to web 
survey via hyperlink  
Simple for participants, with 
more information collected by 
Vaxtracker on initial contact  
Primary 
automated follow 
up question 
Q: Thanks for caring to 
immunise [name]. We 
want to know if there 
were any reactions to 
the vax. Kindly reply 
YES or NO 
Q: In the three days 
following the 
vaccination, did 
[name] experience any 
illness or symptoms? 
 
Different questions  
-a consideration for the 
analysis of aggregated data in 
AusVaxSafety 
- possible biases associated 
with wording of the question 
Other questions 
asked during 
primary contact 
Nil (no details about 
underlying conditions 
extract/asked of 
participants) 
Asks about 
concomitant vaccines, 
underlying conditions, 
allows participants to 
make free text 
comments, and 
collects details 
regarding the nature 
of an adverse event 
A lot of detail to provide at 
initial contact for Vaxtracker 
participants 
Secondary 
automated follow 
up question  
Q: As a result of the 
vaccination reaction, did 
you visit a doctor, 
medical centre, after 
hours service, or 
hospital emergency 
dept? Please answer 
YES or NO 
Not required for this 
tool 
Numerous texts required by 
SmartVax to collect data 
Tertiary 
automated follow 
up question 
[Medical Centre name]. 
Thanks for responding. 
Could you please 
complete a 2 minute 
survey by following: 
http//www…… 
Not required for this 
tool 
Numerous texts required by 
SmartVax to collect data 
A
d
v
er
se
 e
v
en
t 
re
p
o
r
te
d
 
Assessment of 
adverse event 
Medically attended 
reactions are flagged to 
the general practice’s 
software inbox and in 
some states to the local 
health authority. Can 
also be seen by 
SmartVax staff (not 
identifying details) to 
monitor level of adverse 
events 
 
Manually monitored 
by registered nurse or 
doctor. Responses 
from participants 
require regular 
monitoring though 
high level public 
health staff are alerted 
via email to possible 
serious symptoms 
reported 
An important attribute for the 
success of AusVaxSafety 
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N
o
n
-
re
sp
o
n
d
er
s 
Participants who 
don’t respond to 
the primary 
automated contact 
No additional SMS sent 
as follow up 
 
2
nd
 SMS sent at 96 
hours following 
immunisation 
3
rd
 SMS sent at 120 
hours following 
immunisation 
Helps to improve the overall 
participation rate of 
AusVaxSafety 
D
a
ta
 f
lo
w
 Data extraction 
requirements 
during active 
surveillance of 
AusVaxSafety 
Weekly Weekly Timelines of data flow is 
important for AusVaxSafety 
reporting commitments 
 
 
5.8.4 System attributes 
Results from stakeholder interviews and interrogation or exploration of the data 
were incorporated within each of the evaluated system attributes. 
 
Simplicity 
Generally, stakeholders were satisfied with the simplicity of the AusVaxSafety 
system.  
The use of two different data collection tools for a single system inherently means 
it is less simple than some other surveillance systems. During stakeholder 
consultation, concerns were raised regarding the “cohesion of multiple 
databases” utilised by the AusVaxSafety system. In particular, issues related to 
the data generated by different supporting tools, with different primary roles. 
Vaxtracker functionality was “purpose-built” for AusVaxSafety operations and 
required data entry via an easy-to-use web-platform. While SmartVax (which 
includes the FAST component) was built to identify safety signals associated with 
vaccination as its primary role, using data extracted automatically from general 
practice software; research and analysis, as employed by the AusVaxSafety 
system, are secondary roles. 
Purpose-built flat-files containing data are available from the Vaxtracker tool, and 
can be accessed by AusVaxSafety administration staff at any time with a “click of 
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a button.” Whereas, SmartVax data was generated in a different format during 
2015 and therefore required cleaning and reformatting before being manually 
sent to AusVaxSafety administration staff. SmartVax data preparation, for 
AusVaxSafety purposes was, at times, “problematic” during 2015. It was 
suggested during stakeholder consultation, that this attribute could be improved 
by removing the need for data manipulation, by adding further functionality to the 
SmartVax tool, adjusting the output data generated by SmartVax, and 
establishing a direct link between SmartVax and AusVaxSafety.  
Once SmartVax and Vaxtracker data had been received by the AusVaxSafety 
system, further data cleaning, alignment and merging was required before 
analysis. It was apparent from this evaluation that data movement within the 
AusVaxSafety system is not entirely seamless. However, it was noted that the 
synergistic relationship of Vaxtracker, SmartVax and AusVaxSafety is still in its 
early stage of configuration. There are a lot of changes still to be made as this 
organic relationship evolves rapidly overtime.  
 “This is what real-time data looks like, it’s messy and things 
happen…let’s fix it and move on” 
 “It doesn’t stop, and everyone is ok with that it is a little bit 
messy, that is the nature of what we are doing. It’s not going to 
be perfect and clean and without problems”  
“Inherent biases of the two different [tools]” i.e. SmartVax and 
Vaxtracker 
 
Flexibility 
Overall, 71.4% (5/7) of the steering committee members who took part in this 
evaluation were satisfied with the flexibility of AusVaxSafety, with 42.9% (3/7) 
being very satisfied. Administration staff of SmartVax, Vaxtracker and 
AusVaxSafety were each satisfied with the flexibility of their respective 
tool/system. It was noted by stakeholders that these tools/systems were flexible 
with “certain restraints”, and that changes to the functionality would be dependent 
on the complexity of the modification requested.  
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AusVaxSafety appears to be a flexibility system, with protocols and dedicated 
personnel in place to address minor issues quickly and cost effectively. Flexibility 
of the AusVaxSafety system would be a “case by case issue,” with minor 
changes theoretically addressed at any time during its operation, while more 
complex issues may need to be addressed at the completion of the active 
surveillance time period. AusVaxSafety demonstrated good flexibility halfway 
thought the 2015 influenza season, with the incorporation of serious neurological 
events (SNE) into active surveillance using the Paediatric Active Enhanced 
Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) network. 
Some stakeholders commented that they don’t believe that the flexibility of 
AusVaxSafety was “tested” formally during the 2015 influenza season. However, 
the flexibility attribute of AusVaxSafety would be tested in its entirety if this 
system were to be promoted for the active safety surveillance of another 
scheduled vaccine under the NIP.  
 
Data quality  
Aggregated AusVaxSafety data for the 2015 influenza season, for the most part, 
was complete and valid. ‘Age of Participants,’ ‘Vaccine Brand’ and ‘Vaccination 
Date’ were each 100% complete; ‘Sex’ was 94.2% complete (99.0% and 80.6% 
complete for SmartVax and Vaxtracker, respectively); and ‘Concomitant 
Vaccines’ was 94.1% complete (100% and 77.3% complete for SmartVax and 
Vaxtracker, respectively). One variable with poor data completeness was 
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Status’, with a 73.7% completion rate 
(64.4% and 94.2% completed for SmartVax and Vaxtracker, respectively). 
‘Underlying Medical Condition’ was reported by Vaxtracker and the FAST 
component of the SmartVax tool only; 97.1% complete for Vaxtracker (with 33 
missing records from a single GP) and 100% complete for FAST. ‘Underlying 
Medical Condition’ data was not reported by the remaining component of the 
SmartVax tool during 2015.  
“Good data quality, extra info (underlying condition) [from 
Vaxtracker]”  
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Acceptability 
The AusVaxSafety system was well accepted by participants during the active 
surveillance period of 2015. Of the 4,441 children vaccinated for influenza at 
participating health settings during 2015, 99.0% of their parents/carers agreed to 
participate. Of the 4,396 surveys that were sent out by SMS or email, 76.0% were 
completed, resulting in the collection of 3,340 post-vaccination reports. The 
median response time of the 3,340 surveys was 4.7 days (range: three – 48 
days) after vaccination (noting that surveys were sent out three days after 
vaccination). 
Overall, Vaxtracker had a higher acceptance rate for completed surveys than 
SmartVax (79.7% and 74.8% respectively); however, SmartVax collected more 
than twice as many completed surveys than Vaxtracker (N= 2,424 and N=915, 
respectively). When considering the FAST component of the SmartVax tool, it 
had an acceptance rate of 85.9% for completed surveys; however, FAST only 
represented 6.9% (N=231) of all completed surveys during 2015.  
The response rate to whether the participant had experienced an ‘AEFI with 
Influenza Vaccine’ was 99.5% complete (range: 99.3% to 100% for SmartVax 
and Vaxtracker, respectively). Of the 385 surveys reporting that their child had 
experienced an ‘AEFI with Influenza Vaccine’, 26.5% (N=102) had incomplete 
symptom variables for the AEFI. Three surveys contributed by Vaxtracker were 
partially complete, with either two or four symptoms missing per AEFI. The 
remaining 99 surveys were contributed by SmartVax, all of which had no 
symptoms recorded for these AEFIs. This non-reporting of symptoms within 
SmartVax was a result of the three step data collection method used (i.e. primary, 
secondary and tertiary automated follow up question, as detailed in Table 5.1). 
Participants were able to provide answers to the first two text messages without 
completing the web-link survey (detailing the symptoms of the AEFI) in the third 
message. This system omission represents a missed opportunity to collect 
valuable information about the types and severity of the AEFI. 
“It’s exciting! Problems resolved quickly and efficiently”  
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Representativeness 
The SmartVax tool contributed 72.6% (8/11) of completed surveys during 2015, 
while Vaxtracker contributed 27.4% (3/11).  
 SmartVax largely collected data from WA, as well as from a single GP in 
VIC. Overall, 57.4% (1863/3248) of SmartVax data were collected from a 
community clinic, 34.4% (1116/3248) from GPs and 8.3% (269/3248) from 
hospitals.  
 Vaxtracker collected data from participants in NSW, SA and VIC. Overall, 
48.9% (561/1148) of Vaxtracker data were collected from hospitals, 47.1% 
(541/1148) from GPs and 4.0% (46/1148) from Aboriginal medical 
services.  
Stakeholders identified that “there remains some issues with governance of 
the data,” at the jurisdictional level within the AusVaxSafety model. This issue 
will need to be address in the future.  
“Victoria had some sites directly reporting to SAEFVIC via 
Vaxtracker and others via WA Health (Smartvax)” 
Another issue was that AusVaxSafety data for 2015 was not nationally 
representative, with data absent from the Northern Territory, ACT, QLD and 
Tasmania. Ongoing jurisdictional ethical issues were the reason for the absence 
of data from some of these states and territories, despite concerted efforts by 
local public health staff. 
Of the vaccine brands available to children aged between six months and five 
years, Vaxigrip represented 96.2% (N=3125) and 80.1% (N=920) of data 
contributed by SmartVax and Vaxtracker, respectively (Table 5.2). Unfortunately, 
it was not possible to determine whether this was representative of the general 
population, with sales of different vaccine brands not freely-available to the 
public. 
“mainly only one brand of vaccine studied” 
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Table 5.2: Vaccine brand representativeness, including total number of 
vaccination administered and number of AFFI with influenza vaccine reported by 
the supporting tools of AusVaxSafety during the 2015 influenza season 
 SmartVax Vaxtracker 
Vaccine 
brand 
Total # of 
vaccinations (# AEFI 
reported) 
% of AEFI 
reported 
Total # of 
vaccinations (# AEFI 
reported) 
% of AEFI 
reported 
Agrippal 0 (0) 0.0% 16 (1) 6.3% 
Fluarix 114 (6) 5.3% 133 (10) 7.5% 
Fluquadri 3 (0) 0.0% 11 (2) 18.2% 
Influvac 1 (0) 0.0% 68 (11) 16.2% 
Vaxigrip 3125 (226) 7.2% 920 (129) 14.0% 
 
 
In general, a higher proportion of AEFIs were reported by Vaxtracker participants 
than by SmartVax (13.3% and 7.2% respectively) (Table 5.2). This discrepancy of 
AEFI reporting between the two tools could be an artefact relating to the method 
of recruiting participants. SmartVax is used routinely for all vaccination (not just 
influenza vaccines administered to children aged six months to five years) as part 
of the health provider’s duty of care. Vaxtracker participants were actively 
recruited and required written consent before participating. During recruitment, 
Vaxtracker participants were informed of why they were being recruited and how 
their data were being used. This may have led Vaxtracker participants being 
more likely to report all minor reactions experienced following vaccination. This 
discrepancy of AEFI reporting between the two supporting tools of AusVaxSafety 
requires close monitoring during future active surveillance. 
Higher rates of fevers (7.2% [N=66] and 3.4% [N=82]), local reactions (4.0% 
[N=37] and 1.2% [N=30]) and seizures (0.3% [N=3] and 0.1% [N=2]) were 
reported by Vaxtracker participants than SmartVax participants. These higher 
rates by Vaxtracker participants could be a result of this tool largely collected 
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data from hospital clinics. During 2015, 48.9% of Vaxtracker data was collected 
from hospital clinics, as opposed to 8.3% for SmartVax. Again, this discrepancy 
of reporting between the two supporting tools of AusVaxSafety requires close 
monitoring during future active surveillance. 
 
Timeliness 
All stakeholders were satisfied with the timeliness of AusVaxSafety reporting of 
AEFI experienced by children aged six months to five years, with 50.0% (5/10) of 
the steering committee who replied being very satisfied. There were no issues 
identified regarding the timely flow of data from supporting tool to AusVaxSafety 
during 2015. SmartVax data was presented to AusVaxSafety at a regular time 
each week, while Vaxtracker data was readily available to AusVaxSafety 
administration staff when required. 
AusVaxSafety successfully fulfilled all of its reporting requirements in 2015 in a 
very timely manner. Ten ‘weekly’ reports were generated between 01 April and 
05 July, 2015, with reports initially available weekly for eight consecutive weeks, 
and then fortnightly (once negotiated with HEALTH) over a four week period. No 
safety signals were identified during the 2015 influenza season, and the 
AusVaxSafety system demonstrated, in real-time, that AEFI with influenza 
vaccines were within anticipated ranges for young children aged six months to 
five years of age. 
The final report, which covered surveillance data collected between 01 April and 
31 August, 2015 was made available to HEALTH for comments in November 
2015, and was accepted by HEALTH a month later. There was also a “rapid 
turnaround” of results generated during 2015 with a “publication in 
Eurosurveillance prior to the northern hemisphere season” of influenza.  
In addition to these reports, AusVaxSafety also disseminated results quickly by 
periodically updating its webpage (http://ncirs.edu.au/surveillance/ausvaxsafety/), 
distributing press releases through GP networks, publishing articles and 
delivering presentations at conferences both in Australia and abroad (2015 New 
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Zealand Immunisation Conference, Hamilton; Influenza Symposium, 
Melbourne).38 
AusVaxSafety successfully provided “very timely feedback on safety of the 
vaccines” while also providing “reassurance” to parents and vaccine providers. 
However, it was suggested by stakeholders that there was still room to “improve 
the timeliness” of reporting when going forward with the AusVaxSafety system, 
with “further active dissemination” of good news required. 
 
Stability 
The steering committee was generally satisfied with the stability of AusVaxSafety, 
with 50.0% of those who replied being very satisfied. Administration staff of 
SmartVax, Vaxtracker and AusVaxSafety were each satisfied with the stability of 
their respective tool/system. Vaxtracker had a minor issue of non-access for 
about two hours following an important update. This non-access issue was due to 
an operator error, where the Vaxtracker tool was not properly restarted following 
the update. A single participant was inconvenienced by this disruption. It was 
noted that, if Vaxtracker were to fail completely, there are contingency plans in 
place, whereby data can be accessed by administrators from the back-end of the 
platform, packaged up and manually sent to the AusVaxSafety system in a timely 
manner. 
SmartVax had no outages during 2015. However, an important issue was raised 
during this evaluation regarding the overall stability of the SmartVax tool. 
SmartVax is installed locally within each public health setting and can be viewed 
as a data extraction tool. Essentially, the tool relies upon the functionality and 
stability of the platform from which it extracts data. Therefore, if SmartVax is 
disabled locally, or the local platform fails, then real-time data from that practice 
will not be available for the weekly analysis. However, this should not be a major 
issue, as data is not lost or destroyed; its extraction is simply delayed. Also 
noteworthy, AusVaxSafety is concerned with detecting a cumulative signal during 
the influenza season, not signal detection from data of an isolated week.  
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5.8.5 Usefulness 
All stakeholders were satisfied with the usefulness of AusVaxSafety to monitor 
adverse events experienced by children; 85.7% of those who responded were 
very satisfied. Likewise, stakeholders were satisfied with the performance of 
AusVaxSafety; with 71.4% being very satisfied. AusVaxSafety “did what it was 
supposed to do” during the 2015 influenza season, supporting health care 
workers and patients with real-time safety information for seasonal influenza 
vaccines, and aiding the duty-of-care responsibilities following vaccination. 
Soon after commencing active surveillance, AusVaxSafety quickly assembled a 
relatively large sample size, and was able to provide a reliable safety profile for 
the 2015 seasonal influenza vaccines. This rapid data collection was aided by an 
increasing number of sentinel sites enrolled in AusVaxSafety in 2015, compared 
to the previous year. Early safety reports were disseminated to the public and 
relevant stakeholders in a very timely manner. Another success of the 
AusVaxSafety system was the quick identification of SAEs, which allowed the 
steering committee to manage these cases in near real-time. The AusVaxSafety 
system demonstrated great potential and can been seen to be “giving back to the 
public health community.”  
“[AusVaxSafety] is huge.”  
“[AusVaxSafety] adds to public trust, and public trust is a huge 
issue with vaccinations” 
“Very timely feedback on safety of the vaccines”  
“Confirmed no [safety] signal” 
Another success of the AusVaxSafety model was the addressing of problems in 
real time, with procedures and protocols in place to resolve issues quickly and 
efficiently. The “flu season is short and sharp” so it is essential that all procedures 
and protocols are in place for when they are required. There “were teething 
problems” during the 2015 operation of the AusVaxSafety system, but “no major 
issues.” The ability for AusVaxSafety to value-add to our understanding of AEFI 
experienced by children in this cohort and detect changing trends looks promising 
at this early stage of active surveillance, especially with the ongoing collection 
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and more efficient analysis of underlying medical conditions collected by the 
supporting tools.  
 
5.9 Going forward  
Stakeholders, when asked, were in support of promoting the AusVaxSafety active 
surveillance system for other vaccines funded under the NIP. They believed that 
the ‘usefulness’ of the AusVaxSafety model was the greatest attribute to promote, 
followed by ‘timeliness,’ ‘data quality,’ ‘simplicity,’ and ‘acceptability.’ It was also 
noted that the promotion of AusVaxSafety should be recommended “when it 
makes sense to do so.” 
Recommended vaccines suitable for AusVaxSafety included: 
“Pertussis containing vaccines” including “pregnancy pertussis 
vaccine” and “18 month booster pertussis vaccine” 
All “pregnancy vaccines” 
“Zoster vaccine” 
“Live attenuated influenza vaccines” 
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5.10 Summary 
Among all stakeholders interviewed during this evaluation: 
a) 100% (N=11) believed AusVaxSafety was effective with the real-time 
identification of an adverse event experienced by a child aged six months 
to five years, with 45.5% (N=5) rating it very effective. 
b) 81.8% (N=9) believed AusVaxSafety was effective with initiating an 
appropriate review of an identified adverse event experienced by a child 
aged six months to five years, with 27.3% (N=3) rating it very effective. 
One stakeholder believed AusVaxSafety was neither effective nor 
ineffective and another chose not to comment. 
c) 90.9% (N= 10) believed AusVaxSafety was effective with adding to current 
knowledge regarding the safe use of influenza vaccine administered to 
children aged six months to five years, with 45.5% (N=5) rating it very 
effective. One stakeholder believed AusVaxSafety was neither effective 
nor ineffective. 
d) 72.7% (N=8) believed AusVaxSafety was effective with restoring 
professional and public confidence regarding the safe use of influenza 
vaccine administered to children aged six months to five years. No 
stakeholders rated AusVaxSafety being very effective at this, and 27.3% 
(N=3) of stakeholders chose not to comment.  
During the 2015 influenza season, the AusVaxSafety system demonstrated, in 
real time, that influenza vaccines registered for use in children aged six months to 
five years were safe, well tolerated, and that the AEFIs experienced were within 
expected ranges. The AusVaxSafety system was well accepted by participants 
during active surveillance, with 99.0% of parents/carers agreeing to participate 
and 76.0% returning a completed survey. AusVaxSafety also demonstrated that it 
was a very useful system, designed for the public, to enable trust and 
transparency regarding vaccine safety. AusVaxSafety has enormous potential 
when it comes to vaccine safety. 
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5.11 Recommendations 
To improve the usefulness of the AusVaxSafety system, the following actions are 
recommended: 
High priority 
1. Increase the dissemination of results to the public, primarily targeting web-
based information, GP newsletters and articles that target parents  
“Greater community and health provider engagement through 
communication strategies” 
2. The promotion of AusVaxSafety as “part of post-marketing surveillance” of 
vaccines, which “becomes just part of the vaccination program rather than a 
boutique program run on the side”  
3. Standardising the questions asked by the different tools, so that 
AusVaxSafety is not comparing whether a child has experienced ‘reactions’ 
(SmartVax) with whether a child has experienced any ‘illness or symptoms’ 
(Vaxtracker) 
4. Improve the geographic representativeness of AusVaxSafety, with data 
collected nationally 
5. Continue to improve the “cohesion of multiple databases” utilised by the 
AusVaxSafety system. Standardise the data variables collected, the naming of 
variables, and coding of data to establish consistencies between the two 
supporting tools 
Medium priority 
6. Improve the data completeness for underlying conditions within the 
AusVaxSafety system  
7. Improve data completeness for response to the symptoms experienced by a 
child who experiences an AEFI with influenza vaccine  
8. Include “a brief explanatory note on interpreting the Bayesian analysis charts 
[in the weekly reports] could be helpful for a broader audience” (referring to 
the Fast Initial Response Cumulative Summation [FIR CUSUM] methodology 
used for the real-time detection of a ‘safety signal,’ and monitoring of an 
excess in adverse events.
38
 This Bayesian analysis was used to determine 
the likelihood that any detected signal was real versus a chance event) 
Low priority 
9. Promotion of AusVaxSafety internationally e.g. New Zealand 
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5.12 Conclusions 
Following the Australian federal government suspension of the national use of all 
2010 seasonal TIVs for children aged between six months and five years, 
AusVaxSafety was established to occupy an important niche to help repair the 
damage caused by this suspension. AusVaxSafety is a clinical resource that 
fulfils two recommendations made by an independent review2 to improve vaccine 
safety surveillance in Australia. AusVaxSafety is designed to detect vaccine 
safety signals first and foremost, while also enabling trust and transparency for 
parents and vaccine providers regarding vaccine safety. During the 2015 
influenza season, AusVaxSafety was well accepted by participants, with three of 
every four parents/carers who agreed to participate returning a completed survey. 
No safety signals were identified and AusVaxSafety demonstrated, in real-time, 
that AEFI with influenza vaccines were within anticipated ranges for young 
children aged six months to five years.  
AusVaxSafety successfully provided very timely feedback regarding the safety of 
vaccines, while also providing reassurance to parents and vaccine providers. 
During the first two years of operation, AusVaxSafety can already be seen as 
being proactive when it comes to vaccine safety and working to restore 
professional and public confidence regarding the recommendations of the NIP. 
AusVaxSafety has already provided one of the fastest turnaround times for the 
dissemination of real-time data regarding influenza vaccine administered to 
children, with rapid publication of results locally and internationally. It is 
anticipated, as AusVaxSafety enters its third year of active surveillance, it will 
continue to be trustworthy and transparent system, while providing real-time 
vaccine safety data to the public health community. It is also anticipated that 
AusVaxSafety will continue to expand, throughout the jurisdictions of Australia, 
and with the number of vaccines that it reports on. 
When it comes to vaccine safety, AusVaxSafety simply makes sense. 
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5.14 Appendix 5.1 
Vaccine safety surveillance information sheet for AusVaxSafety targeting a lay 
audience at The Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network  
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6.2 Prologue 
This final chapter of my bound volume fulfils a core component of the MAE 
program, in which I prepared and administered (a) a ‘Lesson from the Field’ (LFF) 
to my peers of the MAE15 cohort, and (b) two structured teaching sessions to the 
new MAE16 cohort during their first semester at the Australian National 
University. 
 
Lesson from the filed 
My LFF was a data analysis project, which focused on using postcodes to assign 
place of residence within Australia, as well as creating new variables based on 
historical targeted funding of the hepatitis A vaccine under the National 
Immunisation Program in Australia. I chose this topic for my LFF as I found 
myself exploring the hepatitis A data in Chapter 2 in different ways to those that 
we had been taught during course block. For Chapter 2, I was required to explore 
new syntax and commands in Stata and thought that these were of relevance to 
the other members of MAE15 cohort. I presented this LFF during March 2016. 
 
Structured teaching session 
The first part of my structured teaching session included teaching during the 
Outbreak Investigation course block for the MAE15 cohort. My role was to assist 
with the final session that detailed how to conduct an outbreak investigation.  
The second part included a larger session conducted solely by MAE15 cohort. 
Our teaching session included three different topics, which focused on different 
themes and epidemiological processes tailored for the MAE16 cohort. I was part 
of the group that focused on administering questionnaires when conducting an 
outbreak investigation. 
Before completing these teaching components of the MAE, I didn’t realise how 
much planning, research and consultation was required for a self-directed 
learning exercise (LFF) and a one-hour teaching session. I was very lucky to 
have good support from Emily, Helen and Kerri during the construction of my 
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LFF. The structured teaching session conducted by the MAE15 cohort was a 
collective effort of all members, with everyone playing their part in very different 
ways. Overall, this was a fun and rewarding exercise, from which I learned a lot 
and hope that I was able to pass on some knowledge and enthusiasm to both the 
cohort members of MAE15 and MAE16. 
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6.3 Lesson from the Field 
Title: Data Analysis - Using postcodes to assign place of residence within 
Australia, and create new variables based on historical targeted funding of the 
hepatitis A vaccine under the National Immunisation Program 
 
6.3.1 Learning objectives 
By the end of this LFF you should be able to: 
 inspect a dataset and remove duplicates; 
 create simple Stata syntax using the “inrange” command to assign state of 
residence when only postcodes are known; 
 create new variables based on the historical changes made under the NIP; 
 generate age-specific tables, and; 
 use the immediate stata incidence-rate ratio command (iri), and interpret 
results 
 
6.3.2 Introduction to the LFF exercise  
Postcodes 
 
Australian postcodes are used to sort and send mail to the correct people and 
addresses. All postcodes in Australia have four digits and are placed at the end 
of the address. The allocation of postal addresses to state and territories such as 
Northern Territory, Tasmania, Western Australia and South Australia are uniform; 
each having a consecutive 1000 digit block for the jurisdictions. However, the 
same cannot be said for New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory, with 
small blocks of postal codes being assigned alternatively to each jurisdiction. 
Table 1 highlights this issue for New South Wales and Australian Capital 
Territory. 
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Table 6.1: Postal ranges for each state and territory of Australia 
 
State/Territory   
    
Postcode range*  
New South Wales (NSW)   1000—2599 
2619—2899 
2921—2999 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
   
0200—0299 
2600—2618 
2900—2920 
Victoria (Vic) 3000—3999 
8000—8999 
Queensland (Qld)   4000—4999 
9000—9999 
South Australia (SA)  5000—5999 
Western Australia (WA) 6000—6999 
Tasmania (Tas)   7000—7999 
Northern Territory (NT) 0800—0999 
*including large volume receivers and Post Office boxes 
 
 
Therefore, specialised syntax is required to assign a state or territory to each 
postcode of residence when this information has not been supplied in your 
dataset. 
 
 
Please note that postcode assignment within Australia is not this simple and there are many 
exceptions to the rules of Table 1.  
 
For example: 0872 crosses NT/SA/WA 
2618 crosses NSW/ACT 
2620 crosses NSW/ACT 
3585 crosses Vic/NSW 
3644 crosses Vic/NSW 
4383 crosses Qld/NSW 
4825 crosses Qld/NT 
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Hepatitis A vaccine in Australia 
 
Hepatitis A vaccine was first registered in Australia in 1994 and is recommended 
for at-risk groups including travellers, people with an increased risk of exposure 
to hepatitis A virus (based on their occupation and life-style), and those who are 
at increased risk of severe disease. In February 1999, as a response to an 
increasing number of cases in north Queensland, regional Queensland funding of 
hepatitis A vaccine was provided for all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
(henceforth referred to as Indigenous) children, with two doses at 18 and 24 
months of age. In November 2005, targeted funding of hepatitis A vaccine was 
made available under the NIP for all Indigenous children aged 12 to 24 months 
old residing in Queensland, the Northern Territory, South Australia and Western 
Australia. Two doses were originally funded at 12 months and 18 months of age 
for Indigenous children in NT and WA, and at 18 and 24 months of age for 
Indigenous children in Qld and SA, changing to 12 and 18 months for Indigenous 
children residing in all four jurisdictions in July 2013.  
 
6.3.3 Background  
 
You have been asked to analyse the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System (NNDSS) database for hepatitis A reported in Indigenous people of 
Australia for 2007, and provide an incidence rate ratio (IRR) (95% confidence 
intervals) using the following formula: 
 
Incidence of hepatitis A in children aged < 5 years of age from vaccine targeted jurisdictions*       . 
Incidence of hepatitis A in children aged < 5 years of age from vaccine non-targeted jurisdictions^  
  
* where vaccine targeted jurisdictions are QLD, NT, SA and WA 
^ where vaccine non-targeted jurisdictions are NSW, ACT, VIC and TAS 
 
 
This IRR will help you interpret whether the targeted hepatitis A vaccine program 
has been successful. Your boss informs you that the estimated population size 
for children aged < 5 years are 46,290 in the targeted jurisdictions and 34,224 in 
the non-targeted jurisdictions.  
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Nice you think. This should be easy done and should not take too long. 
However, after looking at the dataset (attached excel file ‘Hep_A_mock_dataset’), 
you realise there is no data field for state_code  
What do you do? 
 
6.3.4 Instructions  
Getting started  
1. After opening up Stata, import the provided spread sheet called 
‘Hep_A_mock_dataset’ (making sure to tick the box for ‘import first row as 
variable names’) 
2. Open up a new ‘do file’ and name it appropriately  
(for example: your name, date, and Hep A Notification_postcodes to 
state_code) 
3. set more off 
 
Inspect your dataset 
4. codebook 
5. tabulate postcode 
6. check for duplicates, and remove any that you find 
 
QUESTION 1  
Using ‘duplicates report’ ‘duplicates list’ and ‘duplicates drop’ how many 
duplicates did you remove from the dataset?  
ANSWER:  3 
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Generate new variable 
7. generate a new variable, call it ‘state_code’, and assign a missing value to 
each of the new cells 
 QUESTION 2  
What syntax do you write for Instruction 7?  
ANSWER: gen state_code =. 
 
 
Before going any further, you decide to use the following rule for recoding the 
new variable-state_code: 
 
1 = ACT 
2 = NSW 
3 = TAS 
4 = VIC 
5 = SA 
6 = NT 
7 = QLD 
8 = WA 
Non-targeted jurisdictions 
Targeted jurisdictions 
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Now, you stop to think of an easy way to code the postcodes of 1000 to 2599 to 
represent the state of New South Wales, and remember a great command to help 
out…… 
 
 
It’s called  
 
Recoding postcodes to state codes 
 
8. For the first line of syntax you write: 
 
replace state_code = 2 if inrange(postcode,1000,2599) 
(where you are telling Stata to replace the newly created variable ‘state_code’ 
with the number 2 (which will be relabelled “NSW” later) if the corresponding 
postcode is within the range of 1000 to 2599 (inclusive)) 
 
 
9. You check if this syntax has worked, and decide to tabulate state_code 
 
QUESTION 3  
How many postcodes were inrange of 1000-2599 in your dataset?  
ANSWER:   65 
 
10. Confident your syntax is correct, you decide to complete the remaining 
syntax for NSW. 
 
QUESTION 4  
What syntax do you write for postcode ranges 2619-2899 and 2921-2999?  
ANSWER:  replace state_code = 2 if inrange(postcode,2619,2899) 
 replace state_code = 2 if inrange(postcode,2921,2999) 
 
inrange 
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11. And do so again for ACT and the other states and territories 
 
QUESTION 5  
(a) What syntax do you write for the ACT postcodes? 
 ANSWER:  replace state_code = 1 if inrange(postcode,200,299) 
replace state_code = 1 if inrange(postcode,2600,2618) 
replace state_code = 1 if inrange(postcode,2900,2920) 
 
(b) What syntax do you write for the VIC postcodes? 
 ANSWER:  replace state_code = 4 if inrange(postcode,3000,3999) 
replace state_code = 4 if inrange(postcode,8000,8999) 
 
(c) What syntax do you write for the QLD postcodes? 
 ANSWER:  replace state_code = 7 if inrange(postcode,4000,4999) 
replace state_code = 7 if inrange(postcode,9000,9999) 
 
(d) What syntax do you write for the SA postcodes? 
 ANSWER:  replace state_code = 5 if inrange(postcode,5000,5999) 
 
(e) What syntax do you write for the WA postcodes? 
 ANSWER:  replace state_code = 8 if inrange(postcode,6000,6999) 
 
(f) What syntax do you write for the TAS postcodes? 
ANSWER:  replace state_code = 3 if inrange(postcode,7000,7999) 
 
(g) What syntax do you write for the NT postcodes? 
 ANSWER:  replace state_code = 6 if inrange(postcode,800,999) 
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Assigning state codes to targeted and non-targeted jurisdictions 
12. The targeted jurisdictions (SA, NT, QLD and WA) have been coded above 
as values>4. You want to create a new variable called 
targeted_state_code, assigning a value of 1 within this new variable only if 
the corresponding values in the state_code variable are greater than 4. 
 
QUESTION 6 
What syntax do you write to create this new variable and assign a value = 
1 if the state_code variable is >4? 
 ANSWER:  gen targeted_state_code = 1 if state_code >4 
 
13. Now the non-targeted jurisdictions (ACT, NSW, TAS and VIC), these have 
been coded with values < 5. Again, you want to create a new variable 
called non_targeted_state_code, assigning a value of 1 within this new 
variable only if the corresponding values in the state code variable are less 
than 5. 
 
QUESTION 7 
What syntax do you write to create this new variable and assign a value = 
1 if the state_code variable is <5? 
ANSWER:  gen non_targeted_state_code = 1 if state_code <5 
 
14. Almost there. According to our boss’ instructions, we want to tabulate the 
number of Indigenous children from the targeted jurisdictions 
(targeted_state_code) only if their age is less than 5 years.  
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QUESTION 8 
In a single line, what syntax do you write to tabulate those individuals only 
who are in the targeted_state_code if their onset age was <5? 
ANSWER:  tab targeted_state_code if onset_age <5 
 
15. You do the same from the non_targeted jurisdictions, again for Indigenous 
children who were less than 5 years of age only. 
ANSWER:  tab non_targeted_state_code if onset_age <5 
 
16. At long last, the final step. Calculating the IRR and CI’s….yippppeeeee 
Using the immediate stata incidence-rate ratio command (iri), you want to 
use your r esults from the tables you constructed for Instruction 14 and 15. 
Using the following syntax 
IRI X Y X1 Y2  
where  
X is the total incidence of hepatitis A within the targeted 
jurisdiction of Indigenous children under the age of 5 years 
(Instruction 14) 
Y is the total incidence of hepatitis A within the non-targeted 
jurisdiction of Indigenous children under the age of 5 years 
(Instruction 15) 
X1 is the estimated population size for Indigenous children aged 
< 5 years in the targeted jurisdictions (originally given to you by 
your boss 46,290) 
Y1 is the estimated population size for Indigenous children aged 
< 5 years in the non-targeted jurisdictions (originally given to you 
by your boss 34,224) 
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QUESTION 9 
(a) What is the IRR and confidence intervals of hepatitis A disease among 
Indigenous children aged <5 years when you compare the targeted 
jurisdictions to that of the non-targeted jurisdiction? 
 ANSWER:  iri 11 27 46290 34224 
   IRR= 0.30 (CI95 0.13 – 0.63)  
 (b) Why do we use an incidence rate ratio calculation? 
 ANSWERS FROM THE GROUP: 
 We use an IRR calculation because it allows us to measure 
whether there is a statistically significant difference between 2 
rates. It gives us a confidence interval and a p-value to accept 
or reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference. 
 IRR tells us how many times higher the rate of hepatitis is in 
the targeted states than the non-targeted states. It gives an 
indication of the strength of association between incidence 
and the vaccination program. 
 Comparing rates of notifications of hepatitis A between 
targeted and non-targeted jurisdictions 
 So we can compare the incidence between vaccine provided 
jurisdictions to non-provided jurisdictions to see if the hep A 
vaccine is effective among indigenous children aged<5. If IRR 
is <1, it has a prevention fraction in the exposed population. 
 It compares the relationship between the number of 
notifications in the targeted jurisdictions and the non-targeted 
jurisdictions to give a measure of how many times greater one 
rate is compared to the other. 
 To compare the incidence of the targeted population against 
the non-targeted population 
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Congratulations. You have the result you need.  
But what does this mean?? 
You will need to interpret this result for your boss on Tuesday. You decide to 
provide answers for the following questions in the context of the targeted funding 
of the hepatitis A vaccine. 
 
During the teleconference meeting 
QUESTION 10 
(a) Are there few cases of hepatitis A notified from targeted jurisdictions 
compared to non-targeted jurisdictions? 
ANSWERS FROM THE GROUP: 
 Yes there are fewer cases of hepatitis A in targeted 
jurisdictions 
 11 versus 27 (ie less than half the number of cases). The rate, 
though, is 0.00024 vs 0.00079, so the ratio is around a third of 
the cases in non-targeted jurisdictions 
 Yes, 11 cases of hepatitis A were notified from targeted 
jurisdictions compared to 27 notifications from non-targeted 
jurisdictions 
 
(b) Are the numbers of cases significantly different between the two 
jurisdictions? 
ANSWERS FROM THE GROUP: 
 Yes the rate is significantly different between targeted and 
non-targeted jurisdictions 
 Yes (p=0.0004) 
 Yes, the confidence interval of the incidence rate ratio does not 
cross one and the p-value for the one-tailed test is < 0.05 
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(c) What is the difference between the two different p-values that you have 
been provided with by Stata?  
ANSWERS FROM THE GROUP:  
 0.0002 (0.0004 vs 0.0002) - 1 p value tests for statistical 
significance in one direction while the second p-value tests for 
statistical significance in both directions only one direction. 
The 2nd p value is to determine whether there is a relationship 
in any direction. ie. Is the null hypothesis rejected either 
because it is smaller or larger not just one. 
 The first is the result of a one-sided significance test, the 
second from a two-sided test. 
 p-values for one- and two-tailed tests 
 The bottom one is 2 x the one above; 0.0002x2=0.0004, One 
and two-sided exact significant tests? 
 The “midp” ones? …0.0002. or conceptually? I think 
conceptually, the “2*PR” one is two-tailed, so gives the 
probability of the difference between the targeted and non-
targeted jurisdictions in two directions, so the difference being 
either lower or higher… but the “Pr” one is one-tailed so is the 
probability of the difference either being higher or lower… 
does that make sense?! 
 1st is the 1 tailed fisher exact p value and the 2nd is the 2 tailed 
fisher exact p value. 
 
(d) What are the main limitations of the results you have generated?  
ANSWERS FROM THE GROUP: 
 There are only small numbers, how many are of unknown 
Indigenous status? 
 did the targeted vaccination of Indigenous kids also have an 
effect on non-Indigenous kids - we didn’t measure that  
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 There are postcodes that cross jurisdictions so people could 
have been incorrectly classified into different states. 
 Don’t know how IRs changed over time – the rate ratio may not 
have changed since previous years 
 IRR is measure of association only, not causation 
 don’t know what other factors may have led to lower incidence 
in targeted states (real or artefact) 
 Only notified cases are included (those children sought health 
care and tested) 
 Don’t know vaccination history of cases 
 Postcode – place of diagnosis may not be place of residence 
(Indigenous population may be highly mobile)  
 Are the population data provided for Indigenous children 
specifically or for all children? 
 The incidence is a crude rate, with no person-time at risk. 
 Not sure if the cases are vaccinated (fully or partially) or not? 
 Don’t know about other confounding factors, such as 
vaccination coverage in those states 
 You are only able to compare targeted against untargeted 
 You have not compared individual targeted states 
 You are using estimates of your target population and non-
targeted populations 
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(e) What additional information would you like to be provided with for 
further analysis of hepatitis A in Australia? 
ANSWERS FROM THE GROUP: 
 I would like to know the numbers of people with unknown 
Indigenous status notified with Hep A. I'd like to know a cost 
analysis of the program 
 I'd like to know, seeing as though this has been successful, if it 
can be applied to other populations in Australia that are over 
notified (to provide further herd vaccination) 
 I suppose in terms of general Hep A analysis I'd like to know 
the age and sex and ethnographic breakdown as time 
continues so we can target different populations in the future 
 I might also like to know more about risk factors and how this 
has changed since the vaccination program. 
 incidence over previous years 
 Vaccination coverage in targeted jurisdictions 
 Vaccination history of cases and ‘controls’ – look at protective 
effect of vaccine (case control study) 
 Secondary benefits of vaccinating children – e.g. less hepatitis 
A in adults due to vaccination in children 
 What is the sero prevalence of hep A immunity among 
indigenous children aged <5 to estimate population at risk. 
 Is there any difference of the vaccine effectiveness in different 
age groups? 
 What makes at risk groups at risk? - barriers and facilitators to 
vaccination 
 Actual number of people under 5 vaccinated for hepatitis A in 
each state 
 Actual target population numbers of age under 5 
END OF EXERCISE 
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6.4 MAE Teaching Exercise for Cohort MAE 16 
Administering questionnaires when conducting an outbreak investigation 
 
6.4.2 Overall purpose of session: 
1. To introduce some of the considerations (and challenges) associated with 
conducting interviews as part of outbreak investigations  
2. To provide a practical exercise to give an experience of interviewing 
(especially for those who are more green among the group) and to 
illustrate strategies to overcome challenges we have identified. 
 
6.4.3 Objectives: 
By the end of this session, MAE2016 will students will have the skills and 
knowledge regarding: 
a) How to deal with interviewees who are concerned about the privacy of 
their information collected as part of the interview process  
b) Some techniques you can use to maximise interviewee recall of 
information 
c) How keep an interview on track while also managing additional information 
about the investigation which interviewees may disclose as part of an open 
ended question 
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6.4.4 Introductions of MAE2015 presenting session 
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6.4.5 Scenario 
You have just arrived at the Victorian Department of Health to take up a post as 
an epidemiologist. Your new manager - Dr Bilirubin – asks you to investigate a 
possible outbreak of Hepatitis A amongst the local population.  
 
 
Dr Bilirubin provides you with the names, contact telephone numbers and 
laboratory results that have just arrived for three individuals with laboratory 
confirmed Hepatitis A, as well as a questionnaire used by the public health unit to 
investigate outbreaks. Your task is to contact one of these cases and using the 
information provided to you, conduct an interview in an attempt to try and identify 
the potential source of infection. Dr Bilirubin also suggests you have a calendar 
handy when you call and mentions as she walks away: “interviews are like a box 
of chocolates – you never know what you’re gonna get”. 
 
 
6.4.6 Important information about Hepatitis A - Occurrence and 
transmission 
The Hepatitis A virus replicates in the liver, is excreted in bile and shed in the 
stool. As such, transmission occurs predominantly via the faecal-oral route and 
the incidence of disease is higher in countries where hygiene and environmental 
sanitation are poor. Worldwide, most infection results from exposure to 
contaminated food or water. 
Hepatitis A notifications in Victoria:           
August 2015 - February 2016 
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In industrialised countries such as Australia, infection with Hepatitis A is more 
likely to occur: 
 amongst household and sexual contacts of an acute case 
 in childcare centres with children in nappies 
 following overseas travel to countries with endemic Hepatitis A (Asia, 
Africa, South-Pacific, Central and South America) 
 amongst injecting drug users 
 from outbreaks 
 
Although infrequent, foodborne outbreaks of Hepatitis A have occurred in 
Australia, including large outbreaks associated with consumption of contaminated 
raw oysters (1997) and semidried tomatoes (2009), and more recently, 
associated with frozen berries (2015). 
 
Incubation period and clinical illness 
The average incubation period is 28-30 days (range 14-50 days, or approx 2-7 
weeks). The disease can vary from an asymptomatic illness lasting 1 – 2 weeks 
to a severely disabling disease that can persist for several months. Approximately 
10% - 50% of infected infants and children (< five years of age), and 70% - 95% 
of infected adults have recognisable clinical symptoms that initially include: fever, 
malaise, anorexia, nausea and abdominal pain, followed by jaundice, dark urine 
and pale-coloured stools. 
Testing of serum samples can provide serological evidence of recent Hepatitis A 
infection. 
During case follow up, the date of onset of jaundice is often used to determine 
the incubation (and exposure) period. 
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6.4.7 Practical exercise 
During a 15 minute break out exercise, each person in the MAE16 each had the 
opportunity to conduct a 1:1 interview one of these "types" of cases. Cases 
(interviewees) were the cohort member of MAE15, and each were assigned one 
of the three following scenarios to follow during the interview.  
Each person in the MAE16 were given a mock hepatitis A questionnaire, a mock 
calendar (as an aide for the interview) and the Pathology results for their 
interviewee. All of the resources used during the teaching session are as follows. 
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Scenario A – prompting memory recall 
. 
You are the interviewee, Indra Pina, aged 32 (DOB: 25 June 1983), 
resident of Melbourne. You were born in Australia but are of Indian 
heritage (your parents are Indian).  
You are very busy and have a poor memory. Your first response to 
every question is that “I Really can’t remember”, and emphasize that 
“it was a long time ago”. 
Mainly use the ‘history of illness’ and ‘details’ columns to guide your 
responses.  
Hopefully the interviewer will use a calendar, to remind you of 
weekend activities, public holidays or major events and prompt your 
recall. 
It is important that you disclose/confirm that you got jaundice on 14 February 2016. You may 
need to assist the MAE in determining the acquisition period (14-50 days prior to jaundice onset: 
29 Dec 15 to 1 Feb 16) 
If the MAE says any ‘unusual’ terms (jaundice, acquisition period) ask for clarification. Please 
make sure that you allow the MAE16 to complete the interview in the allocated time. 
Symptoms Onset Date of 
Symptom 
History of illness 
Diarrhoea Yes  
 
10/2/2016 
(continued for 3 
days) 
Diarrhoea on the day after Indian Independence Day 
lunch ( January 26) but you put that down to spicy 
Indian food you ate at the lunch  
You remember feeling sick (nausea, headache) at 
work one day a week or so after that initial episode 
and vomited. Then the diarrhoea started after 
lunch. (When prompted.... It was awkward as you 
had a team meeting that day the director of your 
company attended....team meetings are usually on 
Wednesdays,....you had cake at the meeting for 
your Manager’s 10 year anniversary....your manager 
said “10 on the 10
th
”...yeah it must have been Weds 
10 Feb) 
Diarrhoea wouldn’t stop for 3 days (you were 
supposed to go out on Friday night (12 Feb) for a 
friend’s birthday. You stayed away from work for 
two days and had a temperature on Thurs. 
You woke up one Sunday remember that your mum 
said you had yellow eyes. (When prompted....you 
cancelled your Valentine’s day dinner that night and 
cried for 3 days. Confirm that it was 14 Feb if asked 
by interviewer). 
Your eyes were still yellow the next day when 
someone at work commented. That afternoon you 
went to the Dr and that’s when you got tested (had 
a blood sample taken). 
Nausea Yes 10/2/2016 
Vomiting Yes  10/2/2016 
Abdominal 
pain 
Yes   
10/2/2016 
Jaundice Yes 14/2/2016 
Headache Yes 10/2/2016 
Fever Yes 11/2/2016 
Other Nil  
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Exposures 
Exposure Details Date(s) 
Did you travel overseas during your 
acquisition period? 
 No  
Last time you were overseas was in January 2008 to 
Mumbai. 
2008 
Did you attend any restaurants during 
your acquisition period?         Yes  
There was an Indian Independence Day luncheon at a 
restaurant you went to (on Tuesday 26 January). You 
think the restaurant was called Bombay by Night. 
(Only disclose the following if the interviewer prompts 
your recall.... You went to breakfast with friends at the 
Top Paddock Café in Richmond and you had hot cakes 
with friends that had berries and fresh cream. You 
remember this because it because it tasted so good, 
especially as you tasted some of your friend’s Eggs 
Benedict and the sauce on the top tasted a bit 
strange...it was on the weekend before the 
Independence Day lunch because your friends were 
visiting all week from interstate). 
26/1/2016 
 
 
(23/1/2016) 
 
Did you attend any major sporting 
events during your incubation period 
where you ate take-away food?          
 Yes  
You went to the 1 day cricket one weekend in January 
at the MCG with your dad and watched the cricket 
which was Australia and India. 
(When prompted: Sunday January 17, and ate chips 
only.) 
 
(You also went to the Australian Open on Saturday 30 
Jan, but only remember this when asked the question 
below) 
17/1/2016 
Did you consume any foods containing 
frozen berries during your incubation 
period? 
Yes 
Mention you ate berries and cream “at the tennis”.  
(If the interviewer prompts you, say it was a Saturday 
and you saw the women’s final – a friend had a spare 
ticket..confirm it was 30 Jan if asked)  
30/1/2016 
 
Did you consume any raw 
seafood/shellfish during your 
incubation period? 
No 
Vegetarian  
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Scenario B – Concerns about privacy 
 
You are the interviewee, Tony Fratelli, aged 54 (DOB: 
28/9/61), resident of Melbourne. You are a 
businessman who lives in Melbourne CBD. 
You are VERY concerned about why you are being 
contacted: how did you get my details? I thought this 
was between me and my doctor? What is this 
information going to be used for?  
You even ask for the name of the interviewer and 
their position and phone number. You are reluctant at 
each question and continually seek assurance re: 
privacy and confidentiality. 
Mainly use the ‘history of illness’ and ‘details’ columns to guide your responses.  
Hopefully the interviewer will use a calendar, to remind you of weekend activities, public 
holidays or major events and prompt your recall. 
It is important that you disclose/confirm that you got jaundice on 14 February 2016. You may 
need to assist the MAE in determining the acquisition period (14-50 days prior to jaundice onset: 
29 Dec 15 to 1 Feb 16) 
If the MAE says any ‘unusual’ terms (jaundice, acquisition period) ask for clarification. Please 
make sure that you allow the MAE16 to complete the interview in the allocated time. 
Symptoms Onset Date of 
Symptom 
History of illness 
Diarrhoea Yes  
 
10/2/2016 
(3 days duration) 
(Express some concern about the personal nature of 
this information that you are disclosing) 
Diarrhoea initially on Wednesday 10
th
 February. 
Remembers feeling sick at work that day (nausea, 
headache) which made it hard to concentrate in an 
important client meeting. 
Diarrhoea wouldn’t stop for 3 days and your 
stomach was cramping a lot. You felt really hot on 
Thurs 11, you could have had a fever, but it might 
have just been a hot day. 
When you woke up on Sunday 14 Feb, your wife 
told you that you had yellow eyes.  
Your eyes were still yellow on the Tuesday of that 
week (16 Feb) and your wife insisted she take you 
to the doctor.  
That afternoon you went to the Dr and that’s when 
you got a blood sample taken. 
 
Nausea Yes 10/2/2016 
Vomiting No  
Abdominal 
pain 
Yes  
10/2/2016 
Jaundice Yes 14/2/2016 
Headache Yes 10/2/2016 
Fever Yes 11/2/2016 
Other Nil  
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Exposures 
Exposure Details Date(s) 
Did you travel overseas during your 
incubation period? 
 No  
(Ask why this is important and how this relates to 
having Hep A) 
Last time you went overseas was in December 2014 to 
London. 
2014 
Did you attend any restaurants during 
your incubation period?         Yes  
(Indicate your concern that you don’t want this 
information to get back to the restaurant, because you 
frequently have business meetings there) 
Went to restaurant at Crown Casino on Fri 23 Jan. Ate 
steak tartare, there was a raw egg on top. 
23/1/2016 
Did you attend any major sporting 
events during your incubation period 
where you ate take-away food?          
 Yes  
Went to the cricket at the MCG on January 17 and 
which was Australia and India. Was in a corporate box, 
but only had beer. (You might be concerned that the 
Hepatitis might be related to drinking, also ask that they 
don’t mention anything to his wife as he is supposed to 
be reducing how much he drinks) 
Was in a corporate box at the Australian Open tennis on 
the last Sat for the women’s final (30 Jan) and ate loads 
of canapés and had some red wine. (Reitterate drinking 
concern) Rattle off all the canapés you can think of and 
at the end also mention they had big sundae glasses full 
of berries and cream. 
Cricket Sun 17 
Jan 
Tennis Sat 30 
Jan 
Did you consume any foods containing 
frozen berries during your incubation 
period? 
Yes 
Berries and cream at the Australian Open. 30/1/2016 
 
Did you consume any raw 
seafood/shellfish during your incubation 
period? 
No 
Allergic to shellfish  
 
 
  
Chapter Six  Teaching 
 
244 | P a g e  
 
Scenario C – Off topic interviewee 
 
You are the interviewee, Wendy de Waffler, aged 25 (DOB 29 
Jan 1991), who is a young single mother from Ballarat. You 
have an opinion on just about everything and are easily side 
tracked.  
You love a chat and will easily stray away from the questions 
you are asked. You will not initially respond yes or no but will 
embark on wild and elaborate stories. Waffle on a bit but the 
responses you need to provide are below. 
Mainly use the ‘history of illness’ and ‘details’ columns to 
guide your responses.  
Hopefully the interviewer will use a calendar, to remind you 
of weekend activities, public holidays or major events recall. 
It is important that you disclose/confirm that you got jaundice on 14 February 2016. You may 
need to assist the MAE in determining the acquisition period (14-50 days prior to jaundice onset: 
29 Dec 15 to 1 Feb 16) 
If the MAE says any ‘unusual’ terms (jaundice, acquisition period) ask for clarification. Although 
we encourage you to free style a bit, please make sure that you get the key food items and 
exposure dates across and allow the MAE16 to complete the interview in the allocated time. 
Symptoms Onset Date of 
Symptom 
History of illness 
Diarrhoea Yes  
 
10/2/2016 
(3 days 
duration) 
Diarrhoea on Wednesday 10
th
 February. 
Remember watching My Kitchen Rules and 
having to run to the toilet. Had a headache 
that day, but didn’t think it was unusual – 
always have a headache (the kids drive you 
crazy!) 
Diarrhoea wouldn’t stop for 3 days. 
Woke up on the Sunday morning and you 
boyfriend told you that you looked yellow. 
Remember it was Sunday morning of 
14/2/2014 because it was Valentines Day. 
Went to the Dr on the 15/2/2016 and got 
tested because that was the day that the free 
bulk billing Dr was open so you waited until 
then. 
 
(You also had a headache on 30 Jan – you’d 
been out the night before for your birthday). 
 
 
Nausea 
Yes 
Always feels 
nauseous 
Vomiting No   
Abdominal 
pain 
Yes   
10/2/2016 
Jaundice Yes 14/2/2016 
Headache Yes 10/2/2016 
Fever Yes 11/2/2016 
Other Yes – go nuts and 
mention whatever 
you like 
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Exposures 
Exposure Details Date(s) 
Did you attend travel overseas 
during your incubation period? 
 No  
Never been overseas – feel free to waffle on 
about how she always wanted to go somewhere 
but then you had kids. 
 
Did you attend any restaurants 
during your incubation period?         
Yes  
Went to Sizzler on Friday January 29
th
 because it 
was your birthday. Waffle on about what you ate, 
you ate from the salad bar and had loads of soft 
serve for dessert. Went to a pub afterwards. 
29/1/2016 
Did you attend any major sporting 
events during your incubation 
period where you ate take-away 
food?          
 Yes  
You took the train to Melbourne and went to the 
Australian Open for the women’s final (the last 
Saturday in January) and ate about 10 cups of 
berries and cream. You go every year and get a 
ground pass and eat the berries and cream, except 
this year your boyfriend took you as a surprise for 
your birthday to Rod Laver Arena. 
30/1/2016 
 
Did you consume any foods 
containing frozen berries during 
your incubation period? 
Yes 
Berries and cream at the Australian Open. 
Before you went to the tennis your boyfriend 
made you a smoothie at home on 30 January 
because you were hungover after your birthday – 
you are pretty sure the smoothie had frozen 
berries (dunno how long they had been in the 
freezer), but he did make you a fried egg (eggs are 
dodgy, right?). 
30/1/2016 
Did you consume any raw 
seafood/shellfish during your 
incubation period? 
Yes 
Went with the whole family to the beach on New 
Years Eve in Portland Victoria and ate raw oysters. 
Your brother bought them from Coles in Portland, 
they could have been a bit off because they tasted 
a bit slimy. 
31/12/2016 
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Mock hepatitis A questionnaire 
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Mock calendar 
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Pathology results for Scenario A 
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Pathology results for Scenario B 
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Pathology results for Scenario C 
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6.4.8 Evaluation of the teaching exercise 
Once the session had been completed, we asked the MAE16 members for some 
feedback.  
 
Table 6.2: Average evaluation scores from MAE16 members 
(Likert scale: 5 = strongly agree and 1 = strongly disagree) 
Score Average 
Content 4.8 
Instructor presentation 4.7 
Methods 4.8 
Learned something new 4.6 
Engagement 4.7 
Asking questions 4.7 
 
The session was well received, with positive and constructive comments 
received:  
 A little bit more about the other personality types 
 This was awesome, a great idea! Maybe more or an opportunity to 
experience all scenarios? 
 Good interactive session 
 Well done MAE 2015 
 No improvements required 
 Really helpful; gave some good ideas to help when interviewing 
 All very interactive sessions; solidified concepts; skills learned in the 
course block 
 Good session, good idea to present people with experience(?)
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7.1 Journal article published at ‘Vaccine’ 
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7.2 Journal article published at ‘Epidemiology and Infection’ 
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